Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Attorney-Client Privilege. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that Arachnid Inc., a plaintiff in a computer-jukebox patent suit, had waived in limited scope its attorney-client privilege when its lawyer failed to object to the disclosure of attorney advice about the patent during the deposition of a former employee in a prior lawsuit. (Arachnid's lawyer had represented both Arachnid and the former employee in the prior litigation.) Rowe International Corp. v. ECast Inc., 06 C 2703. Plaintiff Arachnid Inc. had obtained a patent for jukeboxes that delivered digital music. Rowe International and Arachnid later filed a patent-infringement suit. During discovery, defendant ECast sought production of 'all privileged communications (including the 'patent reports') concerning the patentability of the inventions claimed in the patents-in-suit, [a prior, similar] Patent, communications relating to the preparation and prosecution of the applications of the patents-in-suit, and communications concerning inventorship.'
The district court additionally found that 'even if [Arachnid counsel John] Held's failure to object at the [prior suit] deposition' to statements by former employee Michael Tillery about counsel's advice on the computer-jukebox patent 'did not waive Arachnid's privilege, Arachnid most certainly waived the privilege when it provided a copy of Tillery's deposition transcript to the [Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)]. It is hard to imagine a more 'knowing disclosure' than making the substance of a privileged communication part of the public record.' But the district court went on to note: 'On the other hand, the Court rejects defendants' contention that the waiver extends to the other patents in suit, inventorship, and issues of patentability generally. Courts narrowly construe the scope of waiver in patent cases.'
ECast also claimed the attorney-client privilege had been waived by the crime-fraud exception because Held had told the PTO '[a]lthough superficially similar,' the prior similar patent 'is, upon close analysis, fundamentally different from applicant's invention.' But the district court emphasized: 'Defendants contend that this statement and others like it are fraudulent because the patent reports reveal that Held believed that [the prior similar patent] blocked patents for inventions such as computer jukebox systems. Held's statements to the PTO do not implicate the crime-fraud exception because he did not misrepresent material facts. Rather, Held's statements constituted legal argument.'
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?