Verdicts

Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Established Through a Battle of Experts

A doctor who treated a prisoner who died while incarcerated was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified federal immunity because the fact that the parties' experts differed as to the common knowledge of psychiatrists meant the defendant could not definitively show at the pre-trail stage that his conduct did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights. Quigley v. Thai, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80714 (E.D. Mich. 7/25/11).

The defendant doctor began treating the prisoner after he was transferred from another prison facility. The prisoner had been taking an antidepressant at the previous facility. After transfer, the defendant doctor discussed a prescription change with the prisoner, who agreed to try the newly recommended medications, Amitriptyline and Trazodone. Three days later, he was found dead in his cell. The cause of death remains undetermined.

Plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, brought suit against the doctor for, inter alia, violation of the decedent's constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In support of his claim, the plaintiff provided the court with the affidavit of psychiatrist Dr. Gerald A. Shiener, M.D. It stated that the two drugs prescribed to the decedent, when used in combination, are known within the psychiatric field to be capable of causing “Serotonin Syndrome.” The syndrome is known to cause life-threatening effects on the body, such as hypothermia. The plaintiff also offered the testimony of forensic pathologist Dr. Werner Spitz, M.D., who opined that the death was more likely than not caused by the combination of the two drugs.

The defendant moved the court for summary judgment, claiming the case should be dismissed because he was entitled to qualified immunity for actions he took in his official capacity as a service provider for the state of Michigan. In support of his motion, the defendant offered the opinions of four medical experts, all of whom disputed the plaintiff's experts' claim that it is a “basic psychiatric principle” that the antidepressants the defendant prescribed were widely known to be a potentially lethal combination.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). To overcome a public official's claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, would allow a reasonable fact finder to determine that: 1) there was a violation of a constitutional right; and 2) the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). (Additionally, federal courts in the Sixth Circuit may also consider whether the official's actions were “objectively reasonable” in the context of the facts. See Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002), quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691(6th cir. 1999). Therefore, if the official's actions were objectively reasonable, even if those actions constituted a constitutional violation of a clearly established right, the official may still be entitled to qualified immunity. Id.) Once qualified immunity has been invoked, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See Silberstain v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2006).)

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must present evidence of both an objective and a subjective component. The objective component requires a showing that the prisoner was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The subjective component requires a showing that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference or recklessness that is more than mere negligence. Id.

Referencing Farmer, the court determined that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff), the plaintiff had proffered sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the prisoner was exposed to substantial risk, that the defendant was aware of facts from which the inference could be made that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and that the defendant ignored that risk. Consequently, the plaintiff had presented evidence of a constitutional violation and of the fact that his rights at the time of the alleged violation were “clearly established.” The doctor was therefore not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity at the pre-trail stage. The defendant's attempt to win the “battle of the experts” at this early point in the proceedings could not prevail, as he had simply offered the type of evidence contrary to the plaintiff's that juries are convened to weigh. Stated the court, “The Defendant ' is of the position that because the experts disagree as to whether the course of treatment was widely known to be dangerous, no 'rational finder of fact could believe Shiener's assertion that every expert in the field should know not to prescribe these drugs together.' (Sec. Mot. for Summ. J. 13.) Defendant's argument suffers from a logical misstep. The mere fact that a proffered group of experts disagree about whether Defendant's course of treatment was widely known to be dangerous does not indisputably establish that experts in the field are not in fact expected to know of these potential dangers. Instead, it is the role of the jury to discern the expert testimony and answer, as a question of fact, whether the Defendant knew or should have known that prescribing the two drugs in tandem was potentially lethal.”

Qualified Immunity Cannot Be Established Through a Battle of Experts

A doctor who treated a prisoner who died while incarcerated was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified federal immunity because the fact that the parties' experts differed as to the common knowledge of psychiatrists meant the defendant could not definitively show at the pre-trail stage that his conduct did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights. Quigley v. Thai, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80714 (E.D. Mich. 7/25/11).

The defendant doctor began treating the prisoner after he was transferred from another prison facility. The prisoner had been taking an antidepressant at the previous facility. After transfer, the defendant doctor discussed a prescription change with the prisoner, who agreed to try the newly recommended medications, Amitriptyline and Trazodone. Three days later, he was found dead in his cell. The cause of death remains undetermined.

Plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, brought suit against the doctor for, inter alia, violation of the decedent's constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In support of his claim, the plaintiff provided the court with the affidavit of psychiatrist Dr. Gerald A. Shiener, M.D. It stated that the two drugs prescribed to the decedent, when used in combination, are known within the psychiatric field to be capable of causing “Serotonin Syndrome.” The syndrome is known to cause life-threatening effects on the body, such as hypothermia. The plaintiff also offered the testimony of forensic pathologist Dr. Werner Spitz, M.D., who opined that the death was more likely than not caused by the combination of the two drugs.

The defendant moved the court for summary judgment, claiming the case should be dismissed because he was entitled to qualified immunity for actions he took in his official capacity as a service provider for the state of Michigan. In support of his motion, the defendant offered the opinions of four medical experts, all of whom disputed the plaintiff's experts' claim that it is a “basic psychiatric principle” that the antidepressants the defendant prescribed were widely known to be a potentially lethal combination.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 (1982). To overcome a public official's claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, would allow a reasonable fact finder to determine that: 1) there was a violation of a constitutional right; and 2) the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. See generally Pearson v. Callahan , 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). (Additionally, federal courts in the Sixth Circuit may also consider whether the official's actions were “objectively reasonable” in the context of the facts. See Risbridger v. Connelly , 275 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002), quoting Williams v. Mehra , 186 F.3d 685, 691(6th cir. 1999). Therefore, if the official's actions were objectively reasonable, even if those actions constituted a constitutional violation of a clearly established right, the official may still be entitled to qualified immunity. Id.) Once qualified immunity has been invoked, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See Silberstain v. City of Dayton , 440 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2006).)

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must present evidence of both an objective and a subjective component. The objective component requires a showing that the prisoner was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The subjective component requires a showing that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference or recklessness that is more than mere negligence. Id.

Referencing Farmer, the court determined that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff), the plaintiff had proffered sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the prisoner was exposed to substantial risk, that the defendant was aware of facts from which the inference could be made that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and that the defendant ignored that risk. Consequently, the plaintiff had presented evidence of a constitutional violation and of the fact that his rights at the time of the alleged violation were “clearly established.” The doctor was therefore not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity at the pre-trail stage. The defendant's attempt to win the “battle of the experts” at this early point in the proceedings could not prevail, as he had simply offered the type of evidence contrary to the plaintiff's that juries are convened to weigh. Stated the court, “The Defendant ' is of the position that because the experts disagree as to whether the course of treatment was widely known to be dangerous, no 'rational finder of fact could believe Shiener's assertion that every expert in the field should know not to prescribe these drugs together.' (Sec. Mot. for Summ. J. 13.) Defendant's argument suffers from a logical misstep. The mere fact that a proffered group of experts disagree about whether Defendant's course of treatment was widely known to be dangerous does not indisputably establish that experts in the field are not in fact expected to know of these potential dangers. Instead, it is the role of the jury to discern the expert testimony and answer, as a question of fact, whether the Defendant knew or should have known that prescribing the two drugs in tandem was potentially lethal.”