Decisions of Interest

Court Should Not Have Tried to Decide Religious Matters

Supreme Court, Nassau County, improperly determined that a Hindu marriage entered into in India was valid, though it was performed before India codified the requirements of marriage, because such determination required the court to rule on the validity of religious matters in contravention of the principle of separation of church and state. Madireddy v. Madireddy, — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2009 WL 3209591 (2d Dept. 10/6/09) (Skelos, J.P., Covello, Leventhal and Roman, JJ.).

The parties' marriage allegedly took place in 1952, prior to the enactment in India of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which codified Hindu Law relating to marriage and divorce. The plaintiff brought a divorce action in New York, and the trial court determined that the marriage was valid after delving into the question of which ceremonies were sufficient and necessary for a valid Hindu marriage between members of the Reddy caste of Sudras in the region of Andhra Pradesh, India, in 1952. The defendant appealed, contending that a determination as to whether he and the plaintiff were married in a valid Hindu ceremony improperly involved the court in a religious matter.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, agreed with the defendant, noting that the determination of which ceremonies constituted valid Hindu marriage ceremonies in 1952 could not be “made on the basis of neutral principles of law.” The “neutral principles of law” approach requires the court to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues. Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar Inc., v. Kahana, 9 NY3d 282; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 NY2d 110, 119-120, cert denied 469 U.S. 1037. The Second Department concluded: “This analysis is entrenched in religious doctrine and cannot be resolved by the application of neutral principles of law. When a religious dispute cannot be resolved by application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the court from resolving the issue.” Thus, the court reversed Supreme Court's order and dismissed the complaint.

Use of Media to Humiliate Spouse Cruel and Inhuman, Even Post-Commencement

The judgment of Supreme Court, New York County (Harold B. Beeler, J.) granting the dissolution of the parties' marriage and holding their prenuptial agreement not unconscionable in this highly publicized “YouTube” case was upheld by the Appellate Division, First Department. Smith v. Smith, — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2009 WL 3349983 (1st Dept., 10/20/09) (Tom, J.P., Buckley, Catterson, Freedman, Abdus-Salaam, JJ.).

After the husband filed for divorce, the defendant wife became a YouTube sensation after posting a video there complaining of her imminent eviction from the marital home and disclosing embarrassing details about the couple's marriage. Supreme Court dissolved the marriage in August 2008, after a nonjury trial, on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, declaring the parties' prenuptial agreement valid and enforceable and incorporating its terms. The defendant wife appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the provision of the parties' prenuptial agreement that provided she would receive a tax-free payment of $750,000 in the event of divorce more than five but less than 10 years after the marriage, was unconscionable (i.e., so unfair “as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any [person] of common sense” (Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d63, 71 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The appellate court agreed with the lower court, however, that the substantial financial disparity between the parties was fully disclosed at the time the agreement was executed, and there was no evidence that the husband used his wealth as leverage to coerce the defendant to sign the agreement. Moreover, the wife was represented by counsel when she signed the document three weeks before the marriage took place, and the fact that the plaintiff paid her attorney fees did not by itself raise a triable issue of fact as to duress or overreaching.

The First Department also was unconvinced with the wife's argument that a higher standard for cruel and inhuman treatment should apply to actions taken by a party ' such as posting video on YouTube ' after the filing of a divorce action. “However,” stated the court, “were we to evaluate the evidence of defendant's post-commencement actions according to a higher level of proof, we would find that defendant's use of various media to discuss the parties' marital troubles and publicly humiliate plaintiff, coupled with the evidence that, as a result of defendant's conduct, plaintiff left the marital home and sought medical treatment, is sufficient to support the trial court's determination that defendant's post-commencement acts constituted cruel and inhuman treatment.”

Attempted Murder Suspect Got Sound Advice

A court dismissed a legal malpractice action brought against a matrimonial attorney who advised a client accused of trying to arrange his wife's murder to settle because the court concluded the attorney's advice was reasonable under the circumstances. Pascarella v. Goldberg, Cohn & Richter, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 3465982, (Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unreported Disposition, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 52193(U), N.Y.Sup., 10/23/09 (NO. 10612/06) (Hinds-Radix, J.).

The husband was charged with soliciting his wife's murder. Nine months later, he accepted his attorney's advice and paid his wife $400,000 to settle their divorce. More than two years later, he brought suit for malpractice against his attorney, Richard S. Goldberg, and the firm of Goldberg, Cohn & Richter. The man claimed that Goldberg failed to conduct discovery and pressured him to agree to the settlement. Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the advice Goldberg gave was reasonable in light of the fact that the charges against the husband were fair game for any court considering the question of equitable distribution.

Statement Made After Domestic Violence Encounter Deemed Involuntary

A criminal court refused to admit into evidence a statement made by a woman accused of stabbing her husband because the accused had not been read her rights, and several circumstances surrounding the making of the utterance rendered her statement involuntary. People v. Peters, 3731/08 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty. 10/9/09).

Police Officer Frank Wolff, a domestic violence officer, testified that on Dec. 19, 2007, another officer walked into his office with the defendant. She had obviously been badly beaten, as she had a reddened face and lumps and scratches on her face and upper body. Officer Wolff testified that he was so shocked by the woman's battered appearance that he instinctively asked her what had happened. To this query, she replied that she had cut her husband as he was beating her during a fight over child support.

Prosecutors conceded that the defendant's statement to Officer Wolff was made in violation of her constitutional rights, as she had not been informed of her right to remain silent in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. However, prosecutors requested a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement as they sought to impeach the defendant with her words if she testified at trial. The court noted that involuntary statements may not be used for impeachment, and that to allow them would amount to a denial of due process. Here, the court found that the defendant was under arrest at the time she made the statement. She had been taken to a strange office for no explicable reason, she had recently been beaten and was in pain, and she was thus undergoing emotional and psychological trauma at the time she made the statement. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the defendant's statement was involuntary and not the product of free will and rational intellect. As such, it could not be used at trial.

Court Should Not Have Tried to Decide Religious Matters

Supreme Court, Nassau County, improperly determined that a Hindu marriage entered into in India was valid, though it was performed before India codified the requirements of marriage, because such determination required the court to rule on the validity of religious matters in contravention of the principle of separation of church and state. Madireddy v. Madireddy, — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2009 WL 3209591 (2d Dept. 10/6/09) (Skelos, J.P., Covello, Leventhal and Roman, JJ.).

The parties' marriage allegedly took place in 1952, prior to the enactment in India of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which codified Hindu Law relating to marriage and divorce. The plaintiff brought a divorce action in New York, and the trial court determined that the marriage was valid after delving into the question of which ceremonies were sufficient and necessary for a valid Hindu marriage between members of the Reddy caste of Sudras in the region of Andhra Pradesh, India, in 1952. The defendant appealed, contending that a determination as to whether he and the plaintiff were married in a valid Hindu ceremony improperly involved the court in a religious matter.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, agreed with the defendant, noting that the determination of which ceremonies constituted valid Hindu marriage ceremonies in 1952 could not be “made on the basis of neutral principles of law.” The “neutral principles of law” approach requires the court to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues. Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar Inc., v. Kahana , 9 NY3d 282; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am. , 62 NY2d 110, 119-120, cert denied 469 U.S. 1037. The Second Department concluded: “This analysis is entrenched in religious doctrine and cannot be resolved by the application of neutral principles of law. When a religious dispute cannot be resolved by application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the court from resolving the issue.” Thus, the court reversed Supreme Court's order and dismissed the complaint.

Use of Media to Humiliate Spouse Cruel and Inhuman, Even Post-Commencement

The judgment of Supreme Court, New York County (Harold B. Beeler, J.) granting the dissolution of the parties' marriage and holding their prenuptial agreement not unconscionable in this highly publicized “YouTube” case was upheld by the Appellate Division, First Department. Smith v. Smith, — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2009 WL 3349983 (1st Dept., 10/20/09) (Tom, J.P., Buckley, Catterson, Freedman, Abdus-Salaam, JJ.).

After the husband filed for divorce, the defendant wife became a YouTube sensation after posting a video there complaining of her imminent eviction from the marital home and disclosing embarrassing details about the couple's marriage. Supreme Court dissolved the marriage in August 2008, after a nonjury trial, on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, declaring the parties' prenuptial agreement valid and enforceable and incorporating its terms. The defendant wife appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the provision of the parties' prenuptial agreement that provided she would receive a tax-free payment of $750,000 in the event of divorce more than five but less than 10 years after the marriage, was unconscionable (i.e., so unfair “as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any [person] of common sense” (Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d63, 71 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The appellate court agreed with the lower court, however, that the substantial financial disparity between the parties was fully disclosed at the time the agreement was executed, and there was no evidence that the husband used his wealth as leverage to coerce the defendant to sign the agreement. Moreover, the wife was represented by counsel when she signed the document three weeks before the marriage took place, and the fact that the plaintiff paid her attorney fees did not by itself raise a triable issue of fact as to duress or overreaching.

The First Department also was unconvinced with the wife's argument that a higher standard for cruel and inhuman treatment should apply to actions taken by a party ' such as posting video on YouTube ' after the filing of a divorce action. “However,” stated the court, “were we to evaluate the evidence of defendant's post-commencement actions according to a higher level of proof, we would find that defendant's use of various media to discuss the parties' marital troubles and publicly humiliate plaintiff, coupled with the evidence that, as a result of defendant's conduct, plaintiff left the marital home and sought medical treatment, is sufficient to support the trial court's determination that defendant's post-commencement acts constituted cruel and inhuman treatment.”

Attempted Murder Suspect Got Sound Advice

A court dismissed a legal malpractice action brought against a matrimonial attorney who advised a client accused of trying to arrange his wife's murder to settle because the court concluded the attorney's advice was reasonable under the circumstances. Pascarella v. Goldberg, Cohn & Richter, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 3465982, (Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unreported Disposition, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 52193(U), N.Y.Sup., 10/23/09 (NO. 10612/06) (Hinds-Radix, J.).

The husband was charged with soliciting his wife's murder. Nine months later, he accepted his attorney's advice and paid his wife $400,000 to settle their divorce. More than two years later, he brought suit for malpractice against his attorney, Richard S. Goldberg, and the firm of Goldberg, Cohn & Richter. The man claimed that Goldberg failed to conduct discovery and pressured him to agree to the settlement. Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the advice Goldberg gave was reasonable in light of the fact that the charges against the husband were fair game for any court considering the question of equitable distribution.

Statement Made After Domestic Violence Encounter Deemed Involuntary

A criminal court refused to admit into evidence a statement made by a woman accused of stabbing her husband because the accused had not been read her rights, and several circumstances surrounding the making of the utterance rendered her statement involuntary. People v. Peters, 3731/08 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty. 10/9/09).

Police Officer Frank Wolff, a domestic violence officer, testified that on Dec. 19, 2007, another officer walked into his office with the defendant. She had obviously been badly beaten, as she had a reddened face and lumps and scratches on her face and upper body. Officer Wolff testified that he was so shocked by the woman's battered appearance that he instinctively asked her what had happened. To this query, she replied that she had cut her husband as he was beating her during a fight over child support.

Prosecutors conceded that the defendant's statement to Officer Wolff was made in violation of her constitutional rights, as she had not been informed of her right to remain silent in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436. However, prosecutors requested a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement as they sought to impeach the defendant with her words if she testified at trial. The court noted that involuntary statements may not be used for impeachment, and that to allow them would amount to a denial of due process. Here, the court found that the defendant was under arrest at the time she made the statement. She had been taken to a strange office for no explicable reason, she had recently been beaten and was in pain, and she was thus undergoing emotional and psychological trauma at the time she made the statement. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the defendant's statement was involuntary and not the product of free will and rational intellect. As such, it could not be used at trial.