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Despite Joint Ownership, Home Is Part of Marital Estate
Supreme Court, Nassau County, has dismissed a husband's claim seeking partition of the marital home. The court reasoned that although the parties purchased their home a month before their marriage and held joint title in it, many years have passed in which each could have contributed to the marriage in various financial and non-financial ways. Therefore, the relative rights of the parties in the home are rightfully under the jurisdiction of the matrimonial court. L.L. v. B.H., 2011 NY Slip Op 21316 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty. 9/6/11) (Falanga, J.).
The parties, who had been married for 20 years, purchased their home 30 days prior to their marriage, holding title as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. After the wife served divorce papers on the husband, he counterclaimed for partition and recoupment, claiming that the status of the home's ownership could be addressed outside of the divorce context because it was not part of the marital estate. He sought recoupment because, he claimed, since it was his income and effort that had largely paid for the home and kept it up through the years, he was entitled to more than a one-half share. The wife countered that the actions for partition and recoupment were an improper attempt to divest the court of its right to determine equitable distribution and that Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) ' 901, which permits partition, was inapplicable to the case. In other words, partition and recoupment are not cognizable legal theories in the context of a division of property between divorcing parties, she said.
The court agreed with the wife, rejecting the notion that the teachings of Novak v. Novak, 135 misc. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess Cty 1987) applied in this case. Novak involved a marriage in which the parties cohabited for just 2.5 months. They were joint tenants in a home purchased 10 days before their marriage. The Novak court allowed a claim for partition because substantial improvements had been made to the home, yet the short duration of the marriage meant that there could be little argument that substantial passive appreciation to the property's value had occurred. In contrast, in L.L. v. B.H., the parties had been married for 20 years. They had raised their son in the home and had contributed to the family in numerous economic and non-economic ways that should be taken into consideration when distributing the value of the martial home. In addition, since Novak, the law of equitable distribution has changed to allow for a greater inquiry into and allowance for the active individual contributions to increased property value of each party, as opposed to increases in value due to passive forces, such as the economy. Thus, the impetus to handle cases such as this as partition actions in order to promote equity is less forceful than as it was at the time of the Novak decision.
Dismissing the husband's counterclaim, the court concluded that “in a matrimonial action, Domestic Relations Law ' 234 gives to the court broad authority to determine issues that arise between the parties with respect to title and possession of property and, when read in conjunction with DRL ' 236(B), which authorizes the court to distribute marital and separate property and to adjust debits and credits between the parties as equity would find just and proper given the circumstances of the case, each of the parties have sufficient remedies in the instant matrimonial action so that references to separate causes of action for partition and recoupment are duplicative and unwarranted.”
Despite Joint Ownership, Home Is Part of Marital Estate
Supreme Court, Nassau County, has dismissed a husband's claim seeking partition of the marital home. The court reasoned that although the parties purchased their home a month before their marriage and held joint title in it, many years have passed in which each could have contributed to the marriage in various financial and non-financial ways. Therefore, the relative rights of the parties in the home are rightfully under the jurisdiction of the matrimonial court.
The parties, who had been married for 20 years, purchased their home 30 days prior to their marriage, holding title as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. After the wife served divorce papers on the husband, he counterclaimed for partition and recoupment, claiming that the status of the home's ownership could be addressed outside of the divorce context because it was not part of the marital estate. He sought recoupment because, he claimed, since it was his income and effort that had largely paid for the home and kept it up through the years, he was entitled to more than a one-half share. The wife countered that the actions for partition and recoupment were an improper attempt to divest the court of its right to determine equitable distribution and that Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) ' 901, which permits partition, was inapplicable to the case. In other words, partition and recoupment are not cognizable legal theories in the context of a division of property between divorcing parties, she said.
The court agreed with the wife, rejecting the notion that the teachings of
Dismissing the husband's counterclaim, the court concluded that “in a matrimonial action, Domestic Relations Law ' 234 gives to the court broad authority to determine issues that arise between the parties with respect to title and possession of property and, when read in conjunction with DRL ' 236(B), which authorizes the court to distribute marital and separate property and to adjust debits and credits between the parties as equity would find just and proper given the circumstances of the case, each of the parties have sufficient remedies in the instant matrimonial action so that references to separate causes of action for partition and recoupment are duplicative and unwarranted.”
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