Verdicts

Mental Health Facility Could Be Responsible for Letting Patient Loose

A federal judge sitting in New York has ruled that a mental health facility may be sued for releasing a patient on a weekend pass after that patient, who went to visit his mother, killed his mother's neighbor. Fox v. Marshall, 14183/08, N.Y.L.J. 8/16/09 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.).

In November 2005, Evan Marshall was voluntarily admitted to a residential treatment program operated by a facility run by SLS Residential Inc. He had no violent criminal history. In August 2006, the SLS facility he was then staying in, in Brewster, NY, issued him a pass to visit his mother in Glen Cove, NY. While there, he broke into the next-door-neighbor's home and dismembered her. Marshall pleaded guilty to killing his mother's 57-year-old neighbor in September 2007.

The murder victim's family sued both the mental health facility and Marshall's mother. SLS sought dismissal, arguing that because Marshall's stay with them was voluntary, the facility lacked the authority to control his conduct or to restrict him from leaving the premises. The court disagreed, finding that because Marshall had signed an agreement that limited his freedom of movement before entering the facility, SLS had the ability to exercise control over his movements. It was also alleged that Marshall kept disturbing pornography in his room and had at least twice used cocaine while in the SLS facility, and that Marshall's proclivities could have been discovered by SLS staff through their routine searches of patient rooms. After he committed his crime, a “to do” list was found in his room that said, “Don't get caught. Move into another rehab program. Kill a girl. Do cocaine off her corpse. Do more cocaine. Do more cocaine. Do more cocaine. Next time I do cocaine, I will kill a girl.” The plaintiffs alleged that this list and some sadomasochistic pornography kept by Marshall were removed from his room by SLS staffers after the murder. Those allegations, the court found, must “provoke further inquiry into the activities of [SLS] and militate against premature dismissal of the action against them.”

As to Marshall's mother's exposure to liability, the court held that, while parents are normally not liable for their grown children's acts, “a duty may be imposed” upon Ms. Marshall “to the extent that she took custody of or assumed responsibility” for her son.

Illinois High Court Rejects Arguments for Tarasoff-Like Liability

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed an appellate court finding that the survivors of a woman killed by her psychiatric patient husband had alleged sufficient facts regarding the defendant's medical care providers' duty to warn the deceased about the violent propensities of her husband to permit the case to go to trial. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center Inc., — N.E.2d —-, 2009 WL 3063361 (Ill. 9/24/09).

Psychiatric patient Richard Marshall allegedly sought treatment from the defendant physicians, psychologists and social workers because of his paranoid delusions that his wife was committing adultery and that she was trying to poison him. He had had thoughts of killing his wife and had threatened to kill her before he actually committed the murder. The wife's survivors brought suit claiming the defendants “knew or should have known” of Marshall's paranoid delusions and his thoughts and threats of killing his wife; that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that he would injure and/or kill his wife; and that they knew or should have known that he posed a specific threat of harm to his wife. The plaintiffs also claimed the defendants took it upon themselves, either gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to Marshall, which defendants recognized or should have recognized as necessary for the protection of Marshall's wife. Plaintiffs further claimed that Marshall's wife relied upon their undertaking these duties; assumed that they would appropriately evaluate, treat and supervise Marshall; and relied upon them warning her and the authorities if Marshall posed a threat to her. Marshall's wife was not a patient of the defendants.

The defendants moved for dismissal. Plaintiffs and defendants all agreed that Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d425 (1976), is the “lead case” and the case “most cited” for holding that a mental-health-care provider owes a duty to warn and protect a nonpatient third party when a patient confides his intention to kill an identified third party and later kills the third party. Illinois had not directly addressed the issue of mental health care provider liability in such cases, so both sides offered the cases of other jurisdictions in urging the court's support or rejection of a Tarasoff-like rule for the state.

Defendants also argued that under Illinois law, as enunciated in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill.2d 507 (1987), a plaintiff cannot generally maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff. In Kirk (a case that did not involve a specific threat to a known third party), the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by a man who had taken psychiatric medication and then consumed alcohol. The plaintiff sought recovery from the prescribing doctor on the basis that the psychiatric patient/driver had not been warned of the side effects of the medication. The Kirk plaintiff's argument was unsuccessful before the Illinois Supreme Court, which determined that he could not “maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff or a special relationship, as present in Renslow, between the patient and the plaintiff.” (In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348 (1977), a 13-year-old patient with Rh-negative blood was given a transfusion of Rh-positive blood by the hospital, thereby sensitizing her blood to the Rh-positive factor. The hospital did not inform the patient of the error or of its effects. As a result of the error, the patient's daughter was born several years later with permanent damage to her brain, internal organs, and nervous system. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the defendant's duty of care to the patient should be transferred to the patient's infant daughter because of the special relationship between the infant and her mother and because the injury to the infant was the direct result of the negligent treatment her mother received.)

Here, there was no physician/patient relationship between the health care providers and Marshall's wife. The intermediate appellate court had found, however, that the case should go forward because a “special relationship” akin to that found in Renslow existed due to Marshall's marriage to his victim and the fact that she was an active participant in his medical care, providing the defendants with information regarding her husband's changeable moods and behaviors and consulting with the defendants regarding her concerns about whether her husband would act on his ideas and threats and do her harm. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the relationship between a fetus and its mother, as in Renslow, is far more intimate a relationship than that between a husband and wife. It declined to stretch the concept of a “special relationship” to include the marriage relationship, thus also declining to find that, in Illinois, mental health care providers have a duty to warn third-party non-patients when their patients make specific threats to harm them.

Mental Health Facility Could Be Responsible for Letting Patient Loose

A federal judge sitting in New York has ruled that a mental health facility may be sued for releasing a patient on a weekend pass after that patient, who went to visit his mother, killed his mother's neighbor. Fox v. Marshall, 14183/08, N.Y.L.J. 8/16/09 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.).

In November 2005, Evan Marshall was voluntarily admitted to a residential treatment program operated by a facility run by SLS Residential Inc. He had no violent criminal history. In August 2006, the SLS facility he was then staying in, in Brewster, NY, issued him a pass to visit his mother in Glen Cove, NY. While there, he broke into the next-door-neighbor's home and dismembered her. Marshall pleaded guilty to killing his mother's 57-year-old neighbor in September 2007.

The murder victim's family sued both the mental health facility and Marshall's mother. SLS sought dismissal, arguing that because Marshall's stay with them was voluntary, the facility lacked the authority to control his conduct or to restrict him from leaving the premises. The court disagreed, finding that because Marshall had signed an agreement that limited his freedom of movement before entering the facility, SLS had the ability to exercise control over his movements. It was also alleged that Marshall kept disturbing pornography in his room and had at least twice used cocaine while in the SLS facility, and that Marshall's proclivities could have been discovered by SLS staff through their routine searches of patient rooms. After he committed his crime, a “to do” list was found in his room that said, “Don't get caught. Move into another rehab program. Kill a girl. Do cocaine off her corpse. Do more cocaine. Do more cocaine. Do more cocaine. Next time I do cocaine, I will kill a girl.” The plaintiffs alleged that this list and some sadomasochistic pornography kept by Marshall were removed from his room by SLS staffers after the murder. Those allegations, the court found, must “provoke further inquiry into the activities of [SLS] and militate against premature dismissal of the action against them.”

As to Marshall's mother's exposure to liability, the court held that, while parents are normally not liable for their grown children's acts, “a duty may be imposed” upon Ms. Marshall “to the extent that she took custody of or assumed responsibility” for her son.

Illinois High Court Rejects Arguments for Tarasoff-Like Liability

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed an appellate court finding that the survivors of a woman killed by her psychiatric patient husband had alleged sufficient facts regarding the defendant's medical care providers' duty to warn the deceased about the violent propensities of her husband to permit the case to go to trial. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center Inc., — N.E.2d —-, 2009 WL 3063361 (Ill. 9/24/09).

Psychiatric patient Richard Marshall allegedly sought treatment from the defendant physicians, psychologists and social workers because of his paranoid delusions that his wife was committing adultery and that she was trying to poison him. He had had thoughts of killing his wife and had threatened to kill her before he actually committed the murder. The wife's survivors brought suit claiming the defendants “knew or should have known” of Marshall's paranoid delusions and his thoughts and threats of killing his wife; that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that he would injure and/or kill his wife; and that they knew or should have known that he posed a specific threat of harm to his wife. The plaintiffs also claimed the defendants took it upon themselves, either gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to Marshall, which defendants recognized or should have recognized as necessary for the protection of Marshall's wife. Plaintiffs further claimed that Marshall's wife relied upon their undertaking these duties; assumed that they would appropriately evaluate, treat and supervise Marshall; and relied upon them warning her and the authorities if Marshall posed a threat to her. Marshall's wife was not a patient of the defendants.

The defendants moved for dismissal. Plaintiffs and defendants all agreed that Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d425 (1976), is the “lead case” and the case “most cited” for holding that a mental-health-care provider owes a duty to warn and protect a nonpatient third party when a patient confides his intention to kill an identified third party and later kills the third party. Illinois had not directly addressed the issue of mental health care provider liability in such cases, so both sides offered the cases of other jurisdictions in urging the court's support or rejection of a Tarasoff-like rule for the state.

Defendants also argued that under Illinois law, as enunciated in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center , 117 Ill.2d 507 (1987), a plaintiff cannot generally maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff. In Kirk (a case that did not involve a specific threat to a known third party), the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by a man who had taken psychiatric medication and then consumed alcohol. The plaintiff sought recovery from the prescribing doctor on the basis that the psychiatric patient/driver had not been warned of the side effects of the medication. The Kirk plaintiff's argument was unsuccessful before the Illinois Supreme Court, which determined that he could not “maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff or a special relationship, as present in Renslow , between the patient and the plaintiff.” (In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital , 67 Ill. 2d 348 (1977), a 13-year-old patient with Rh-negative blood was given a transfusion of Rh-positive blood by the hospital, thereby sensitizing her blood to the Rh-positive factor. The hospital did not inform the patient of the error or of its effects. As a result of the error, the patient's daughter was born several years later with permanent damage to her brain, internal organs, and nervous system. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the defendant's duty of care to the patient should be transferred to the patient's infant daughter because of the special relationship between the infant and her mother and because the injury to the infant was the direct result of the negligent treatment her mother received.)

Here, there was no physician/patient relationship between the health care providers and Marshall's wife. The intermediate appellate court had found, however, that the case should go forward because a “special relationship” akin to that found in Renslow existed due to Marshall's marriage to his victim and the fact that she was an active participant in his medical care, providing the defendants with information regarding her husband's changeable moods and behaviors and consulting with the defendants regarding her concerns about whether her husband would act on his ideas and threats and do her harm. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the relationship between a fetus and its mother, as in Renslow, is far more intimate a relationship than that between a husband and wife. It declined to stretch the concept of a “special relationship” to include the marriage relationship, thus also declining to find that, in Illinois, mental health care providers have a duty to warn third-party non-patients when their patients make specific threats to harm them.