Development

Constitutional Claims Not Ripe Because Landowner Had Not Sought Variance

Rivendell Winery, LLC v. Town of New Paltz

NYLJ 7/28/10, p. 31, col. 3 U.S. Dist. Ct., NDNY (Hurd, J.).

Landowner brought an action challenging the actions of local zoning officials as violations of the First Amendment and as due process violations. The court dismissed the claim, holding that because landowner had not sought a variance, landowner's claim was not ripe.

Landowner operated a 15-acre winery for seven years until it was forced to close in 1994 due to storm damage. Subsequently, the owner acquired two contiguous parcels for the purpose of operating a new winery. The parcels were located in an agricultural zoning district. In 2007, landowner submitted an application to the county, seeking state include the two parcels in an Ulster County agricultural district, which would provide state protection from unreasonable interference with agricultural activities by local officials. Although the county agricultural and farmland protection board recommended inclusion of the parcel, a member of the county legislature called landowner to suggest that the application be withdrawn due to public opposition. Landowner complied, but subsequently learned that the legislator had a personal financial interest in denial of the application. Meanwhile, the town building inspector interpreted the ordinance to preclude the proposed winery because landowner proposed to use a building on the premises for retail sale of wine produced at the winery. Landowner appealed to the zoning board of appeals, submitting a letter from the state commissioner of agriculture and markets stating that the proposed use qualified as a farm operation under the state agriculture and markets law. Nevertheless the zoning board of appeals upheld the building inspector's determination without addressing any of the findings by the state commissioner. Landowner's article 78 proceeding challenging that determination proved unsuccessful in state court. Landowner then applied again to the Ulster County Legislature, which denied its application for inclusion in a county agricultural district. Landowner subsequently brought this action in federal court.

In dismissing, the court sympathized with landowner's frustration, but noted that landowner had never sought a variance from the town's zoning ordinance. The court concluded that in the absence of such a variance application, landowner had not secured a final determination from local officials. The court conceded that the likelihood of success on a variance application was doubtful, but held that mere doubt is insufficient to establish that an application would be unsuccessful. As a result, the claims were not ripe.

Landmark Commission Entitled To Revisit Prior Decision

In re Stahl York Avenue Co. LLC v. City of New York

NYLJ 7/8/10, p. 26, col. 1 AppDiv, First Dept. (Opinion by Nardelli, J.)

In landowner's article 78 proceeding challenging the New York City Council's approval of a landmarks designation by the Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC), landowner appealed from Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the Council was within its authority when it revisited and reversed a prior refusal to designate the subject property as a landmark.

Landowner owns two six-story buildings facing York Avenue between 64th and 65th Streets. The two buildings are part of a full city block of “light court model tenements” constructed between 1900 and 1913 so that courtyards and apartments would receive maximum exposure to light and air, in contrast to earlier dark tenements. In 1990, the LPC designated the entire block as a landmark, but the Board of Estimate voted to exclude landowner's two buildings from the designation. At the same time, the Board of Estimate voted to exclude four buildings from a similar block located between 78th and 79th Streets, east of York Avenue. Both exclusions were challenged in article 78 proceedings. Supreme Court denied both petitions, but only the exclusion concerning the 78th Street block was appealed. On that appeal, the Appellate Division held that the exclusion was arbitrary. Sixteen years later, in 2006, the LPC, acting on the recommendation of the local community board, designated landowner's two previously excluded buildings as landmarks, and the City Council ultimately approved the designation. Landowner then brought this article 78 proceeding, arguing that the Board of Estimate's prior decision was binding on the City Council, and that the Council failed to explain its departure from the earlier decision. Supreme Court denied the petition, and landowner appealed.

In affirming, the Appellate Division noted that an administrative body is entitled to reverse a prior administrative determination if its proffered reasons for the reversal find rational support. Here, the court noted that the record before the Council's subcommittee on landmarks emphasized that the 1990 decision to exclude the buildings was the product of a politically motivated backroom deal. Moreover, the record made it clear that even in 1990, the LPC had concluded that the entire block should be protected, even if landowner's two excluded buildings had been designed by a different architect and had been completed later than the other buildings. As a result, the court concluded that the Council had adequate reasons to depart from the 1990 determination. The court also rejected landowner's argument that, on the merits, the buildings were not worthy of landmark designation. The court emphasized that the designation was based on historical and cultural grounds, rather than purely on architectural grounds, making it irrelevant that the subject buildings were designed by a less renowned architect.

Constitutional Claims Not Ripe Because Landowner Had Not Sought Variance

Rivendell Winery, LLC v. Town of New Paltz

NYLJ 7/28/10, p. 31, col. 3 U.S. Dist. Ct., NDNY (Hurd, J.).

Landowner brought an action challenging the actions of local zoning officials as violations of the First Amendment and as due process violations. The court dismissed the claim, holding that because landowner had not sought a variance, landowner's claim was not ripe.

Landowner operated a 15-acre winery for seven years until it was forced to close in 1994 due to storm damage. Subsequently, the owner acquired two contiguous parcels for the purpose of operating a new winery. The parcels were located in an agricultural zoning district. In 2007, landowner submitted an application to the county, seeking state include the two parcels in an Ulster County agricultural district, which would provide state protection from unreasonable interference with agricultural activities by local officials. Although the county agricultural and farmland protection board recommended inclusion of the parcel, a member of the county legislature called landowner to suggest that the application be withdrawn due to public opposition. Landowner complied, but subsequently learned that the legislator had a personal financial interest in denial of the application. Meanwhile, the town building inspector interpreted the ordinance to preclude the proposed winery because landowner proposed to use a building on the premises for retail sale of wine produced at the winery. Landowner appealed to the zoning board of appeals, submitting a letter from the state commissioner of agriculture and markets stating that the proposed use qualified as a farm operation under the state agriculture and markets law. Nevertheless the zoning board of appeals upheld the building inspector's determination without addressing any of the findings by the state commissioner. Landowner's article 78 proceeding challenging that determination proved unsuccessful in state court. Landowner then applied again to the Ulster County Legislature, which denied its application for inclusion in a county agricultural district. Landowner subsequently brought this action in federal court.

In dismissing, the court sympathized with landowner's frustration, but noted that landowner had never sought a variance from the town's zoning ordinance. The court concluded that in the absence of such a variance application, landowner had not secured a final determination from local officials. The court conceded that the likelihood of success on a variance application was doubtful, but held that mere doubt is insufficient to establish that an application would be unsuccessful. As a result, the claims were not ripe.

Landmark Commission Entitled To Revisit Prior Decision

In re Stahl York Avenue Co. LLC v. City of New York

NYLJ 7/8/10, p. 26, col. 1 AppDiv, First Dept. (Opinion by Nardelli, J.)

In landowner's article 78 proceeding challenging the New York City Council's approval of a landmarks designation by the Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC), landowner appealed from Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the Council was within its authority when it revisited and reversed a prior refusal to designate the subject property as a landmark.

Landowner owns two six-story buildings facing York Avenue between 64th and 65th Streets. The two buildings are part of a full city block of “light court model tenements” constructed between 1900 and 1913 so that courtyards and apartments would receive maximum exposure to light and air, in contrast to earlier dark tenements. In 1990, the LPC designated the entire block as a landmark, but the Board of Estimate voted to exclude landowner's two buildings from the designation. At the same time, the Board of Estimate voted to exclude four buildings from a similar block located between 78th and 79th Streets, east of York Avenue. Both exclusions were challenged in article 78 proceedings. Supreme Court denied both petitions, but only the exclusion concerning the 78th Street block was appealed. On that appeal, the Appellate Division held that the exclusion was arbitrary. Sixteen years later, in 2006, the LPC, acting on the recommendation of the local community board, designated landowner's two previously excluded buildings as landmarks, and the City Council ultimately approved the designation. Landowner then brought this article 78 proceeding, arguing that the Board of Estimate's prior decision was binding on the City Council, and that the Council failed to explain its departure from the earlier decision. Supreme Court denied the petition, and landowner appealed.

In affirming, the Appellate Division noted that an administrative body is entitled to reverse a prior administrative determination if its proffered reasons for the reversal find rational support. Here, the court noted that the record before the Council's subcommittee on landmarks emphasized that the 1990 decision to exclude the buildings was the product of a politically motivated backroom deal. Moreover, the record made it clear that even in 1990, the LPC had concluded that the entire block should be protected, even if landowner's two excluded buildings had been designed by a different architect and had been completed later than the other buildings. As a result, the court concluded that the Council had adequate reasons to depart from the 1990 determination. The court also rejected landowner's argument that, on the merits, the buildings were not worthy of landmark designation. The court emphasized that the designation was based on historical and cultural grounds, rather than purely on architectural grounds, making it irrelevant that the subject buildings were designed by a less renowned architect.