Counsel Concerns

Client's RICO Claim Against Lawyer Is Dismissed

A federal magistrate for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided that a radio talk show host failed to state a claim against his former lawyer under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). Meier v. Musburger, 08 C 216. Popular Chicago radio personality Garry Meier and attorney Todd W. Musburger had a falling out over the handling of Meier's contract renewal talks with WLS-AM in Chicago. A state court jury found for Musburger in the lawyer's suit for fees for his representation of Meier in the renegotiation. While that case was on appeal, Meier sued Musburger and Musburger's son, a non-lawyer, in federal court. According to Meier's complaint, Musburger for many years acted as “agent and exclusive legal representative for the negotiating and drafting of [Meier's] agreements in the entertainment fields of radio and television, in exchange for a fee of five percent (5%) of the gross amount of any employment compensation and income payable to [Meier] under each such agreement.”

The magistrate noted, among other things: “[T]he Complaint charges a scheme that consists of: 1) non-registration with the Illinois Department of Labor by Mr. Musburger and his son as an employment agency under the Illinois Private Employment Act; 2) use of the name, 'The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.' [which wasn't registered with the Illinois Supreme Court]; 3) breach of fiduciary duty in September 2003 when Mr. Meier was asked to sign an agreement allowing Mr. Musburger to simultaneously represent a competing talk show host; and 4) breach of fiduciary duty by Mr. Musburger when, a few months later, he submitted a bill for legal services that was allegedly excessive and included time for the services of his son who was not a lawyer.” In dismissing the federal suit, the magistrate emphasized that the duration of the alleged racketeering activity “covers a period of four to six months. That is an insufficient duration to show a pattern or to pose the kind of threat of continuing activity that RICO was designed to combat.”

Malpractice Suit Lacks Proximate Cause

The California Court of Appeal, Second District, in effect upheld dismissal of a malpractice complaint against a law firm that had represented the unhappy client in a dispute over the musical Jailhouse Rock. Sheridan v. Rintala, B199979. The Los Angeles firm of Rintala, Smoot, Jaenicke & Rees (Rintala) served as counsel to Rene Sheridan early in a suit brought by Sabrina LaBow alleging breach of a joint venture agreement by Sheridan to equally share income from Jailhouse Rock. Sheridan replaced Rintala with new counsel several months before the LaBow case trial. A jury awarded LaBow $100,000 on a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Sheridan. When Sheridan sued Rintala for malpractice, the trial court sustained Rintala's demurrer three times, finally without leave for Sheridan to further amend her complaint.

In her second-amended malpractice complaint against Rintala, Sheridan alleged, among other things, that Rintala failed to depose her colleagues who would have supported her position that LaBow wasn't involved in Jailhouse Rock. In California, to show malpractice, a client must prove that a better outcome would have occurred but for negligence by counsel. According to the Court of Appeal, Sheridan therefore had “to plead facts that, if believed, would establish a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury. ' But, we cannot see how failure to depose friendly witnesses could be malpractice, unless the witnesses were unavailable for trial. Sheridan did not allege any of Sheridan's colleagues were unavailable at the time of trial, nor did she allege any facts showing that her new counsel, in the four and a half months before trial, could not have obtained any desired testimony.”

Sheridan also claimed that Rintala failed to ask “critical questions” in deposing LaBow. But the Court of Appeal found in its unpublished opinion that: “Sheridan does not allege the nature of the 'critical questions' Rintala failed to ask; does not allege what critical questions LaBow refused to answer; and does not allege any facts showing how or why the failure to obtain answers to these (unidentified) questions operated to affect the verdict against her at the trial.”

Client's RICO Claim Against Lawyer Is Dismissed

A federal magistrate for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided that a radio talk show host failed to state a claim against his former lawyer under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). Meier v. Musburger , 08 C 216. Popular Chicago radio personality Garry Meier and attorney Todd W. Musburger had a falling out over the handling of Meier's contract renewal talks with WLS-AM in Chicago. A state court jury found for Musburger in the lawyer's suit for fees for his representation of Meier in the renegotiation. While that case was on appeal, Meier sued Musburger and Musburger's son, a non-lawyer, in federal court. According to Meier's complaint, Musburger for many years acted as “agent and exclusive legal representative for the negotiating and drafting of [Meier's] agreements in the entertainment fields of radio and television, in exchange for a fee of five percent (5%) of the gross amount of any employment compensation and income payable to [Meier] under each such agreement.”

The magistrate noted, among other things: “[T]he Complaint charges a scheme that consists of: 1) non-registration with the Illinois Department of Labor by Mr. Musburger and his son as an employment agency under the Illinois Private Employment Act; 2) use of the name, 'The Law Offices of Todd W. Musburger, Ltd.' [which wasn't registered with the Illinois Supreme Court]; 3) breach of fiduciary duty in September 2003 when Mr. Meier was asked to sign an agreement allowing Mr. Musburger to simultaneously represent a competing talk show host; and 4) breach of fiduciary duty by Mr. Musburger when, a few months later, he submitted a bill for legal services that was allegedly excessive and included time for the services of his son who was not a lawyer.” In dismissing the federal suit, the magistrate emphasized that the duration of the alleged racketeering activity “covers a period of four to six months. That is an insufficient duration to show a pattern or to pose the kind of threat of continuing activity that RICO was designed to combat.”

Malpractice Suit Lacks Proximate Cause

The California Court of Appeal, Second District, in effect upheld dismissal of a malpractice complaint against a law firm that had represented the unhappy client in a dispute over the musical Jailhouse Rock. Sheridan v. Rintala, B199979. The Los Angeles firm of Rintala, Smoot, Jaenicke & Rees (Rintala) served as counsel to Rene Sheridan early in a suit brought by Sabrina LaBow alleging breach of a joint venture agreement by Sheridan to equally share income from Jailhouse Rock. Sheridan replaced Rintala with new counsel several months before the LaBow case trial. A jury awarded LaBow $100,000 on a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Sheridan. When Sheridan sued Rintala for malpractice, the trial court sustained Rintala's demurrer three times, finally without leave for Sheridan to further amend her complaint.

In her second-amended malpractice complaint against Rintala, Sheridan alleged, among other things, that Rintala failed to depose her colleagues who would have supported her position that LaBow wasn't involved in Jailhouse Rock. In California, to show malpractice, a client must prove that a better outcome would have occurred but for negligence by counsel. According to the Court of Appeal, Sheridan therefore had “to plead facts that, if believed, would establish a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury. ' But, we cannot see how failure to depose friendly witnesses could be malpractice, unless the witnesses were unavailable for trial. Sheridan did not allege any of Sheridan's colleagues were unavailable at the time of trial, nor did she allege any facts showing that her new counsel, in the four and a half months before trial, could not have obtained any desired testimony.”

Sheridan also claimed that Rintala failed to ask “critical questions” in deposing LaBow. But the Court of Appeal found in its unpublished opinion that: “Sheridan does not allege the nature of the 'critical questions' Rintala failed to ask; does not allege what critical questions LaBow refused to answer; and does not allege any facts showing how or why the failure to obtain answers to these (unidentified) questions operated to affect the verdict against her at the trial.”