<b><i>Decision of Note:</i></b> FL Federal Court Has Jurisdiction Over TN Manager

The appeals court noted: “Lovelady maintains that he has no constitutionally significant contacts with Florida. He has no office, no agents, no employees or property in Florida. His sporadic travel to Florida in connection with his management of Carman and other music groups, he argues, is both constitutionally
insufficient and unrelated to this cause of action.” But the appeals court found that: “Lovelady is alleged to have committed an intentional tort against Carman ' using his trademarked name and his picture on a Web site accessible in Florida in a manner to imply Carman's endorsement of Lovelady and his products. The use was not negligent, but intentional. The purpose was to make money from Carman's implied endorsement. The unauthorized use of Carman's mark, therefore, individually targeted Carman in order to misappropriate his name and reputation for commercial gain. ' [T]he Florida plaintiff, injured by the intentional misconduct of a nonresident expressly aimed at the Florida plaintiff, is not required to travel to the nonresident's state of residence to obtain a remedy.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that a federal district court in Florida had personal jurisdiction over a Tennessee-based personal manager who used the indicia of a Florida musician on his Web site. Licciardello v. Lovelady, 07-14086.

Rendy Lovelady managed Christian music artist Carman Licciardello from 2000 to 2001. The Florida-based Licciardello filed suit in the Middle District of Florida, alleging that in 2006 Lovelady set up a Web site to promote his personal management business by including Licciardello's photograph and trademarked name. The district court dismissed the Lanham Act suit on the ground that Florida's long-arm statute didn't give the court personal jurisdiction over Lovelady.

Reversing and remanding, the appeals court decided that Licciardello's suit could be heard in Florida “because in this case the alleged infringement clearly also occurred in Florida by virtue of the Web site's accessibility in Florida.”

The appeals court noted: “Lovelady maintains that he has no constitutionally significant contacts with Florida. He has no office, no agents, no employees or property in Florida. His sporadic travel to Florida in connection with his management of Carman and other music groups, he argues, is both constitutionally
insufficient and unrelated to this cause of action.” But the appeals court found that: “Lovelady is alleged to have committed an intentional tort against Carman ' using his trademarked name and his picture on a Web site accessible in Florida in a manner to imply Carman's endorsement of Lovelady and his products. The use was not negligent, but intentional. The purpose was to make money from Carman's implied endorsement. The unauthorized use of Carman's mark, therefore, individually targeted Carman in order to misappropriate his name and reputation for commercial gain. ' [T]he Florida plaintiff, injured by the intentional misconduct of a nonresident expressly aimed at the Florida plaintiff, is not required to travel to the nonresident's state of residence to obtain a remedy.”