Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Delaware courts are beginning to analyze claims concerning the controversial practice of spring-loading options. Spring-loading is the granting of options just prior to the release of favorable company information (in the company's possession at the time of the grant). The options are granted at a market price on the day of the grant. They are said to be 'spring-loaded' because upon release of the favorable news, the stock price is expected to rise and the options would then become 'in-the-money.' While the practice has long been the subject of academic debate and regulatory scrutiny, the judiciary has largely remained silent on the substance of this matter. Three recent opinions of the Delaware Chancery court are significant because they confirm that spring-loading may give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and they reveal the analytical framework that the Chancery court ' and other courts ' will likely use when deciding future claims. These early signals from the bench should be heeded by both practitioners and in-house counsel to corporations considering changes to equity-based executive compensation plans.
The Chancery Court Weighs-In
By most accounts, options manipulation began in the late 1990s. The use of options manipulation increased when technology and 'dot.com' companies had little cash, but substantial potential for future value. Published reports estimate that over 100 companies are (or have been) under investigation for various forms of options manipulation, including spring-loading. Academics have vigorously debated whether spring-loading could be shoehorned into a claim for insider trading (on the theory that the directors granting the options possess material, non-public information at the time of the grant), or whether spring-loading constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders because the practice is deceptive. Others, such as Commissioner Paul Atkins of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission ('SEC'), have suggested that there may be a legitimate business purpose for boards to spring-load. See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins: Remarks Before The International Corporate Governance Network on SEC.gov, http://www.sec.gov/ news/ speech/2006/spch070606psa.htmnews/speech/2006/spch070606psa.htm (last viewed on April 14, 2008) ('In approving the grant, the directors may determine that they can grant fewer options to get the same economic effect because they anticipate that the share price will rise. Who are we to second-guess that decision?'). Until recently, the judiciary has largely declined to weigh-in on this debate.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?