Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
In the fall of 2006, the Second Circuit ruled on appeals from the jury trials in two huge insurance cases: SR International Business Insurance Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties, LLC, 467 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2006) ('Swiss Re'), and Olin Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 468 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2006). Both cases went to a jury verdict in 2005 against fairly overwhelming odds. Commentators have widely observed that jury trials are a disappearing breed. In 2002, only 1.8% of civil cases in federal courts and only 0.6% of civil cases in state courts went to jury trial. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1 (3), 459-570 (2004); Brian J. Ostrom, et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976'2002, J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1 (3), 755-782 (2004). Moreover, both cases define high stakes, mega-insurance litigation: complex fact patterns, major corporate policyholders and insurers, billions of dollars in insurance coverage, and disputes closely watched by the press and public. Given this context, it is fairly extraordinary that the parties in Swiss Re and Olin let a jury of 'peers' determine the outcome of their disputes. The trial proceedings and appellate review in these cases are worthy of study for insurance litigators hoping or planning for a jury trial of their own.
In Swiss Re, the Second Circuit upheld the jury verdicts in both phases of a bifurcated jury trial dealing with recovery under the first-party property insurance covering the World Trade Center complex on 9/11. In the first phase, the jury found nine out of 12 insurers and the London syndicates bound their coverage under a form originally generated by the policyholder's broker, known as the WilProp form. The Second Circuit had previously ruled that under the 'occurrence' definition in the WilProp form, the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center was treated as one occurrence. In the second phase, the jury determined that the nine insurers not bound by the WilProp form had contemplated a two-occurrence treatment of two airplanes crashing into the two towers of the World Trade Center.
In Olin, the Second Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment in a coverage dispute over the liability of Olin's third-party insurers for Olin's remediation costs at four sites near Niagara Falls, NY. The trial, which proceeded solely against certain excess London insurers, turned on the years during which property damage took place. Olin contended that the damage stopped when full remediation became necessary, while the London insurers contended that the damage did not stop until Olin began to remediate the four sites. The Second Circuit concluded that the trial judge erred in siding with Olin and instructing the jury that the passive spread of contamination after active dumping has stopped does not constitute property damage.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.