NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Bill Seeks Easier Route to Grandparent Visitation

A bill introduced June 27 would alter the teachings of Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003) to make it easier for grandparents to obtain court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren when parents or guardians or not cooperative. The current Grandparent Visitation Act, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, does not require a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the lack of contact between grandchild and grandparent could potentially harm the child, but Moriarty imposed that test. According to the new bill's statement the Moriarty standard “places an onerous burden on an applicant to prove that the child would be specifically or concretely harmed if the court denies the order of visitation, especially if the applicant has been unable to establish a relationship with the child because the child's parent refuses to allow visitation.” Under the proposed new law, a presumption would be made that visitation is in a child's best interest under any of five circumstances: 1) If the grandparent was ever the child's full-time caregiver; 2) If one or both parents is deceased; 3) If the parents are divorced; 4) If the grandparent can show a past or current close relationship with the child; or 5) If the grandparent has tried to establish a close relationship with the child but the parents have refused to allow it. A showing of any of these would trigger a right to at least one mediation session and, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, to court intervention.

CONNECTICUT

Allegedly Battered Wife Gets Larger Share of Marital Estate

While emphasizing that it was not sitting in judgment on the separate civil battery lawsuit brought by the wife against her husband, a court in Stamford recently awarded 75% of the marital estate to the wife in the case of Farren v. Farren, Doc. No. FA10-4017970S. The uneven distribution of the estate to the wife, formerly an attorney with Skadden Arps, was apparently justified by the fact that the husband's assault on his wife after she filed for divorce left her so badly injured that she can no longer maintain her employment. The husband in the case, former Bush administration attorney John Farren, has not only been sued by his wife for several million dollars, but has also been charged with attempted murder. He has pleaded not guilty.

Falsely Accused Father's Suit Not Time-Barred

The Supreme Court of Connecticut determined in Watts v. Chittenden, 2011 Conn. LEXIS 282 (Conn. 7/19/11), that a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on an ex-wife's false accusations of child abuse is not time barred where there is a continuing course of conduct, despite the plaintiff's failure to allege a duty that was breached. The plaintiff brought his suit in 2005, seeking damages premised on false accusations made against him by his ex-wife in 1999. The wife moved for dismissal of the claim because the suit was commenced more than three years after the conduct complained of, making the suit time-barred by Connecticut's statute of limitations (General Statutes 57-577). The plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint to allege a continuation of the tortious conduct through 2006, without cessation for any three-year period within that timeframe. The trial court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the defendant's conduct subsequent to her original false accusation, and found for the plaintiff. The intermediate appellate court reversed, concluding that the State's case law required a showing of a duty of care before the “continuing course of conduct” doctrine could be applied to toll the statute of limitations. The State's high court noted on appeal that it had never addressed whether the existence of an original duty is necessary in order to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In determining that it did not, the court stated: “Unlike a claim based on negligence ' the existence of a duty is not a required element for establishing liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We conclude, therefore, that the existence of an original duty is not necessary to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

NEW JERSEY

Bill Seeks Easier Route to Grandparent Visitation

A bill introduced June 27 would alter the teachings of Moriarty v. Bradt , 177 N.J. 84 (2003) to make it easier for grandparents to obtain court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren when parents or guardians or not cooperative. The current Grandparent Visitation Act, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, does not require a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the lack of contact between grandchild and grandparent could potentially harm the child, but Moriarty imposed that test. According to the new bill's statement the Moriarty standard “places an onerous burden on an applicant to prove that the child would be specifically or concretely harmed if the court denies the order of visitation, especially if the applicant has been unable to establish a relationship with the child because the child's parent refuses to allow visitation.” Under the proposed new law, a presumption would be made that visitation is in a child's best interest under any of five circumstances: 1) If the grandparent was ever the child's full-time caregiver; 2) If one or both parents is deceased; 3) If the parents are divorced; 4) If the grandparent can show a past or current close relationship with the child; or 5) If the grandparent has tried to establish a close relationship with the child but the parents have refused to allow it. A showing of any of these would trigger a right to at least one mediation session and, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, to court intervention.

CONNECTICUT

Allegedly Battered Wife Gets Larger Share of Marital Estate

While emphasizing that it was not sitting in judgment on the separate civil battery lawsuit brought by the wife against her husband, a court in Stamford recently awarded 75% of the marital estate to the wife in the case of Farren v. Farren, Doc. No. FA10-4017970S. The uneven distribution of the estate to the wife, formerly an attorney with Skadden Arps, was apparently justified by the fact that the husband's assault on his wife after she filed for divorce left her so badly injured that she can no longer maintain her employment. The husband in the case, former Bush administration attorney John Farren, has not only been sued by his wife for several million dollars, but has also been charged with attempted murder. He has pleaded not guilty.

Falsely Accused Father's Suit Not Time-Barred

The Supreme Court of Connecticut determined in Watts v. Chittenden, 2011 Conn. LEXIS 282 (Conn. 7/19/11), that a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on an ex-wife's false accusations of child abuse is not time barred where there is a continuing course of conduct, despite the plaintiff's failure to allege a duty that was breached. The plaintiff brought his suit in 2005, seeking damages premised on false accusations made against him by his ex-wife in 1999. The wife moved for dismissal of the claim because the suit was commenced more than three years after the conduct complained of, making the suit time-barred by Connecticut's statute of limitations (General Statutes 57-577). The plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint to allege a continuation of the tortious conduct through 2006, without cessation for any three-year period within that timeframe. The trial court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the defendant's conduct subsequent to her original false accusation, and found for the plaintiff. The intermediate appellate court reversed, concluding that the State's case law required a showing of a duty of care before the “continuing course of conduct” doctrine could be applied to toll the statute of limitations. The State's high court noted on appeal that it had never addressed whether the existence of an original duty is necessary in order to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In determining that it did not, the court stated: “Unlike a claim based on negligence ' the existence of a duty is not a required element for establishing liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We conclude, therefore, that the existence of an original duty is not necessary to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”