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In its 2006 report on 'Judicial Hellholes',' the American Tort Reform Association ('ATRA') identified the plaintiff bar's aggressive use of public nuisance theories in product liability litigation as one of the key 'rising flames' that is threatening traditional judicial protections for defendants in the country's most plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. As ATRA explained, 'personal injury lawyers and some attorneys general have been trying to move public nuisance theory far beyond its traditional boundaries in order to avoid the well-defined strictures of products liability law.' American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes 2006, at 9. In so doing, they seek to tilt the playing field dramatically in their favor by writing out of the common law a plaintiff's obligation of establishing actual causation, proximate causation, and control.
Historically, most courts have been properly resistant to this misuse of the public nuisance doctrine. See generally, Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 Washburn L.J. 541 (2006). These courts have recognized that the purpose of the public nuisance doctrine is to abate conduct that gives rise to injury to public lands or waterways or to rights common to the public as a whole, not to compensate individuals or entities allegedly injured by exposures to an alleged injurious product.
However, three recent developments have provided fuel for this 'rising flame' of public nuisance and threaten to fan the flames even higher. First, although the litigation in fact never tested plaintiffs' expanded use of public nuisance theories, the $368 billion settlement of lawsuits brought by state attorneys general against the tobacco industry demonstrated the coercive power of such lawsuits and, equally importantly, generously funded similar attacks on other industries. Second, state attorneys general and, increasingly, municipalities have turned to public nuisance theories against private industry as a means to fund general treasuries and to sidestep the constitutional checks and balances of the legislative and regulatory power. Third, plaintiffs enjoyed preliminary success with their first major trial victory in Rhode Island, where a jury found that the presence of deteriorating lead paint in public buildings gave rise to a public nuisance for which former manufacturers of lead paint could be held liable. See Richard O. Faulk and John S. Gray, The Mouse That Roared?: Novel Public Nuisance Theory Runs Amok in Rhode Island, Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper Series No. 146 (March 2007).
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