Verdicts

Trial Court Cannot Ignore Probate Court's Order

The Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division Four, has found that a trial court erred in dismissing a medical malpractice/wrongful death claim after it improperly found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue even after the probate court corrected the clerical error that could have stood in their way. Smith v. Rebsamen Medical Center Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 722 (11/30/11).

An order appointing the co-administrators of the decedent's estate was signed on May 26, 2010. The co-administrators filed this malpractice/wrongful death suit that same day. However, unbeknown to them, the order was not marked as filed in the clerk's office until two days later, on May 28. The last date for timely filing of the suit under Arkansas law was June 16, 2010. The defendant medical providers moved the court for summary judgment on Aug. 9, 2010, claiming that the co-administrators of the decedent's estate did not have the authority to file the action on May 26th. On Aug. 12, 2010, the co-administrators filed a motion for order nunc pro tunc in the probate case. The probate court granted the order, declaring that the order appointing the co-special administrators was deemed filed as of 9:00 a.m., May 26, 2010 ' a time that preceded the filing of the malpractice complaint. Despite the order nunc pro tunc, Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the med-mal case on Nov. 10, 2010.

On appeal, the co-administrators argued the trial court erred in disregarding the order nunc pro tunc. They pointed to the case of Edwards v. Nelson, 372 Ark. 300 (2008), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial court in a wrongful-death action brought on behalf of a patient's estate lacked jurisdiction to decide the validity of a probate order appointing the patient's son as administrator of the estate. The appellate court here found Edwards to be on point, and stated, “When the trial court entertained the collateral attack in the malpractice case, the authority of the probate order was usurped. In other words, by finding that appellants did not have the authority to act on May 26, 2010, the trial court in the malpractice case refused to acknowledge the authority of the probate court's nunc pro tunc order.”

The defendants further argued that the statute of limitations had run on June 16, 2010, a date that fell before the nunc pro tunc order was filed on Aug. 12, 2010. Because recognition of the probate court's order would have the effect of prejudicing their rights in the medical malpractice litigation, they contended that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. For this argument, they pointed to two cases ' Ozment v. Mann, 235 Ark. 901 (1962) and Melton v. St. Lous, LM. & S.Ry. Co., 99 Ark. 433 (1911) ' both of which held that nunc pro tunc orders are not to prejudice innocent third parties. The appeals court here was not convinced, and stated: “[N]either Melton nor Ozment define 'innocent third parties,' and we do not believe that appellees can be described as such. The appellees were not parties to the probate case and have no legally recognizable interest in how the probate action is managed. Appellees are not prejudiced by the nunc pro tunc order because their rights have not been violated by it. Appellees do not have a right to exploit a technical deficiency that has been cured by an applicable court order.”

For these and other reasons, the appellate court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of the probate order. It therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Trial Court Cannot Ignore Probate Court's Order

The Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division Four, has found that a trial court erred in dismissing a medical malpractice/wrongful death claim after it improperly found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue even after the probate court corrected the clerical error that could have stood in their way. Smith v. Rebsamen Medical Center Inc. , 2011 Ark. App. 722 (11/30/11).

An order appointing the co-administrators of the decedent's estate was signed on May 26, 2010. The co-administrators filed this malpractice/wrongful death suit that same day. However, unbeknown to them, the order was not marked as filed in the clerk's office until two days later, on May 28. The last date for timely filing of the suit under Arkansas law was June 16, 2010. The defendant medical providers moved the court for summary judgment on Aug. 9, 2010, claiming that the co-administrators of the decedent's estate did not have the authority to file the action on May 26th. On Aug. 12, 2010, the co-administrators filed a motion for order nunc pro tunc in the probate case. The probate court granted the order, declaring that the order appointing the co-special administrators was deemed filed as of 9:00 a.m., May 26, 2010 ' a time that preceded the filing of the malpractice complaint. Despite the order nunc pro tunc, Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the med-mal case on Nov. 10, 2010.

On appeal, the co-administrators argued the trial court erred in disregarding the order nunc pro tunc. They pointed to the case of Edwards v. Nelson , 372 Ark. 300 (2008), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial court in a wrongful-death action brought on behalf of a patient's estate lacked jurisdiction to decide the validity of a probate order appointing the patient's son as administrator of the estate. The appellate court here found Edwards to be on point, and stated, “When the trial court entertained the collateral attack in the malpractice case, the authority of the probate order was usurped. In other words, by finding that appellants did not have the authority to act on May 26, 2010, the trial court in the malpractice case refused to acknowledge the authority of the probate court's nunc pro tunc order.”

The defendants further argued that the statute of limitations had run on June 16, 2010, a date that fell before the nunc pro tunc order was filed on Aug. 12, 2010. Because recognition of the probate court's order would have the effect of prejudicing their rights in the medical malpractice litigation, they contended that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. For this argument, they pointed to two cases ' Ozment v. Mann , 235 Ark. 901 (1962) and Melton v. St. Lous, LM. & S.Ry. Co. , 99 Ark. 433 (1911) ' both of which held that nunc pro tunc orders are not to prejudice innocent third parties. The appeals court here was not convinced, and stated: “[N]either Melton nor Ozment define 'innocent third parties,' and we do not believe that appellees can be described as such. The appellees were not parties to the probate case and have no legally recognizable interest in how the probate action is managed. Appellees are not prejudiced by the nunc pro tunc order because their rights have not been violated by it. Appellees do not have a right to exploit a technical deficiency that has been cured by an applicable court order.”

For these and other reasons, the appellate court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of the probate order. It therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.