NJ & CT News

New Jersey

No 'Fourth Pony' Without Justification

Invoking the “three pony rule,” an appellate court granted the appeal of former New York Giants defensive end Michael Strahan from an $18,000-a-month child-support obligation imposed in conjunction with his 2006 divorce. The court, in Strahan v. Strahan, A-3747-06, held that the trial judge did not make the specific findings of fact necessary to uphold his decision to add $200,000 a year to the $35,984 annual award that Strahan's daughters are entitled to under statutory guidelines. The appellate court relied for support of its decision on In re Patterson, 920 P.2d 450 (Kan. App. 1996), which said, “[N]o child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs to be provided [with] more than three ponies.” Saying the demands of the mother and children may have amounted to a “fourth pony” ' for example, one of the girls reportedly would refuse to leave the house unless she had a new purse ' the appellate court refused to uphold the child support order because the lower court had made no distinction between which “needs” were reasonable and which were not.

Connecticut

Magistrate's Order Modification Exceeded Authority

In the absence of a hearing or a motion to the court, a magistrate exceeded her statutory authority when, with what appeared to be good intentions, the magistrate retroactively modified an order of support. Commissioner of Social Services v. Pearson, Ansonia/Milford J.D., at Milford (Doc. No. FA07-4007492S) (Turner, J. ' July 10, 2008). In 2007, a magistrate ordered the defendant, Marcus Pearson II, to pay $80 per week as child support, plus $8 per week toward a child support arrearage. The State of Connecticut appealed, and a trial court reversed and remanded, ordering the magistrate to enter a child support arrearage based on the minimum wage. On remand, the magistrate took the case on the papers and did not follow orders to enter a child support arrearage based on the minimum wage. The magistrate, sua sponte, appointed an attorney to represent the defendant, without any request from the defendant, or any finding that the defendant was indigent. There was no advance notice to the parties. The magistrate issued the finding about the child support arrearage, as ordered, but modified the defendant's current child support and child support arrearage to zero. The state appealed, arguing the magistrate lacked the authority to appoint an attorney to represent the defendant or to modify the support order. C.G.S. '46b-231 provides, “The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is . . . in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate.” Because there was no evidence the defendant was indigent or that a motion for contempt was filed, the magistrate exceeded her authority when appointing counsel. Apparently, the magistrate assumed the defendant faced a risk of going to jail, although no motion for contempt had been filed yet, and assumed the defendant could prove he was indigent, although no hearing was held on that issue. The magistrate exceeded her authority when she modified the support order, although there was no motion before the court, and violated the incarcerated defendant's due-process rights, because she did not hold a hearing on modification. The trial court vacated and remanded.

New Jersey

No 'Fourth Pony' Without Justification

Invoking the “three pony rule,” an appellate court granted the appeal of former New York Giants defensive end Michael Strahan from an $18,000-a-month child-support obligation imposed in conjunction with his 2006 divorce. The court, in Strahan v. Strahan, A-3747-06, held that the trial judge did not make the specific findings of fact necessary to uphold his decision to add $200,000 a year to the $35,984 annual award that Strahan's daughters are entitled to under statutory guidelines. The appellate court relied for support of its decision on In re Patterson, 920 P.2d 450 (Kan. App. 1996), which said, “[N]o child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs to be provided [with] more than three ponies.” Saying the demands of the mother and children may have amounted to a “fourth pony” ' for example, one of the girls reportedly would refuse to leave the house unless she had a new purse ' the appellate court refused to uphold the child support order because the lower court had made no distinction between which “needs” were reasonable and which were not.

Connecticut

Magistrate's Order Modification Exceeded Authority

In the absence of a hearing or a motion to the court, a magistrate exceeded her statutory authority when, with what appeared to be good intentions, the magistrate retroactively modified an order of support. Commissioner of Social Services v. Pearson, Ansonia/Milford J.D., at Milford (Doc. No. FA07-4007492S) (Turner, J. ' July 10, 2008). In 2007, a magistrate ordered the defendant, Marcus Pearson II, to pay $80 per week as child support, plus $8 per week toward a child support arrearage. The State of Connecticut appealed, and a trial court reversed and remanded, ordering the magistrate to enter a child support arrearage based on the minimum wage. On remand, the magistrate took the case on the papers and did not follow orders to enter a child support arrearage based on the minimum wage. The magistrate, sua sponte, appointed an attorney to represent the defendant, without any request from the defendant, or any finding that the defendant was indigent. There was no advance notice to the parties. The magistrate issued the finding about the child support arrearage, as ordered, but modified the defendant's current child support and child support arrearage to zero. The state appealed, arguing the magistrate lacked the authority to appoint an attorney to represent the defendant or to modify the support order. C.G.S. '46b-231 provides, “The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is . . . in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate.” Because there was no evidence the defendant was indigent or that a motion for contempt was filed, the magistrate exceeded her authority when appointing counsel. Apparently, the magistrate assumed the defendant faced a risk of going to jail, although no motion for contempt had been filed yet, and assumed the defendant could prove he was indigent, although no hearing was held on that issue. The magistrate exceeded her authority when she modified the support order, although there was no motion before the court, and violated the incarcerated defendant's due-process rights, because she did not hold a hearing on modification. The trial court vacated and remanded.