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Default Judgment
Where no reasonable excuse can be provided by either the defendant or the attorney for failure to file a timely answer, a default judgment may not be vacated. Baker f/k/a/ Lockridge v. Abdallah, Appeal No. 2007AP504, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District One, Aug. 19, 2008.
Baker leased space from Abdallah to operate a salon. When the lease term commenced, Baker discovered that the roof leaked, and asked Abdallah to fix it. Abdallah failed to repair the roof and Baker was unable to open her salon. She vacated the premises and leased a different space for almost double the amount of rent. Baker then commenced an action against Abdallah and arranged to have him served personally on or about June 26, 2006. No answer was filed and Baker moved for a default judgment on Aug. 24, 2006. On Oct. 6, 2006, Abdallah's attorney discovered Abdallah's pleadings and moved to extend his time to answer on Oct. 30, 2006. The trial court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against Abdallah on Dec. 13, 2006. Abdallah appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.
The court held that the dispute between the parties was credibility oriented and that the trial court was in the best position to consider the credibility of the parties. It held that absent an abuse of discretion, it would not question the trial court's discretion regarding the credibility of the parties. The appellate court further held that the actions of the attorney were not excusable neglect, as the attorney admitted receipt of the answer on Oct. 6, 2006, but failed to move for an extension of time until Oct. 30, 2006, a period of approximately three weeks. The attorney was unable to produce evidence of proper procedures in place at the time the documents were received, and therefore a delay of three weeks was inexcusable.
Default Judgment
Where no reasonable excuse can be provided by either the defendant or the attorney for failure to file a timely answer, a default judgment may not be vacated. Baker f/k/a/ Lockridge v. Abdallah, Appeal No. 2007AP504, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District One, Aug. 19, 2008.
Baker leased space from Abdallah to operate a salon. When the lease term commenced, Baker discovered that the roof leaked, and asked Abdallah to fix it. Abdallah failed to repair the roof and Baker was unable to open her salon. She vacated the premises and leased a different space for almost double the amount of rent. Baker then commenced an action against Abdallah and arranged to have him served personally on or about June 26, 2006. No answer was filed and Baker moved for a default judgment on Aug. 24, 2006. On Oct. 6, 2006, Abdallah's attorney discovered Abdallah's pleadings and moved to extend his time to answer on Oct. 30, 2006. The trial court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against Abdallah on Dec. 13, 2006. Abdallah appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.
The court held that the dispute between the parties was credibility oriented and that the trial court was in the best position to consider the credibility of the parties. It held that absent an abuse of discretion, it would not question the trial court's discretion regarding the credibility of the parties. The appellate court further held that the actions of the attorney were not excusable neglect, as the attorney admitted receipt of the answer on Oct. 6, 2006, but failed to move for an extension of time until Oct. 30, 2006, a period of approximately three weeks. The attorney was unable to produce evidence of proper procedures in place at the time the documents were received, and therefore a delay of three weeks was inexcusable.
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