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Panel Finds Canadian Gay Marriage Valid in Probate Case
A New York State appeals court has cleared the way for a same-sex spouse to inherit the estate of his deceased partner. The Appellate Division, First Department, held in Matter of the Estate of H. Kenneth Ranftle, 4214, that recognizing the marriage in Canada of H. Kenneth Ranftle and J. Craig Leiby, who was designated as Mr. Ranftle's surviving spouse and sole distributee, did not violate public policy.
“[T]he Legislature's failure to authorize same-sex couples to enter into marriage in New York or require recognition of validly performed out-of-state same-sex marriages, cannot serve as an expression of public policy for the State,” the unanimous panel wrote in an unsigned ruling.
The decision came the day after the Obama administration announced that it would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as the union between one man and one woman for federal law purposes.
Susan L. Sommer, who represented Mr. Leiby, said the Ranftle decision is significant because it marks the first time the First Department has ruled on the validity of same-sex marriage. The ruling also means that in questions of inheritance, private parties and competing family members will make no headway if they claim a same-sex marriage is invalid, said Ms. Sommer, who serves as legal director of constitutional litigation at the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Messrs. Ranftle and Leiby married in Quebec in June 2008. Mr. Ranftle died five months later. In his will, he gave each of his three brothers approximately $30,000. He left the remainder of his estate to Mr. Leiby, who was also designated executor. Mr. Leiby subsequently filed a petition for probate, in which he named himself as the surviving spouse and only distributee of the estate. After the probate was granted in December 2008, one of Mr. Ranftle brothers moved to vacate the order.
In 2009, Manhattan Surrogate Kristen Booth Glen ruled that Mr. Ranftle's three siblings were not entitled to notification of the probate proceedings under Surrogate's Court Procedure Act ' 1403(1)(a). She cited the Feb. 1, 2008, decision of Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 AD3d 189, in which the Fourth Department ordered Monroe County to extend health insurance coverage to the same-sex spouse of a female community college employee.
New York's high court, the Court of Appeals, has ruled that same-sex marriage is not valid if contracted in New York. At the same time, however, the court has held that the state should recognize marriages in foreign countries and other states where such unions are legal.
Former Governor David A. Paterson also has instructed state agencies to recognize such marriages. However, the Legislature has not addressed the issue.
On appeal, Mr. Ranftle's brother argued that Surrogate Glen's decision ignored the legislature's clear definitions and directives. He accused the surrogate of acting according to her own political/personal predilections.
Mr. Leiby countered that the case called for adherence to one of the most enduring principles of New York common law ' that out-of-state marriages valid where entered are honored in New York even if those marriages could not have been obtained under our State's laws. Under the marriage rule, New York has long recognized out-of-state marriages unless they expressly run afoul of state laws or are repugnant to public policy.
In an amicus brief backing Mr. Leiby, the state Attorney General's Office said that in order to fall under the exception of the marriage recognition rule, the Legislature must do more than prohibit the performance of the marriage in New York ' it must also explicitly prohibit the recognition of the marriage validly performed in another state or country.
The First Department agreed. Same-sex marriage does not fall within either of the two exceptions to the marriage recognition rule, the panel wrote. In the absence of an express statutory prohibition legislative action or inaction does not qualify as an exception to the marriage recognition rule. ' Noeleen G. Walder
Panel Finds Canadian Gay Marriage Valid in Probate Case
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“[T]he Legislature's failure to authorize same-sex couples to enter into marriage in
The decision came the day after the Obama administration announced that it would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as the union between one man and one woman for federal law purposes.
Susan L. Sommer, who represented Mr. Leiby, said the Ranftle decision is significant because it marks the first time the First Department has ruled on the validity of same-sex marriage. The ruling also means that in questions of inheritance, private parties and competing family members will make no headway if they claim a same-sex marriage is invalid, said Ms. Sommer, who serves as legal director of constitutional litigation at the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Messrs. Ranftle and Leiby married in Quebec in June 2008. Mr. Ranftle died five months later. In his will, he gave each of his three brothers approximately $30,000. He left the remainder of his estate to Mr. Leiby, who was also designated executor. Mr. Leiby subsequently filed a petition for probate, in which he named himself as the surviving spouse and only distributee of the estate. After the probate was granted in December 2008, one of Mr. Ranftle brothers moved to vacate the order.
In 2009, Manhattan Surrogate Kristen Booth Glen ruled that Mr. Ranftle's three siblings were not entitled to notification of the probate proceedings under Surrogate's Court Procedure Act ' 1403(1)(a). She cited the Feb. 1, 2008, decision of
Former Governor David A. Paterson also has instructed state agencies to recognize such marriages. However, the Legislature has not addressed the issue.
On appeal, Mr. Ranftle's brother argued that Surrogate Glen's decision ignored the legislature's clear definitions and directives. He accused the surrogate of acting according to her own political/personal predilections.
Mr. Leiby countered that the case called for adherence to one of the most enduring principles of
In an amicus brief backing Mr. Leiby, the state Attorney General's Office said that in order to fall under the exception of the marriage recognition rule, the Legislature must do more than prohibit the performance of the marriage in
The First Department agreed. Same-sex marriage does not fall within either of the two exceptions to the marriage recognition rule, the panel wrote. In the absence of an express statutory prohibition legislative action or inaction does not qualify as an exception to the marriage recognition rule. ' Noeleen G. Walder
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