Bit Parts

Being a Principal in Production and Distribution Agreement Makes Artist Subject to Personal Jurisdiction

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided that Texas-based artist Dash Crofts is subject to jurisdiction in a suit in Georgia alleging that Crofts breached a production and distribution agreement with the plaintiff by allegedly improperly negotiating with a third party for Seals and Crofts music. St. James Entertainment LLC v. Crofts, 1:09-CV-1975-RWS. Crofts argued that the St. James/Crofts agreement had been executed in Tennessee and that he performed only one concert in Georgia. But Northern District Judge Richard W. Story noted: “The dispute at the heart of this lawsuit arises out of the obligations and alleged breach of contract under [Crofts'] Agreement with [St. James] which created and formed SCHR Productions, LLC. ' As a principal of a Georgia company, Crofts has benefitted from the State's corporate structure and taken advantage of Georgia's privileges and laws. Further, Crofts has intentionally and knowingly contracted with SCHR Productions, LLC, a Georgia company, for the production and distribution of his music. In doing so, he has purposefully availed himself of the laws of the State of Georgia and reasonably should have expected to be haled into court in the State.”

Complaint over Broadcast Agreement Found Flawed

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed claims brought by a TV station over termination of a broadcast license agreement to supply Korean-language programming. Korean American Broadcasting Co. Inc. (KABC) v. Korean Broadcasting System, 09 C 6665. The plaintiffs' statutory fraud and promissory estoppel claims were dismissed with prejudice, but all other claims were dismissed without prejudice due largely to insufficient allegations in the complaint as drafted. Northern District Judge John F. Grady noted of a claim under the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, for example, that “the facts pleaded by plaintiffs do not demonstrate that a franchise did not exist or that plaintiffs did not pay a 'franchise fee' within the meaning of the Franchise Act. ' The claim, however, will be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to adequately specify which agreement or agreements allegedly created a franchise.”

Filming Dance Competition Is of “Public Interest”

The California Court of Appeal, Second District, decided that an intentional interference suit against a studio should be dismissed, because the studio was exercising its free speech rights in a matter of public interest when it filmed a dance competition. Krown Towers v. David La Chapelle Studio Inc. (DLCS), B217526. Krown Towers had entered into an agreement with dancer Thomas E. Johnson to invest in, and share revenues from, the “Battle Zone 5″ dance competition. Though Krown Towers' written approval was required for conveying broadcast, motion picture and other rights to third parties, Johnson granted DLCS the broadcast rights without Krown Towers' permission. The studio then filmed the dance competition as “Rize,” which was also successfully distributed as a movie. Krown sued in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The complaint alleged breach of contract by Johnson, and intentional interference with existing contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage by DLCS and the distribution companies. The court of appeal noted, in an unpublished opinion, that DLCS's motion to strike Krown Towers' complaint should be granted under California's anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) law, Calif. Code of Civil Procedure '425.16. The court of appeal noted that the meaning of “public interest” in '425.16 “has been broadly construed” and that this included DLCS's “conduct in filming the dance competition and incorporating the footage in its documentary, which was later screened to audiences and won a significant award.” The court of appeal also found that, in any case, the intentional interference allegations in Krown Towers' complaint as drafted didn't sufficiently state causes of action.

Being a Principal in Production and Distribution Agreement Makes Artist Subject to Personal Jurisdiction

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided that Texas-based artist Dash Crofts is subject to jurisdiction in a suit in Georgia alleging that Crofts breached a production and distribution agreement with the plaintiff by allegedly improperly negotiating with a third party for Seals and Crofts music. St. James Entertainment LLC v. Crofts, 1:09-CV-1975-RWS. Crofts argued that the St. James/Crofts agreement had been executed in Tennessee and that he performed only one concert in Georgia. But Northern District Judge Richard W. Story noted: “The dispute at the heart of this lawsuit arises out of the obligations and alleged breach of contract under [Crofts'] Agreement with [St. James] which created and formed SCHR Productions, LLC. ' As a principal of a Georgia company, Crofts has benefitted from the State's corporate structure and taken advantage of Georgia's privileges and laws. Further, Crofts has intentionally and knowingly contracted with SCHR Productions, LLC, a Georgia company, for the production and distribution of his music. In doing so, he has purposefully availed himself of the laws of the State of Georgia and reasonably should have expected to be haled into court in the State.”

Complaint over Broadcast Agreement Found Flawed

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed claims brought by a TV station over termination of a broadcast license agreement to supply Korean-language programming. Korean American Broadcasting Co. Inc. (KABC) v. Korean Broadcasting System , 09 C 6665. The plaintiffs' statutory fraud and promissory estoppel claims were dismissed with prejudice, but all other claims were dismissed without prejudice due largely to insufficient allegations in the complaint as drafted. Northern District Judge John F. Grady noted of a claim under the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, for example, that “the facts pleaded by plaintiffs do not demonstrate that a franchise did not exist or that plaintiffs did not pay a 'franchise fee' within the meaning of the Franchise Act. ' The claim, however, will be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to adequately specify which agreement or agreements allegedly created a franchise.”

Filming Dance Competition Is of “Public Interest”

The California Court of Appeal, Second District, decided that an intentional interference suit against a studio should be dismissed, because the studio was exercising its free speech rights in a matter of public interest when it filmed a dance competition. Krown Towers v. David La Chapelle Studio Inc. (DLCS), B217526. Krown Towers had entered into an agreement with dancer Thomas E. Johnson to invest in, and share revenues from, the “Battle Zone 5″ dance competition. Though Krown Towers' written approval was required for conveying broadcast, motion picture and other rights to third parties, Johnson granted DLCS the broadcast rights without Krown Towers' permission. The studio then filmed the dance competition as “Rize,” which was also successfully distributed as a movie. Krown sued in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The complaint alleged breach of contract by Johnson, and intentional interference with existing contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage by DLCS and the distribution companies. The court of appeal noted, in an unpublished opinion, that DLCS's motion to strike Krown Towers' complaint should be granted under California's anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) law, Calif. Code of Civil Procedure '425.16. The court of appeal noted that the meaning of “public interest” in '425.16 “has been broadly construed” and that this included DLCS's “conduct in filming the dance competition and incorporating the footage in its documentary, which was later screened to audiences and won a significant award.” The court of appeal also found that, in any case, the intentional interference allegations in Krown Towers' complaint as drafted didn't sufficiently state causes of action.