Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals issued its decision in McSparron v. McSparron, 87 NYS2d 275 (1995), thereby abolishing the merger doctrine with respect to the valuation of professional licenses. However, in McSparron, the Court of Appeals warned that in distributing the value of such licenses, duplication must be avoided by ensuring that maintenance awards are not based on the same earnings already used in calculating the license value.
Five years later, in Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 NY2d 696 (2000), the Court of Appeals expanded on this 'double-dipping' theme, stating that '[o]nce a court converts a specific stream of income into an asset, that income may no longer be calculated into the maintenance formula and payout' [citations omitted]. While Grunfeld dealt specifically with whether the husband's license income was being double counted in the determination of the wife's maintenance award, it also involved a capitalization of the value of the husband's law practice, which was distributed as a marital asset. The excess earnings ' that is, the husband's earnings in excess of reasonable compensation ' used in the valuation of the husband's law practice were not used in determining the wife's maintenance award, since that would have violated the double counting proscribed by McSparron. (Subsequent appellate division cases have similarly applied the double-counting principle to businesses that are valued and distributed in divorce actions. See e.g. Murphy v.Murphy, 6 AD3d 678 (2nd Dept. 2004); Sodaro v. Sodaro, 286 AD2d 434, (2nd Dept. 2001); Douglas v. Douglas, 281 AD2d 709 (3rd Dept. 2001). Practitioners should consider, however, that to the extent a spouse does not receive a 50% distribution of a license or business, earnings deriving from the undistributed value would be available in the consideration of a maintenance award.)
While New York courts have struggled in recent years to apply the principles set forth in McSparron and Grunfeld, the recent Court of Appeals decision in Keane v. Keane, 8 NY3d 115 (2006) may serve to complicate matters even further.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?