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The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled that statute-of-limitations tolling available for “compulsory” counterclaims didn't apply to a copyright co-ownership counterclaim that failed to arise out of the same operative facts as the plaintiff's copyright co-ownership suit. The counterclaim thus was time-barred. Sebastian Music Group Inc. v. Ayala-Rodr'guez, 07-1436(JP).
The plaintiffs had sued artist Daddy Yankee, alleging co-ownership of the songs “Cu'ntame” and “Lo que Pas', Pas'.” One of the co-defendants counterclaimed for co-ownership of several other songs he alleged the plaintiffs had registered with the Copyright Office. The district court noted that “the original claim and the counterclaim do not arise ' from the same aggregate of operative facts because the work of preparing the two songs at issue in the original complaint was distinct from, and occurred after, the work of preparing the songs at issue in the counterclaim. The distinct sets of songs also resulted in separate albums that were released on different dates. Second, Plaintiffs' original claims did not 'activate' an otherwise dormant counterclaim [that] could have [been] brought [as] a claim pertaining to the earlier songs at any point before the instant action. ' [T]he counterclaim is not compulsory.”
The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled that statute-of-limitations tolling available for “compulsory” counterclaims didn't apply to a copyright co-ownership counterclaim that failed to arise out of the same operative facts as the plaintiff's copyright co-ownership suit. The counterclaim thus was time-barred. Sebastian Music Group Inc. v. Ayala-Rodr'guez, 07-1436(JP).
The plaintiffs had sued artist Daddy Yankee, alleging co-ownership of the songs “Cu'ntame” and “Lo que Pas', Pas'.” One of the co-defendants counterclaimed for co-ownership of several other songs he alleged the plaintiffs had registered with the Copyright Office. The district court noted that “the original claim and the counterclaim do not arise ' from the same aggregate of operative facts because the work of preparing the two songs at issue in the original complaint was distinct from, and occurred after, the work of preparing the songs at issue in the counterclaim. The distinct sets of songs also resulted in separate albums that were released on different dates. Second, Plaintiffs' original claims did not 'activate' an otherwise dormant counterclaim [that] could have [been] brought [as] a claim pertaining to the earlier songs at any point before the instant action. ' [T]he counterclaim is not compulsory.”
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