Verdicts

Damages Awardable to Both Parents, Not to Each Individually

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, has found that Florida's birth injury compensation statute, which limits parents' awards to $100,000, is meant to award parents that amount jointly. Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological, Etc., — So.3d —-, 2010 WL 2425990 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., 6/18/10).

In August 2007, MacKenzie Samples was born with birth-related neurological injuries, as defined in ' 766.302(2), Florida Statutes (2007). Her parents filed a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings for compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan). The Plan was enacted to provide compensation to families of birth-injured children regardless of the presence or absence of medical fault. It is administered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA).

NICA agreed that MacKenzie's injuries were compensable under the plan and awarded her compensation for past and ongoing care needs, as well as for attorney fees. The dispute here developed because ' 766.31(1)(b), which authorizes an award of up to $100,000 to the “parents or legal guardians” of the injured child, does not specify whether the award limitation applies to each parent separately or to both of them as a single entity. MacKenzie's parents argued that they were each entitled to seek $100,000 from the Plan, and should not have been limited to sharing the $100,000 awarded to them jointly by NICA. They lost in their administrative appeal before the Division of Administrative Hearings, leading to this appeal.

Among other things, the Samples argued on appeal that ' 766.31(1)(b) violated their constitutional right to equal protection under the federal and state constitutions. Conceding that they were not members of any “suspect class,” the Samples agreed that the “rational relationship” test for constitutionality should apply to this claim. Under this test, the statute must be upheld if the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective and the statutory classification does not treat similarly situated people in a different manner on an illogical and arbitrary basis. Miller v. State, 971 So.2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

The Samples claimed that the law was ambiguous, as it could be read to apply the $100,000 limitation to each parent separately or to both parents together. They argued that, as read by the administrative law judge, the law afforded them disparate treatment because a single parent could receive $100,000, but as a two-parent family they had been shortchanged by half. They relied for this argument on St. Mary's Hospital, a case in which the Florida Supreme Court held that an analogous classification in the State's medical malpractice non-economic damages limitations statute was ambiguous. In St. Mary's Hospital, a mother died during childbirth and her child was born with brain damage. Her husband filed a wrongful death action against the hospital on behalf of himself and their four surviving children. The hospital conceded liability and the parties voluntarily arbitrated the issue of damages. The husband and injured child were each awarded $250,000 in noneconomic damages, while the three remaining children were each awarded $175,000 in noneconomic damages.

The hospital appealed, arguing that the multiple noneconomic damage awards exceeded the cap of $250,000 per incident in violation of section 766.207(7)(b), Florida Statutes. The district court agreed with the hospital and reversed the award, but certified a question to the State Supreme Court, asking whether the $250,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages applied to each beneficiary under the Wrongful Death Act, or in the aggregate to all beneficiaries. Florida's Supreme Court found that the statutory cap was ambiguous because it first stated that non-economic damages were $250,000 per incident, but later described how such damages were to be calculated be referring to a singular “claimant.” Id. at 968. Finding ambiguity, the court construed the cap to allow for awards of up to $250,000 for each claimant rather than an aggregate of $250,000 per incident.

The St. Mary's court reached its conclusion in part to avoid an equal protection problem, reasoning that if the cap were construed to limit non-economic damages to $250,000 per incident without regard to the number of claimants, “then the death of a wife who leaves only a surviving spouse to claim the $250,000 is not equal to the death of a wife who leaves a surviving spouse and four minor children, resulting in five claimants to divide $250,000. We fail to see how this classification bears any rational relationship to the Legislature's stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability industry. Such a categorization offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under the law and can only be described as purely arbitrary and unrelated to any state interest.”

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, determined that the statute, as interpreted to limit the Samples' compensation to a shared $100,000, did not violate the United States' or Florida's Constitution. It found no ambiguity in the statute because its plain language authorized a payment of up to $100,000 to the “parents,” not to each parent. The court also found that the statute bore a rational relationship to the legitimate government objective of keeping the Plan solvent, because limiting each injured child's parents' compensation to $100,000 rather than $200,000 would preserve monies in the Plan's funds. Finally, the court found that the statute did not treat single and co-parents disparately because every child subject to NICA has two biological parents. If a single parent is awarded $100,000, the absent parent or dead parent's estate is awarded nothing. If two parents, whether together or apart, apply for an award, they cannot receive more than $100,000 total. If the two parents dispute the distribution of the award amongst each other, the administrative law judge is authorized to decide how much each shall receive, up to a total of $100,000.

The court found the Florida Supreme Court's equal protection analysis in St. Mary's Hospital inapposite as the parental award in section 766.31(1)(b) is primarily intended to compensate parents for the costs of providing care for an injured child, not as damages to make parents whole for the loss of consortium, as in a traditional tort action like the one for medical malpractice damages in St. Mary's. In a traditional tort action, the number of such claimants could be numerous ' from parents to spouses to multiple children. The court found that this was significant because the legislative classification in this case ' including “parents” only ' is well-defined and narrowly drawn when compared with the classification in St. Mary's Hospital.

Despite finding that section 766.31(1)(b) was constitutional and that the case was sufficiently different from St. Mary's so that its teachings should not apply, the Samples court ultimately decided that there were enough similarities between the two cases that it should give the Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to give its opinion. Thus, the court concluded by certifying this question to the State Supreme Court: “Does the limitation in section 766.31(1)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, of a single award of $100,000 to both parents violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions?”

Damages Awardable to Both Parents, Not to Each Individually

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, has found that Florida's birth injury compensation statute, which limits parents' awards to $100,000, is meant to award parents that amount jointly. Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological, Etc., — So.3d —-, 2010 WL 2425990 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., 6/18/10).

In August 2007, MacKenzie Samples was born with birth-related neurological injuries, as defined in ' 766.302(2), Florida Statutes (2007). Her parents filed a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings for compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan). The Plan was enacted to provide compensation to families of birth-injured children regardless of the presence or absence of medical fault. It is administered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA).

NICA agreed that MacKenzie's injuries were compensable under the plan and awarded her compensation for past and ongoing care needs, as well as for attorney fees. The dispute here developed because ' 766.31(1)(b), which authorizes an award of up to $100,000 to the “parents or legal guardians” of the injured child, does not specify whether the award limitation applies to each parent separately or to both of them as a single entity. MacKenzie's parents argued that they were each entitled to seek $100,000 from the Plan, and should not have been limited to sharing the $100,000 awarded to them jointly by NICA. They lost in their administrative appeal before the Division of Administrative Hearings, leading to this appeal.

Among other things, the Samples argued on appeal that ' 766.31(1)(b) violated their constitutional right to equal protection under the federal and state constitutions. Conceding that they were not members of any “suspect class,” the Samples agreed that the “rational relationship” test for constitutionality should apply to this claim. Under this test, the statute must be upheld if the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective and the statutory classification does not treat similarly situated people in a different manner on an illogical and arbitrary basis. Miller v. State , 971 So.2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

The Samples claimed that the law was ambiguous, as it could be read to apply the $100,000 limitation to each parent separately or to both parents together. They argued that, as read by the administrative law judge, the law afforded them disparate treatment because a single parent could receive $100,000, but as a two-parent family they had been shortchanged by half. They relied for this argument on St. Mary's Hospital, a case in which the Florida Supreme Court held that an analogous classification in the State's medical malpractice non-economic damages limitations statute was ambiguous. In St. Mary's Hospital, a mother died during childbirth and her child was born with brain damage. Her husband filed a wrongful death action against the hospital on behalf of himself and their four surviving children. The hospital conceded liability and the parties voluntarily arbitrated the issue of damages. The husband and injured child were each awarded $250,000 in noneconomic damages, while the three remaining children were each awarded $175,000 in noneconomic damages.

The hospital appealed, arguing that the multiple noneconomic damage awards exceeded the cap of $250,000 per incident in violation of section 766.207(7)(b), Florida Statutes. The district court agreed with the hospital and reversed the award, but certified a question to the State Supreme Court, asking whether the $250,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages applied to each beneficiary under the Wrongful Death Act, or in the aggregate to all beneficiaries. Florida's Supreme Court found that the statutory cap was ambiguous because it first stated that non-economic damages were $250,000 per incident, but later described how such damages were to be calculated be referring to a singular “claimant.” Id. at 968. Finding ambiguity, the court construed the cap to allow for awards of up to $250,000 for each claimant rather than an aggregate of $250,000 per incident.

The St. Mary's court reached its conclusion in part to avoid an equal protection problem, reasoning that if the cap were construed to limit non-economic damages to $250,000 per incident without regard to the number of claimants, “then the death of a wife who leaves only a surviving spouse to claim the $250,000 is not equal to the death of a wife who leaves a surviving spouse and four minor children, resulting in five claimants to divide $250,000. We fail to see how this classification bears any rational relationship to the Legislature's stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical liability industry. Such a categorization offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under the law and can only be described as purely arbitrary and unrelated to any state interest.”

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, determined that the statute, as interpreted to limit the Samples' compensation to a shared $100,000, did not violate the United States' or Florida's Constitution. It found no ambiguity in the statute because its plain language authorized a payment of up to $100,000 to the “parents,” not to each parent. The court also found that the statute bore a rational relationship to the legitimate government objective of keeping the Plan solvent, because limiting each injured child's parents' compensation to $100,000 rather than $200,000 would preserve monies in the Plan's funds. Finally, the court found that the statute did not treat single and co-parents disparately because every child subject to NICA has two biological parents. If a single parent is awarded $100,000, the absent parent or dead parent's estate is awarded nothing. If two parents, whether together or apart, apply for an award, they cannot receive more than $100,000 total. If the two parents dispute the distribution of the award amongst each other, the administrative law judge is authorized to decide how much each shall receive, up to a total of $100,000.

The court found the Florida Supreme Court's equal protection analysis in St. Mary's Hospital inapposite as the parental award in section 766.31(1)(b) is primarily intended to compensate parents for the costs of providing care for an injured child, not as damages to make parents whole for the loss of consortium, as in a traditional tort action like the one for medical malpractice damages in St. Mary's. In a traditional tort action, the number of such claimants could be numerous ' from parents to spouses to multiple children. The court found that this was significant because the legislative classification in this case ' including “parents” only ' is well-defined and narrowly drawn when compared with the classification in St. Mary's Hospital.

Despite finding that section 766.31(1)(b) was constitutional and that the case was sufficiently different from St. Mary's so that its teachings should not apply, the Samples court ultimately decided that there were enough similarities between the two cases that it should give the Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to give its opinion. Thus, the court concluded by certifying this question to the State Supreme Court: “Does the limitation in section 766.31(1)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, of a single award of $100,000 to both parents violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions?”