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More and more often insureds are being forced to litigate with their insurers to protect rights under insurance policies, while at the same time those insureds must actively defend against the very litigation for which they seek insurance coverage. Indeed, insurers often will pursue litigation against their insureds to establish the absence of any coverage obligation if there appears to be a question regarding the existence of a defense or indemnity obligation with respect to underlying litigation. Alternatively, due to potentially applicable statutes of limitation, or a need to seek judicial intervention to force an insurer to assist in an underlying defense for which the insurer has refused coverage, an insured may be required to file coverage litigation before underlying litigation is concluded.
In either circumstance, the insured can be prejudiced by being forced to litigate on 'two fronts,' expending resources in coverage litigation that should be reserved to adequately defend against the underlying litigation. Additionally, to the extent that insurers seek to rely upon issues being litigated in an underlying action as the basis to avoid coverage, there is a clear risk that the insured will be required to litigate the same issues in two different courts before two different judges. This is inefficient and can lead to inconsistent results to the detriment of the insured. Underlying defense counsel also could be required to become involved in the coverage action, in an effort to ensure that issues at the heart of the underlying action are adequately resolved in the coverage litigation. This, of course, further depletes resources that should be focused solely upon defeating the claims in the underlying action. Indeed, allowing an insurer to attack its insured in coverage litigation on the same grounds asserted by underlying plaintiffs in underlying litigation, instead of assisting its insured in its defense against those very claims, is counterintuitive to the concept of insurance.
As a result, courts across the country repeatedly have recognized that the dangers inherent in permitting insurers to seek prejudicial discovery and to litigate against their insureds before the factual issues in the underlying lawsuit have been determined warrant a 'stay' of the coverage action. Stays have been granted even when the coverage litigation was initiated by the insured seeking the stay, and without any consideration for possible prejudice that an insurer may suffer if the coverage action is staying pending resolution of the underlying action.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?