Advising Unsecured Creditors in Complex Bankruptcies

2005 Bankruptcy Code Reform: BAPCPA

In the face of demands that companies in reorganization require better oversight of management and that parties in interest should be provided transparency, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

One of the reforms of BAPCPA was the addition of Bankruptcy Code Section 1102(b)(3), which is intended to provide improved access to information to all creditors. It imposes upon the official creditors” committee an obligation to grant unsecured creditors increased access to the committee that represents their interests.

However, Section 1102(b)(3) does not provide any practical guidance as to what kind of “information” a creditors” committee should provide to the unsecured creditor, when, and in what form. There is no requirement of a formal report. The information provided by the creditors” committee is presumably request driven, which can lead to particularized communications to only a few creditors with the rest left to sift inefficiently through the docket for nuggets of relevant and comprehensive information. If the creditors in a large case deluged the committee with requests for information, it is debatable whether the typical committee and its counsel would be able to provide the relevant assistance outside of instituting a reporting regime.

Congress Intended the Appointment of Examiners And Trustees to Increase

Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, proponents in favor of appointing a trustee faced a heavy burden, even in cases where there was substantial evidence of fraud and mismanagement. The burden that was imposed occurred despite the facial application of the statute requiring appointment of a trustee on request of parties in interest or the United States Trustee, the federal office charged with monitoring bankruptcies nationwide. BAPCPA was amended in committee shortly before its final passage to reflect these congressional concerns about management abuses in Chapter 11. Clifford J. White III and Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees And Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 289, 312-313 (2006).

One amendment to BAPCPA, which reflects Congress” priority towards addressing corporate mismanagement, was a pointed directive to the U.S. Trustee to ratchet up the use of appointed trustees in the form of ” 1104(e), which provides:

The United States trustee shall move for the appointment of a trustee under subsection (a) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current members of the governing body of the debtor, the debtor”s chief executive or chief financial officer, or members of the governing body who selected the debtor”s chief executive or chief financial officer, participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct in the management of the debtor or the debtor”s public financial accounting.

11 U.S.C. ” 1104(e).

Although BAPCPA did not expressly alter the Bankruptcy Code with respect to examiners, any motion for appointment of a trustee includes the less intrusive remedy of an examiner, so the congressional intent of requiring oversight of the Chapter 11 process points to a reevaluation of the role of Chapter 11 examiners.

The need for a policy shift is part of the focus of an article co-authored by Clifford White, Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees in Washington, DC, the top national official of the United States Trustee Program. White & Theus, Chapter 11 Trustees And Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J., at 321. Many courts will find that appointment of an examiner is mandatory under ” 1104(c)(2) (based on $5 million of unsecured public debt), and discretionary where a party in interest requests the appointment and is able to cite to evidence of fraud or misconduct. However, “[a] review of dockets from 576 of the largest Chapter 11 cases commenced between 1991 and 2007 indicates that examiners were requested in only eighty-seven cases, or about 15% of the sample.” Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, 4 (2010). And of those requests, only 39 motions were granted; it is clear that examiners are neither regularly sought, nor automatically appointed in complex Chapter 11 cases. Id.

In viewing BAPCPA as a comprehensive bankruptcy reform to correct “imbalances” in Chapter 11 cases that favored incumbent management, Director White makes the case for why trustees and examiners can serve the interests of all stakeholders and the public by “promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of complex Chapter 11 cases.” White & Theus at 289. It is up to the parties to these cases to decide whether support for these measures is in their interest and to take appropriate action, either by supporting such motions or directing requests to the local U.S. Trustee.

Dynegy: Examiner Appointment a Sign of More to Come?

An examiner was recently appointed in Dynegy Holdings, LLC. Dynegy and four affiliated companies filed Chapter 11 petitions in the Southern District of New York on November 7, 2011. In re Dynegy Holdings, LLC, No. 11-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Bank National Association, as successor indenture trustee and also an appointed member of the three-member creditors” committee, submitted a motion to appoint an examiner to investigate certain of Dynegy”s complex pre-petition transactions that the Bank contended may have impacted Dynegy”s creditors and other parties in interest. The Bank”s motion alleged that a number of transactions were potentially actionable depending on the facts.

On Dec. 29, 2011, United States Bankruptcy Judge Cecelia G. Morris ordered the appointment of an examiner to conduct an “unfettered investigation” of the Debtors” conduct in connection with the pre-petition 2011 restructuring and reorganization of the Debtors and their non-Debtor affiliates, and whether there were any possible fraudulent conveyances. Whether as a nod to efficiency or independence, Judge Morris ordered the examiner to conduct an independent investigation where the “Creditors” Committee cannot ”tag along.””

This recent appointment of an examiner raises the question of whether the appointment of examiners will continue on an upward trend.

Why an Examiner?

Although an unsecured creditor may suspect mismanagement to be at the root of a company”s Chapter 11 filing, it can be difficult to evaluate whether anything can be done and the nature of its substantive rights without a complete picture. A single comprehensive and independent report may be more accessible to an unsecured creditor whose stake may not warrant an independent investigation, even where a creditors” committee is in a position to provide the necessary information. As illustrated by the Dynegy case, a member of the creditors” committee filed the motion presumably in recognition of the usefulness of such a report and the limitations on what a committee might accomplish.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, courts have the power to appoint an independent examiner for the purpose of investigating matters related to the debtor”s estate, “including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement ' ” 11 U.S.C. ” 1104(c). At the conclusion of such investigation, the appointed examiner must submit his or her report to the court and to all parties in interest. The examiner”s report is filed and must include “ any fact ascertained pertaining to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor, or to a cause of action available to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. ” 1106(a)(4). The benefit of appointing an examiner is that he or she will “act as an objective nonadversarial party who will review the pertinent transactions and documents, thereby allowing the parties to make an informed determination as to their substantive rights.” In re Fibermark, Inc., 339 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006). In contrast to the intermittent information an unsecured creditor would otherwise receive upon relying solely on the creditors” committee, the public report of the examiner helps to promote transparency of complex Chapter 11 cases.

Unlike other court-appointed officers, an examiner is completely disinterested and answers solely to the court. Thus, requesting the appointment of an examiner helps to create a level playing field to ensure that all parties, not just those on the creditors” committee, are privy to information that is obtained without bias.

Enron Scandal: A Case Study in Examiner Value-Add

One of the co-authors of this article served as a member of the Enron Task Force, and conducted the criminal investigation and trial of former CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. As has been well documented, in December 2001, Enron collapsed in what was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. In the wake of the collapse, allegations surfaced against Enron management and entities with which Enron transacted, involving securities fraud, accounting improprieties, energy market manipulation, misleading financial statements, insider trading, excessive compensation, and ERISA violations. The losses to shareholders and creditors were in the billions, and the task of investigating, assessing, and explaining the accounting and transactions at the core of the Enron scandal presented a daunting task.

In response, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. ” 1104(c), the bankruptcy court approved the appointment of an examiner to probe the transactions and accounting at issue, to assess the role of management, directors, and others, and to report on any claims against those entities. The examination that ensued was one of the most complex of its kind and still today demonstrates the benefits of examiners in complex fraud and mismanagement matters. After an 18-month investigation, the examiner issued a series of reports detailing the complex accounting and financial structures at issue, the role of hundreds of individuals and entities, the application of these facts in the bankruptcy process, and the potential claims against officers, directors, and others to recoup losses. In all, the examiner”s reports identified more than $10 billion in potential claims for the bankruptcy estate.

In addition, the Enron aftermath is a good example of the type of complex enforcement terrain that often must be traversed in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and demonstrates a further benefit of a qualified examiner. The Enron collapse spurred several class action lawsuits on behalf of shareholders and employees, and a variety of enforcement responses, including investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and numerous other agencies, as well as probes by congressional committees and investigative reporters. Parallel investigations and stake-holders are typical in relatively large Chapter 11 filings, and a competent examiner, with experience dealing with enforcement authorities, can serve as a central and efficient fact-gatherer, while navigating the legal, procedural, and practical difficulties potentially created by such overlapping investigative efforts. For this reason, “it is generally important that the examiner or someone on the examiner”s staff be experienced in working with law enforcement authorities on the criminal matters.” White & Theus at 325.

Why a Trustee?

A Chapter 11 trustee is an agent of the court, but not an officer of the debtor. Similar to an appointed examiner, a trustee has a direct reporting obligation to the court, but also has a fiduciary duty for his or her performance to the U.S. Trustee, the creditors and others with interests in the estate. The appointment of a trustee is an extraordinary remedy as the trustee completely divests the debtor”s management of all control over the debtor”s estate. The trustee takes over the assets and operation of the debtor”s business, which can be a tall order in a complex case. However, as indicated earlier, BAPCPA added ” 1104(e) to require the U.S. Trustee to seek appointment of a trustee where there is “reasonable grounds to suspect” misconduct in the debtor”s management. But, upon the request of any party in interest, and after notice and hearing, a court shall order the appointment of a trustee:

1. for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
2. if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of
   holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.

11 U.S.C. ” 1104(a).

Clearly, appointment of a trustee in an operating business requires careful selection of a qualified individual. Even then, parties that oppose the appointment of a trustee often point to the additional costs incurred. However, in today”s Chapter 11 legal environment, the debtor often retains a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) immediately prior to filing. This raises the concern that the officer”s legal duty is to the directors, which may not provide enough “distance” from past acts or assurances to all constituencies of his or her independence. Also, a CRO managing a debtor in possession does not have statutory investigative duties, as does both an examiner and a trustee, nor does management necessarily give up control of the company and restructuring process if that is the selected strategy. A trustee, by contrast, must answer to the creditors and all those with interests in the estate. Moreover, a Chapter 11 trustee often replaces a senior officer of the debtor, and, thus, the cost of the trustee should be balanced against the compensation of that officer. White & Theus at 318. And if the senior officer is the recently appointed CRO, then the comparative learning curve for the trustee would entail minimal duplication.

A Case Study in Trustee Value-Add

One of the co-authors of this article was appointed as the operating Chapter 11 trustee of a large 70-restaurant franchisee of casual food restaurants in California. The principal of the debtors had diverted massive funds from the operation of the profitable restaurants to a related real estate development empire that had collapsed. Prebankruptcy efforts by secured lenders and others to enforce rights and require sound management were ineffective and would have continued if the debtor had been left in possession.

The trustee had hands-on experience in managing multi-site restaurant businesses, which meant quickly evaluating and replacing ineffective management, and reestablishing confidence in vendors, employees, lenders, taxing authorities and the critical franchisor. A detailed analysis for a potential restructure of the business was performed, and it was determined to be not feasible. The situation urgently required a sale of the business in order for it to survive long term and provide any value to the creditors. The trustee also recognized that it was important to increase the cash flow prior to a sale by making emergency repairs to facilities, retraining personnel in customer service along with other management ideas implemented that maximized the market appeal of the restaurants to buyers in a difficult economy. Unlike the debtor, the trustee was able to credibly convince the relevant parties to align their support behind a robust strategy that paid off in sale proceeds far exceeded predicted returns.

In order to confirm a plan and close the case, the trustee had to respond to Department of Labor (DOL) as well as state and federal criminal investigations, and to satisfy constituents and the court that a full investigation had identified feasible courses of action. Without such intervention, the case would have spiraled into a no-asset liquidation with all of the business-critical franchise rights forfeited.

What Corporate Advisers Can Do

As legal counsel for unsecured creditors, who may otherwise be left feeling helpless and out of the loop in a complex Chapter 11 case, it is logical to consider motions to appoint an examiner or trustee, which have in the past been under-utilized in the face of increasing bankruptcy fraud and corporate scandals.

Congress has assisted by providing the statutory tools to help practitioners ensure that their clients can participate in a bankruptcy process that is fair, transparent, and accessible by all parties in interest. The Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees has urged the increased use of examiners and trustees to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process. It remains to be seen whether, in this current economic downturn, there will be an upward trend of motions to appoint an examiner or trustee, and whether courts will find that such appointments are necessary. Nevertheless, in today”s economic environment, corporate counsel should be aware of the powerful tools that examiners and trustees bring to bear in protecting unsecured creditors and others in the Chapter 11 process.

Robb C. Adkins ([email protected]) is a litigation partner in Winston & Strawn, LLP”s San Francisco and Los Angeles offices, where he focuses on white collar and internal investigations. He previously was a federal prosecutor at the DOJ, serving as a member of the Enron Task Force and most recently as the Executive Director of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. Beverly N. McFarland ([email protected]) has four decades of real estate and business experience on asset values in excess of $7.5 billion, serves as a Chapter 11 trustee, fraud investigator, court-appointed receiver and federal contractor, and is the CEO of The Beverly Group, Inc., an asset management company located in the Sacramento, CA, region.

A perfect storm has developed in the need for increased use of fiduciaries for examination and management of debtors. As a result of being over-leveraged, companies have engaged in complex financial transactions that have impaired creditors' rights. At the same time, in the wake of the economic crisis, there have been increased reports of fraud and mismanagement. A decade ago, a number of unprecedented corporate scandals rocked the nation – Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco are the leading examples. The recent financial crisis, epitomized by the fall of Lehman Brothers, the collapse of the Madoff funds and a record number of bank failures, has led to a new wave of investigations into whether fraudulent or actionable conduct lies at the heart of recent institutional failures.

It is important to recognize that individual creditors, even those with significant stakes, seldom have much ability to influence the bankruptcy process. When complex entities and financial transactions are involved, the Chapter 11 filing and the events to follow are often understood only by the creditors with the most at stake who are close to the action, well informed and highly motivated. Often, some of these creditors may be appointed to the creditors” committee. In those situations, a creditors” committee, although representative to a degree, may not be able to provide timely and meaningful information and assistance to creditors outside the active inner circle.

This article explores the roles of examiners and trustees in Chapter 11 cases and focuses on how corporate counsel can best protect a client”s position as a single unsecured creditor or party in interest, beyond filing a proof of claim or seeking relief from the stay. For the reasons explained below, in today”s economic environment, when indications of corporate mismanagement or complex undisclosed transactions surface, corporate counsel should be armed with an understanding of when and how to protect their clients” interests by supporting the appointment of a qualified Chapter 11 examiner or trustee.

2005 Bankruptcy Code Reform: BAPCPA

In the face of demands that companies in reorganization require better oversight of management and that parties in interest should be provided transparency, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

One of the reforms of BAPCPA was the addition of Bankruptcy Code Section 1102(b)(3), which is intended to provide improved access to information to all creditors. It imposes upon the official creditors” committee an obligation to grant unsecured creditors increased access to the committee that represents their interests.

However, Section 1102(b)(3) does not provide any practical guidance as to what kind of “information” a creditors” committee should provide to the unsecured creditor, when, and in what form. There is no requirement of a formal report. The information provided by the creditors” committee is presumably request driven, which can lead to particularized communications to only a few creditors with the rest left to sift inefficiently through the docket for nuggets of relevant and comprehensive information. If the creditors in a large case deluged the committee with requests for information, it is debatable whether the typical committee and its counsel would be able to provide the relevant assistance outside of instituting a reporting regime.

Congress Intended the Appointment of Examiners And Trustees to Increase

Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, proponents in favor of appointing a trustee faced a heavy burden, even in cases where there was substantial evidence of fraud and mismanagement. The burden that was imposed occurred despite the facial application of the statute requiring appointment of a trustee on request of parties in interest or the United States Trustee, the federal office charged with monitoring bankruptcies nationwide. BAPCPA was amended in committee shortly before its final passage to reflect these congressional concerns about management abuses in Chapter 11. Clifford J. White III and Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees And Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 289, 312-313 (2006).

One amendment to BAPCPA, which reflects Congress” priority towards addressing corporate mismanagement, was a pointed directive to the U.S. Trustee to ratchet up the use of appointed trustees in the form of ” 1104(e), which provides:

The United States trustee shall move for the appointment of a trustee under subsection (a) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current members of the governing body of the debtor, the debtor”s chief executive or chief financial officer, or members of the governing body who selected the debtor”s chief executive or chief financial officer, participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct in the management of the debtor or the debtor”s public financial accounting.

11 U.S.C. ” 1104(e).

Although BAPCPA did not expressly alter the Bankruptcy Code with respect to examiners, any motion for appointment of a trustee includes the less intrusive remedy of an examiner, so the congressional intent of requiring oversight of the Chapter 11 process points to a reevaluation of the role of Chapter 11 examiners.

The need for a policy shift is part of the focus of an article co-authored by Clifford White, Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees in Washington, DC, the top national official of the United States Trustee Program. White & Theus, Chapter 11 Trustees And Examiners After BAPCPA, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J., at 321. Many courts will find that appointment of an examiner is mandatory under ” 1104(c)(2) (based on $5 million of unsecured public debt), and discretionary where a party in interest requests the appointment and is able to cite to evidence of fraud or misconduct. However, “[a] review of dockets from 576 of the largest Chapter 11 cases commenced between 1991 and 2007 indicates that examiners were requested in only eighty-seven cases, or about 15% of the sample.” Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, 4 (2010). And of those requests, only 39 motions were granted; it is clear that examiners are neither regularly sought, nor automatically appointed in complex Chapter 11 cases. Id.

In viewing BAPCPA as a comprehensive bankruptcy reform to correct “imbalances” in Chapter 11 cases that favored incumbent management, Director White makes the case for why trustees and examiners can serve the interests of all stakeholders and the public by “promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of complex Chapter 11 cases.” White & Theus at 289. It is up to the parties to these cases to decide whether support for these measures is in their interest and to take appropriate action, either by supporting such motions or directing requests to the local U.S. Trustee.

Dynegy: Examiner Appointment a Sign of More to Come?

An examiner was recently appointed in Dynegy Holdings, LLC. Dynegy and four affiliated companies filed Chapter 11 petitions in the Southern District of New York on November 7, 2011. In re Dynegy Holdings, LLC, No. 11-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Bank National Association, as successor indenture trustee and also an appointed member of the three-member creditors” committee, submitted a motion to appoint an examiner to investigate certain of Dynegy”s complex pre-petition transactions that the Bank contended may have impacted Dynegy”s creditors and other parties in interest. The Bank”s motion alleged that a number of transactions were potentially actionable depending on the facts.

On Dec. 29, 2011, United States Bankruptcy Judge Cecelia G. Morris ordered the appointment of an examiner to conduct an “unfettered investigation” of the Debtors” conduct in connection with the pre-petition 2011 restructuring and reorganization of the Debtors and their non-Debtor affiliates, and whether there were any possible fraudulent conveyances. Whether as a nod to efficiency or independence, Judge Morris ordered the examiner to conduct an independent investigation where the “Creditors” Committee cannot ”tag along.””

This recent appointment of an examiner raises the question of whether the appointment of examiners will continue on an upward trend.

Why an Examiner?

Although an unsecured creditor may suspect mismanagement to be at the root of a company”s Chapter 11 filing, it can be difficult to evaluate whether anything can be done and the nature of its substantive rights without a complete picture. A single comprehensive and independent report may be more accessible to an unsecured creditor whose stake may not warrant an independent investigation, even where a creditors” committee is in a position to provide the necessary information. As illustrated by the Dynegy case, a member of the creditors” committee filed the motion presumably in recognition of the usefulness of such a report and the limitations on what a committee might accomplish.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, courts have the power to appoint an independent examiner for the purpose of investigating matters related to the debtor”s estate, “including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement ' ” 11 U.S.C. ” 1104(c). At the conclusion of such investigation, the appointed examiner must submit his or her report to the court and to all parties in interest. The examiner”s report is filed and must include “ any fact ascertained pertaining to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor, or to a cause of action available to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. ” 1106(a)(4). The benefit of appointing an examiner is that he or she will “act as an objective nonadversarial party who will review the pertinent transactions and documents, thereby allowing the parties to make an informed determination as to their substantive rights.” In re Fibermark, Inc., 339 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006). In contrast to the intermittent information an unsecured creditor would otherwise receive upon relying solely on the creditors” committee, the public report of the examiner helps to promote transparency of complex Chapter 11 cases.

Unlike other court-appointed officers, an examiner is completely disinterested and answers solely to the court. Thus, requesting the appointment of an examiner helps to create a level playing field to ensure that all parties, not just those on the creditors” committee, are privy to information that is obtained without bias.

Enron Scandal: A Case Study in Examiner Value-Add

One of the co-authors of this article served as a member of the Enron Task Force, and conducted the criminal investigation and trial of former CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. As has been well documented, in December 2001, Enron collapsed in what was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. In the wake of the collapse, allegations surfaced against Enron management and entities with which Enron transacted, involving securities fraud, accounting improprieties, energy market manipulation, misleading financial statements, insider trading, excessive compensation, and ERISA violations. The losses to shareholders and creditors were in the billions, and the task of investigating, assessing, and explaining the accounting and transactions at the core of the Enron scandal presented a daunting task.

In response, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. ” 1104(c), the bankruptcy court approved the appointment of an examiner to probe the transactions and accounting at issue, to assess the role of management, directors, and others, and to report on any claims against those entities. The examination that ensued was one of the most complex of its kind and still today demonstrates the benefits of examiners in complex fraud and mismanagement matters. After an 18-month investigation, the examiner issued a series of reports detailing the complex accounting and financial structures at issue, the role of hundreds of individuals and entities, the application of these facts in the bankruptcy process, and the potential claims against officers, directors, and others to recoup losses. In all, the examiner”s reports identified more than $10 billion in potential claims for the bankruptcy estate.

In addition, the Enron aftermath is a good example of the type of complex enforcement terrain that often must be traversed in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and demonstrates a further benefit of a qualified examiner. The Enron collapse spurred several class action lawsuits on behalf of shareholders and employees, and a variety of enforcement responses, including investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and numerous other agencies, as well as probes by congressional committees and investigative reporters. Parallel investigations and stake-holders are typical in relatively large Chapter 11 filings, and a competent examiner, with experience dealing with enforcement authorities, can serve as a central and efficient fact-gatherer, while navigating the legal, procedural, and practical difficulties potentially created by such overlapping investigative efforts. For this reason, “it is generally important that the examiner or someone on the examiner”s staff be experienced in working with law enforcement authorities on the criminal matters.” White & Theus at 325.

Why a Trustee?

A Chapter 11 trustee is an agent of the court, but not an officer of the debtor. Similar to an appointed examiner, a trustee has a direct reporting obligation to the court, but also has a fiduciary duty for his or her performance to the U.S. Trustee, the creditors and others with interests in the estate. The appointment of a trustee is an extraordinary remedy as the trustee completely divests the debtor”s management of all control over the debtor”s estate. The trustee takes over the assets and operation of the debtor”s business, which can be a tall order in a complex case. However, as indicated earlier, BAPCPA added ” 1104(e) to require the U.S. Trustee to seek appointment of a trustee where there is “reasonable grounds to suspect” misconduct in the debtor”s management. But, upon the request of any party in interest, and after notice and hearing, a court shall order the appointment of a trustee:

1. for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
2. if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of
   holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.

11 U.S.C. ” 1104(a).

Clearly, appointment of a trustee in an operating business requires careful selection of a qualified individual. Even then, parties that oppose the appointment of a trustee often point to the additional costs incurred. However, in today”s Chapter 11 legal environment, the debtor often retains a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) immediately prior to filing. This raises the concern that the officer”s legal duty is to the directors, which may not provide enough “distance” from past acts or assurances to all constituencies of his or her independence. Also, a CRO managing a debtor in possession does not have statutory investigative duties, as does both an examiner and a trustee, nor does management necessarily give up control of the company and restructuring process if that is the selected strategy. A trustee, by contrast, must answer to the creditors and all those with interests in the estate. Moreover, a Chapter 11 trustee often replaces a senior officer of the debtor, and, thus, the cost of the trustee should be balanced against the compensation of that officer. White & Theus at 318. And if the senior officer is the recently appointed CRO, then the comparative learning curve for the trustee would entail minimal duplication.

A Case Study in Trustee Value-Add

One of the co-authors of this article was appointed as the operating Chapter 11 trustee of a large 70-restaurant franchisee of casual food restaurants in California. The principal of the debtors had diverted massive funds from the operation of the profitable restaurants to a related real estate development empire that had collapsed. Prebankruptcy efforts by secured lenders and others to enforce rights and require sound management were ineffective and would have continued if the debtor had been left in possession.

The trustee had hands-on experience in managing multi-site restaurant businesses, which meant quickly evaluating and replacing ineffective management, and reestablishing confidence in vendors, employees, lenders, taxing authorities and the critical franchisor. A detailed analysis for a potential restructure of the business was performed, and it was determined to be not feasible. The situation urgently required a sale of the business in order for it to survive long term and provide any value to the creditors. The trustee also recognized that it was important to increase the cash flow prior to a sale by making emergency repairs to facilities, retraining personnel in customer service along with other management ideas implemented that maximized the market appeal of the restaurants to buyers in a difficult economy. Unlike the debtor, the trustee was able to credibly convince the relevant parties to align their support behind a robust strategy that paid off in sale proceeds far exceeded predicted returns.

In order to confirm a plan and close the case, the trustee had to respond to Department of Labor (DOL) as well as state and federal criminal investigations, and to satisfy constituents and the court that a full investigation had identified feasible courses of action. Without such intervention, the case would have spiraled into a no-asset liquidation with all of the business-critical franchise rights forfeited.

What Corporate Advisers Can Do

As legal counsel for unsecured creditors, who may otherwise be left feeling helpless and out of the loop in a complex Chapter 11 case, it is logical to consider motions to appoint an examiner or trustee, which have in the past been under-utilized in the face of increasing bankruptcy fraud and corporate scandals.

Congress has assisted by providing the statutory tools to help practitioners ensure that their clients can participate in a bankruptcy process that is fair, transparent, and accessible by all parties in interest. The Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees has urged the increased use of examiners and trustees to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process. It remains to be seen whether, in this current economic downturn, there will be an upward trend of motions to appoint an examiner or trustee, and whether courts will find that such appointments are necessary. Nevertheless, in today”s economic environment, corporate counsel should be aware of the powerful tools that examiners and trustees bring to bear in protecting unsecured creditors and others in the Chapter 11 process.

Robb C. Adkins ([email protected]) is a litigation partner in Winston & Strawn, LLP”s San Francisco and Los Angeles offices, where he focuses on white collar and internal investigations. He previously was a federal prosecutor at the DOJ, serving as a member of the Enron Task Force and most recently as the Executive Director of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. Beverly N. McFarland ([email protected]) has four decades of real estate and business experience on asset values in excess of $7.5 billion, serves as a Chapter 11 trustee, fraud investigator, court-appointed receiver and federal contractor, and is the CEO of The Beverly Group, Inc., an asset management company located in the Sacramento, CA, region.