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Bit Parts

By Stan Soocher
December 27, 2011

Judge Denies Recusal Request in Marley Family Royalties Dispute Against UMG

Federal Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of her decision not to recuse herself from litigation between the family interests of the late reggae artist Bob Marley and UMG Recordings. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. UMG Recordings Inc., 08 Civ. 6143. The case involves a dispute over the amount of digital distribution royalties that the plaintiffs claim UMG owes them from Bob Marley recordings. Judge Forrest was assigned the case in Nov. 2011. Lawyers for the Marley parties and for UMG then submitted a joint letter to Forrest seeking her recusal; until Jan. 2010, Judge Forrest had served as counsel for record label plaintiffs, including UMG, in the file-sharing infringement suit Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 06 CV 5936 (S.D.N.Y.), which resulted in the defendant peer-to-peer service being shut down. But Judge Forrest noted in her recent ruling: “It is clear that Lime Wire and the present action differ in significant ways: licensed versus unlicensed distribution; digital distribution agreements that were negotiated when the digital recording industry was in its nascent stage, versus unlicensed digital distribution with developed Internet technology; etc.” She added that in the Lime Wire case, “I dealt with counsel for UMG infrequently, I did not personally review any UMG documents in connection with my representation, I never visited any UMG office or met with any UMG executive at any point during that representation, and I did not prepare or defend any UMG personnel for any deposition or proceeding.”


UK Judgment Against U.S. Videogame Distributor Is Valid in Virginia

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, held that a judgment by a UK court in a dispute between a UK-based videogame developer and a Virginia-based videogame distributor was enforceable in Virginia. Codemasters Group Holdings Ltd. v. SouthPeak Interactive Corp., 3:11-CV-641. Game developer Codemasters and distributor SouthPeak had entered into a settlement agreement over monies SouthPeak owed Codemasters. Codemasters later filed suit in Queen's Bench of the High Court of Justice in England, alleging breach of contract by SouthPeak for failure to pay the settlement amount in full. Codemasters obtained a default judgment against SouthPeak from the UK court, then filed suit in Virginia federal court seeking recognition of the UK judgment. Virginia abides by the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, in Va. Code Ann. '8.01-465.6 et seq. District Judge James R. Spencer noted: “Two issues raised in this case are whether: 1) the UK court had personal jurisdiction over SouthPeak; and 2) SouthPeak received notice of the UK Action in sufficient time to enable it to defend.” Judge Spencer found: “The Settlement Agreement contained a forum selection clause designating the UK court as the forum for resolution of the parties' dispute. The Settlement Agreement establishes the acquiescence of SouthPeak to the jurisdiction of the UK court.” The district judge additionally determined: “SouthPeak undeniably had notice of the UK Action. SouthPeak received the first notice on June 2, 2011, when Codemasters' hired private-process server served notice of the UK Action on Katherine Rowe, assistant to SouthPeak's Chairman. On June 3, 2011, SouthPeak received the second notice through a letter sent by Codemasters' counsel to SouthPeak. Also, on July 8, 2011, after the UK court granted Codemasters a default judgment, SouthPeak received the third notice through the Federal Express letter and e-mail sent by Codemasters. The UK court was satisfied that SouthPeak had proper notice of the UK Action prior to the UK's court entry of default judgment.”


Stan Soocher is Editor-in-Chief of Entertainment Law & Finance and a tenured Associate Professor of Music & Entertainment Industry Studies at the University of Colorado's Denver Campus. He can be reached at [email protected] or via www.stansoocher.com.

Judge Denies Recusal Request in Marley Family Royalties Dispute Against UMG

Federal Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of her decision not to recuse herself from litigation between the family interests of the late reggae artist Bob Marley and UMG Recordings. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. UMG Recordings Inc., 08 Civ. 6143. The case involves a dispute over the amount of digital distribution royalties that the plaintiffs claim UMG owes them from Bob Marley recordings. Judge Forrest was assigned the case in Nov. 2011. Lawyers for the Marley parties and for UMG then submitted a joint letter to Forrest seeking her recusal; until Jan. 2010, Judge Forrest had served as counsel for record label plaintiffs, including UMG, in the file-sharing infringement suit Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 06 CV 5936 (S.D.N.Y.), which resulted in the defendant peer-to-peer service being shut down. But Judge Forrest noted in her recent ruling: “It is clear that Lime Wire and the present action differ in significant ways: licensed versus unlicensed distribution; digital distribution agreements that were negotiated when the digital recording industry was in its nascent stage, versus unlicensed digital distribution with developed Internet technology; etc.” She added that in the Lime Wire case, “I dealt with counsel for UMG infrequently, I did not personally review any UMG documents in connection with my representation, I never visited any UMG office or met with any UMG executive at any point during that representation, and I did not prepare or defend any UMG personnel for any deposition or proceeding.”


UK Judgment Against U.S. Videogame Distributor Is Valid in Virginia

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, held that a judgment by a UK court in a dispute between a UK-based videogame developer and a Virginia-based videogame distributor was enforceable in Virginia. Codemasters Group Holdings Ltd. v. SouthPeak Interactive Corp., 3:11-CV-641. Game developer Codemasters and distributor SouthPeak had entered into a settlement agreement over monies SouthPeak owed Codemasters. Codemasters later filed suit in Queen's Bench of the High Court of Justice in England, alleging breach of contract by SouthPeak for failure to pay the settlement amount in full. Codemasters obtained a default judgment against SouthPeak from the UK court, then filed suit in Virginia federal court seeking recognition of the UK judgment. Virginia abides by the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, in Va. Code Ann. '8.01-465.6 et seq. District Judge James R. Spencer noted: “Two issues raised in this case are whether: 1) the UK court had personal jurisdiction over SouthPeak; and 2) SouthPeak received notice of the UK Action in sufficient time to enable it to defend.” Judge Spencer found: “The Settlement Agreement contained a forum selection clause designating the UK court as the forum for resolution of the parties' dispute. The Settlement Agreement establishes the acquiescence of SouthPeak to the jurisdiction of the UK court.” The district judge additionally determined: “SouthPeak undeniably had notice of the UK Action. SouthPeak received the first notice on June 2, 2011, when Codemasters' hired private-process server served notice of the UK Action on Katherine Rowe, assistant to SouthPeak's Chairman. On June 3, 2011, SouthPeak received the second notice through a letter sent by Codemasters' counsel to SouthPeak. Also, on July 8, 2011, after the UK court granted Codemasters a default judgment, SouthPeak received the third notice through the Federal Express letter and e-mail sent by Codemasters. The UK court was satisfied that SouthPeak had proper notice of the UK Action prior to the UK's court entry of default judgment.”


Stan Soocher is Editor-in-Chief of Entertainment Law & Finance and a tenured Associate Professor of Music & Entertainment Industry Studies at the University of Colorado's Denver Campus. He can be reached at [email protected] or via www.stansoocher.com.

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