Verdicts

Juror's Dishonesty Did Not Prejudice the Plaintiff

When seeking a new trial based on a juror's dishonest answer during voir dire, a party must show that the misconduct prejudiced the outcome of the case, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on Dec. 11, 2008. Grundy v. Dhillon, 2008 WL 5234354, 2008 – Ohio – 6324 (Ohio, 12/11/08).

A jury delivered a defense verdict on claims that hospital and emergency medical staff negligently caused the death of Susanne Sumner. Her estate sought a new trial, asserting that, during jury selection, a juror had failed to disclose that he had a low opinion of the medical facility based on a family member's treatment there. The plaintiff alleged that this failure constituted misconduct warranting a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion. A state intermediate appellate court reversed and the defendants appealed.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the defense verdict. There was no evidence that the juror deliberately lied. Furthermore, if any party had reason to excuse the juror, it would have been the defendants. To obtain a new trial in such cases, the moving party first must demonstrate that a juror answered a material question dishonestly and that prejudice resulted, the court said. To do that, the moving party must show that the juror's accurate response would have provided a valid challenge. In weighing this issue, an appellate court may not substitute its opinion for the trial court's judgment “unless it appears that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable,” the court said. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion.

Ambulance Worker Not Liable Under Georgia Law

Georgia's statute immunizing ambulance workers from civil liability, as long as their organization is performing the emergency medical services for no remuneration, applied to the emergency medical technician in this case even though the ambulance company intended to charge plaintiff's decedent a fee to assist with defraying the administrative costs of operating the service. Presley v. City of Blackshear, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 5431177 (S.D.Ga., 12/31/08).

Plaintiff Administratrix of the Estate of the decedent, Antonio Presley, brought suit after the decedent died while in police custody for suspected cocaine possession. Presley had, in fact, consumed a large amount of cocaine at the time of the arrest in an attempt to hide the evidence. The decedent died from an overdose after having been treated and transported to a hospital by emergency medical technician David Farrior. The Administratrix made claims for medical malpractice and negligence against Farrior, a paramedic with Pierce County EMS. Farrier filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court here granted.

Farrior claimed in his motion for summary judgment that he was statutorily immune from liability for negligence and medical malpractice under Georgia law. The relevant Code Section provides:

(a) Any person, including agents and employees, who is licensed to furnish ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such emergency care to such victim.

…

(c) The immunity provided in this Code section shall apply only to those persons who perform the aforesaid emergency services for no remuneration. O.C.G.A. ' 31-11-8.

Plaintiff did not dispute the contention that Farrior was an employee of Pierce County EMS, which was licensed to provide ambulance services by the Georgia Department of Human Resources. In addition, plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that Farrior did not act in “good faith.” So, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence showed, at best, that Farrior's judgment was faulty, which would not support a finding of bad faith. See, e.g. Thomas v. DeKalb County, 489 S.E.2d 58 (Ga.Ct.App. 1997) (“Even if the paramedics exercised bad judgment and acted negligently, such does not amount to a lack of good faith.”).

The plaintiff claimed, however, that the statute did not apply because the decedent was supposed to have been charged for the ambulance services in accordance with Pierce County, GA, policy. The county bills those using a Pierce County EMS ambulance for two things: 1) a standard transportation fee; and 2) a mileage fee based upon the length of the transport. The monies collected from transport fees and mileage fees do not cover the budget for the operation of Pierce County EMS, but are used solely to assist with defraying the administrative costs of operating Pierce County EMS. With this in mind, the court looked to Ramsey v. Forest Park, 418 S.E.2d 432 (Ga.Ct.App. 1992), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals held that “a fee charged by a governmental organization to assist in defraying the administrative costs of 'transporting a person to a hospital' is not the equivalent of receiving remuneration for providing stated 'emergency care,' within the meaning of O.C.G.A. ' 31-11-8(c).” Relying on Ramsey, the court determined that Farrior was protected by the immunity statute, even though the decedent was to have been charged for the ambulance services received.

Juror's Dishonesty Did Not Prejudice the Plaintiff

When seeking a new trial based on a juror's dishonest answer during voir dire, a party must show that the misconduct prejudiced the outcome of the case, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on Dec. 11, 2008. Grundy v. Dhillon, 2008 WL 5234354, 2008 – Ohio – 6324 (Ohio, 12/11/08).

A jury delivered a defense verdict on claims that hospital and emergency medical staff negligently caused the death of Susanne Sumner. Her estate sought a new trial, asserting that, during jury selection, a juror had failed to disclose that he had a low opinion of the medical facility based on a family member's treatment there. The plaintiff alleged that this failure constituted misconduct warranting a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion. A state intermediate appellate court reversed and the defendants appealed.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the defense verdict. There was no evidence that the juror deliberately lied. Furthermore, if any party had reason to excuse the juror, it would have been the defendants. To obtain a new trial in such cases, the moving party first must demonstrate that a juror answered a material question dishonestly and that prejudice resulted, the court said. To do that, the moving party must show that the juror's accurate response would have provided a valid challenge. In weighing this issue, an appellate court may not substitute its opinion for the trial court's judgment “unless it appears that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable,” the court said. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion.

Ambulance Worker Not Liable Under Georgia Law

Georgia's statute immunizing ambulance workers from civil liability, as long as their organization is performing the emergency medical services for no remuneration, applied to the emergency medical technician in this case even though the ambulance company intended to charge plaintiff's decedent a fee to assist with defraying the administrative costs of operating the service. Presley v. City of Blackshear, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 5431177 (S.D.Ga., 12/31/08).

Plaintiff Administratrix of the Estate of the decedent, Antonio Presley, brought suit after the decedent died while in police custody for suspected cocaine possession. Presley had, in fact, consumed a large amount of cocaine at the time of the arrest in an attempt to hide the evidence. The decedent died from an overdose after having been treated and transported to a hospital by emergency medical technician David Farrior. The Administratrix made claims for medical malpractice and negligence against Farrior, a paramedic with Pierce County EMS. Farrier filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court here granted.

Farrior claimed in his motion for summary judgment that he was statutorily immune from liability for negligence and medical malpractice under Georgia law. The relevant Code Section provides:

(a) Any person, including agents and employees, who is licensed to furnish ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such emergency care to such victim.

…

(c) The immunity provided in this Code section shall apply only to those persons who perform the aforesaid emergency services for no remuneration. O.C.G.A. ' 31-11-8.

Plaintiff did not dispute the contention that Farrior was an employee of Pierce County EMS, which was licensed to provide ambulance services by the Georgia Department of Human Resources. In addition, plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that Farrior did not act in “good faith.” So, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence showed, at best, that Farrior's judgment was faulty, which would not support a finding of bad faith. See, e.g. Thomas v. DeKalb County , 489 S.E.2d 58 (Ga.Ct.App. 1997) (“Even if the paramedics exercised bad judgment and acted negligently, such does not amount to a lack of good faith.”).

The plaintiff claimed, however, that the statute did not apply because the decedent was supposed to have been charged for the ambulance services in accordance with Pierce County, GA, policy. The county bills those using a Pierce County EMS ambulance for two things: 1) a standard transportation fee; and 2) a mileage fee based upon the length of the transport. The monies collected from transport fees and mileage fees do not cover the budget for the operation of Pierce County EMS, but are used solely to assist with defraying the administrative costs of operating Pierce County EMS. With this in mind, the court looked to Ramsey v. Forest Park , 418 S.E.2d 432 (Ga.Ct.App. 1992), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals held that “a fee charged by a governmental organization to assist in defraying the administrative costs of 'transporting a person to a hospital' is not the equivalent of receiving remuneration for providing stated 'emergency care,' within the meaning of O.C.G.A. ' 31-11-8(c).” Relying on Ramsey , the court determined that Farrior was protected by the immunity statute, even though the decedent was to have been charged for the ambulance services received.