Verdicts

FTCA Claim Untimely

The trial court did not err in dismissing a claim brought late under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 28, U.S.C. ' 1346, because even though the plaintiff was not aware the defendants were federally funded so that the claim was subject to the limitations period set forth in the FTCA, she could have discovered this fact through normal diligence. Ramos v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12168 (11th Cir. 6/14/11).

The plaintiff's father died on Dec. 31, 2004, while being cared for at Florida's Pine Hills Family Health Center. His daughter, Ms. Ramos, learned on Jan. 10, 2005, after the medical examiner issued a report on the death, that she might have a valid claim against the facility. She asked Pines Hills several times, in person and in writing, for her father's medical records. They gave her six pages of records, though they had 77 such pages.

On Nov. 6, 2006, the plaintiff filed for a 90-day extension of the Florida Statute of Limitations under Fla. Stat. ' 766.104(2). On March 31, 2007, she sent Pine Hills a letter of her intent to file suit for medical malpractice and wrongful death. A few days later, on April 4, Pine Hills notified Ramos that it was covered by the FTCA. In order to bring suit under the FTCA, complainants must first file an administrative claim against the federal government. Any such claim must be filed within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. 28 U.S.C. ' 2401(b).

On Aug. 2, 2007, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim with DHHS, which denied the claim as time-barred under ' 2401(b). She next filed suit in the federal district court on Feb. 11, 2009. DHHS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court agreed, finding that the claim arose on Jan. 10, 2005, the date on which the plaintiff became aware that she had a potential cause of action against Pine Hills. Because she failed to present her administrative claim to DHHS within two years of that date, the court found that the complaint was untimely.

On appeal, the plaintiff conceded that she was aware that she had a cause of action as early as January 2005, but renewed her argument that she did not know that the federal government was the proper defendant until April 4, 2007 when she learned Pine Hills was federally funded. She asserted her claim did not accrue until that date because she notified Pine Hills of her intent to sue in December 2005 and they, at that time, had a duty to inform her of their federal-facility status. Alternatively, she argued that the appeals court should consider equitable tolling of the limitations period because Pine Hills had hidden its status as a federally funded facility by withholding her father's medical records, and she had diligently pursued her claim.

Looking to case law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff's knowledge of her father's death and its cause was sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations clock and it was immaterial that she did not learn until later that the government was the proper defendant. See, e.g., Garza v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2002) (statute of limitations under the FTCA does not wait until plaintiff becomes aware alleged tortfeasor is federal employee).

As to the question of equitable tolling, the court for several reasons found the plaintiff was not entitled to relief. First, her letter to Pine Hills seeking medical records in December 2005 did not put the facility on notice that she intended to file a claim, so they had no duty to inform her of their federal funding. When Pine Hills did receive notice of the claim in March 2007 it immediately informed her counsel that it was a federal facility. Additionally, the Pine Hills website indicated it was a federally funded facility, and the federal government's website listed Pine Hills as one of its clinics. Plaintiff's counsel could have researched these sites without much effort and discovered that claims against Pine Hills must be brought in accordance with the FTCA.

Finally, the time extension the plaintiff sought and received under Georgia law was inapplicable in this case, as the limitations period is set by the FTCA and is not affected by any deference to state law.

New Firm Not Liable for Tortious Interference

An attorney whose client discharges him in favor of a new law firm cannot maintain an action for tortious interference with contract unless he can show that the second law firm used a wrongful means to induce the switch, such as fraud or defamation. Nostrame v. Santiago, A-2298-10T2 (N.J. Superior Ct., Appellate Division, 6/10/11).

Plaintiff did some work for his medical malpractice client. Later, she discharged him in favor of a new law firm. The client's claim was settled for $1.2 million, more than $300,000 of which went to the second law firm for its services. (The plaintiff here asserted a lien to collect the fees for his services up to the time he was terminated and the trial court ordered payment, which the plaintiff had already received by the time this action for tortuous interference came to trial.) The second law firm moved for dismissal of the claim, which the court granted because the law permits business competitors to compete with one another so long as they do not use “wrongful means” such as fraud or defamation. In addition, the court was loathe to interfere with any person's choice concerning which attorney she wished to have represent her in a legal matter.

FTCA Claim Untimely

The trial court did not err in dismissing a claim brought late under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 28, U.S.C. ' 1346, because even though the plaintiff was not aware the defendants were federally funded so that the claim was subject to the limitations period set forth in the FTCA, she could have discovered this fact through normal diligence. Ramos v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12168 (11th Cir. 6/14/11).

The plaintiff's father died on Dec. 31, 2004, while being cared for at Florida's Pine Hills Family Health Center. His daughter, Ms. Ramos, learned on Jan. 10, 2005, after the medical examiner issued a report on the death, that she might have a valid claim against the facility. She asked Pines Hills several times, in person and in writing, for her father's medical records. They gave her six pages of records, though they had 77 such pages.

On Nov. 6, 2006, the plaintiff filed for a 90-day extension of the Florida Statute of Limitations under Fla. Stat. ' 766.104(2). On March 31, 2007, she sent Pine Hills a letter of her intent to file suit for medical malpractice and wrongful death. A few days later, on April 4, Pine Hills notified Ramos that it was covered by the FTCA. In order to bring suit under the FTCA, complainants must first file an administrative claim against the federal government. Any such claim must be filed within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. 28 U.S.C. ' 2401(b).

On Aug. 2, 2007, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim with DHHS, which denied the claim as time-barred under ' 2401(b). She next filed suit in the federal district court on Feb. 11, 2009. DHHS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court agreed, finding that the claim arose on Jan. 10, 2005, the date on which the plaintiff became aware that she had a potential cause of action against Pine Hills. Because she failed to present her administrative claim to DHHS within two years of that date, the court found that the complaint was untimely.

On appeal, the plaintiff conceded that she was aware that she had a cause of action as early as January 2005, but renewed her argument that she did not know that the federal government was the proper defendant until April 4, 2007 when she learned Pine Hills was federally funded. She asserted her claim did not accrue until that date because she notified Pine Hills of her intent to sue in December 2005 and they, at that time, had a duty to inform her of their federal-facility status. Alternatively, she argued that the appeals court should consider equitable tolling of the limitations period because Pine Hills had hidden its status as a federally funded facility by withholding her father's medical records, and she had diligently pursued her claim.

Looking to case law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff's knowledge of her father's death and its cause was sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations clock and it was immaterial that she did not learn until later that the government was the proper defendant. See, e.g., Garza v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons , 284 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2002) (statute of limitations under the FTCA does not wait until plaintiff becomes aware alleged tortfeasor is federal employee).

As to the question of equitable tolling, the court for several reasons found the plaintiff was not entitled to relief. First, her letter to Pine Hills seeking medical records in December 2005 did not put the facility on notice that she intended to file a claim, so they had no duty to inform her of their federal funding. When Pine Hills did receive notice of the claim in March 2007 it immediately informed her counsel that it was a federal facility. Additionally, the Pine Hills website indicated it was a federally funded facility, and the federal government's website listed Pine Hills as one of its clinics. Plaintiff's counsel could have researched these sites without much effort and discovered that claims against Pine Hills must be brought in accordance with the FTCA.

Finally, the time extension the plaintiff sought and received under Georgia law was inapplicable in this case, as the limitations period is set by the FTCA and is not affected by any deference to state law.

New Firm Not Liable for Tortious Interference

An attorney whose client discharges him in favor of a new law firm cannot maintain an action for tortious interference with contract unless he can show that the second law firm used a wrongful means to induce the switch, such as fraud or defamation. Nostrame v. Santiago, A-2298-10T2 (N.J. Superior Ct., Appellate Division, 6/10/11).

Plaintiff did some work for his medical malpractice client. Later, she discharged him in favor of a new law firm. The client's claim was settled for $1.2 million, more than $300,000 of which went to the second law firm for its services. (The plaintiff here asserted a lien to collect the fees for his services up to the time he was terminated and the trial court ordered payment, which the plaintiff had already received by the time this action for tortuous interference came to trial.) The second law firm moved for dismissal of the claim, which the court granted because the law permits business competitors to compete with one another so long as they do not use “wrongful means” such as fraud or defamation. In addition, the court was loathe to interfere with any person's choice concerning which attorney she wished to have represent her in a legal matter.