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Although the marital exception to rape and forcible sodomy remained on the legislative books, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Liberta, 64 NY2d 152 (1984), held that the exception ' which had previously shielded men from criminal liability for raping their wives ' was unconstitutional. It was a hard-won victory at the time for victims of such abuse and the feminist advocates behind them, but the extent of the protection the decision offered was limited; it applied only to rape and not to other sexual contacts that would be treated as crimes if perpetrated by anyone other than the victim's husband.
Nearly a decade later, the right of a married women to say 'no' to sexual contact with her husband was extended by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in People v. Horvath, 183 A.D.2d 915 (1992). There, the court upheld the conviction of a husband for sexual abuse in the first-degree (two counts), attempted sexual abuse in the first degree and assault in the third degree. The court reasoned that sexual abuse in the first degree, like first-degree rape, involves the element of forcible compulsion and therefore is a criminal act regardless of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
Still, sexual assaults in the third degree against wives were rarely treated as criminal acts in New York, with one exception: In People v. Naylor, 196 AD2d 320 (1994), the Third Department held that the marital exception did not apply to sexual abuse in the third degree in the limited situation presented there, in which the parties, although married, had lived apart for years and were married in name only. Now, however, two cases in the Brooklyn Supreme Court, decided together Jan.12, have expanded the scope of criminal liability for husbands who cross the line; in People v. Alexis, '- N.Y.S.2d ”, 2007 WL 92732 (N.Y.Sup., 1/12/07), Justice John M. Leventhal ruled that although the Penal Law defines 'sexual contact' as the touching of the 'intimate parts' of a person 'not married to the actor,' there is no constitutional basis for an exception when the parties are married.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?