Law.com Subscribers SAVE 30%

Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.

Counsel Concerns

By Stan Soocher
March 30, 2012

Law Firm's Push for Sale of George Clinton Copyrights, to Pay for Legal Fees, Will Remain in Western District of Washington

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington refused to dismiss a bid by former attorneys of musician George Clinton who are seeking the sale of the artist's copyrights to pay for legal fees that a California federal court found the artist owed the firm. Clinton v. Hendricks v. Lewis PLLC, 11-1142.

In 2009, an arbitrator ruled that Clinton owed legal fees to his former lawyers, Seattle-based Hendricks & Lewis. In 2010, the Western District of Washington confirmed the award. Hendricks & Lewis then sued George Clinton in the Central District of California for an assignment of royalties that Capitol Records owed Clinton. But the California district court denied the assignment request. (That case is on appeal.) Meanwhile, Clinton filed a malpractice complaint against Hendrick & Lewis in the Western District of Washington. The law firm counterclaimed for judicial sale of four of Clinton's copyrights to pay the legal fees judgment it had previously obtained against Clinton. Clinton responded with an affirmative defense to have the law firm's counterclaim dismissed as duplicative of the California litigation.

Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the Western District of Washington explained, however, that the ruling by the Central District of California “that Hendricks & Lewis was not entitled to the assignment of royalties under California law will not be disturbed regardless of how this Court rules on [Hendricks & Lewis'] request for assignment and judicial sale of four specific copyrights. The law and facts in the two actions will differ significantly. The California action was based on California law and required evidence regarding royalty streams subject to judicial action in California. This case, on the other hand, will require defendant to show that it is entitled to the assignment of different assets (the four copyrights) and that judicial sale of those assets is appropriate under Washington law. In addition, Hendricks & Lewis will have to show how much has already been recovered from Clinton to ensure that there is no double recovery.”

Still, Clinton moved for transfer of the Washington federal court case to California. But denying that motion, Judge Lasnik observed: “Clinton makes no effort to show that venue in this district (which he chose as plaintiff in this matter) is improper. The mere fact that the Central District of California was an appropriate venue for [Hendricks & Lewis'] attempt to collect royalty payments owed by certain entities tells us nothing about the propriety of bringing the pending counterclaim in this district.”


Motion by Nina Simone's Former Husband, to Disqualify Counsel in Estate Litigation, Is Denied

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a motion by the former husband of singer/songwriter Nina Simone to disqualify the attorneys representing his late wife's estate as plaintiff's counsel in a suit in which he is a defendant. Kelly v. Roker, 11-05822.

Andrew Stroud claims that, based on the recommendation of Simone's daughter and estate administrator Lisa Simone Kelly, he had retained the New York law firm of Shukat Arrow Hafer Weber & Herbsman in 2006 “to represent [him] in connection with all music industry matters relating to my Nina Simone ownership interests.” But in October 2011, a lawyer for Stroud sent Shukat Arrow a letter objecting to the latter's continued representation of the Simone estate in litigation the parties face from entertainment attorney Steven Ames Brown, also over rights to Simone works. Brown v. Stroud, 08-2348 (N.D.Calif.). Shukat Arrow claimed Stroud orally waived the conflict issue during yet a different litigation, Stroud Production Enterprises Inc. v. Castle Rock Entertainment Inc., 09-3796 (N.D.Calif.), in which Shukat Arrow attorney Dorothy Weber represented Castle Rock.

Kelly sued Stroud in December 2011 in the Northern District of California over her mother's recordings and belongings. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310(E) requires “informed written consent” of clients for lawyers to accept “adverse” employment. In considering Stroud's motion to disqualify Shukat Arrow as plaintiff's pro hac vice counsel in the suit by Kelly, District Judge Jeffrey S. White noted in an unreported decision: “When, as here, the alleged conflict of interest arises from successive representation of clients with potentially adverse interests, the principal question is whether there is a 'substantial relationship' between the subjects of the former and current relationships.”

If a substantial relationship exists, disqualification is usually mandatory ' unless here Stroud unreasonably delayed in objecting to the potential conflict. Judge White emphasized that the Kelly suit “is yet another strand in the web of litigation between the parties, which has been pending for years.” The district judge continued: “It is clear that Stroud ' if not his current counsel ' has known of the facts underlying the alleged conflict since at least 2007, when the issue was raised in the Castle Rock action. ' In addition, although he raised the issue in October 2011 in the [Brown v.] Stroud action, he has yet to file a motion to disqualify in that case.”

Judge White then found that, “although it appears that Stroud filed his motion as early as possible in the instant litigation, he fails to offer any persuasive reason for not acting sooner in the other cases. Thus, given the extensive litigation between the parties, the Court finds that Stroud's failure to act on this issue, despite his knowledge of the purported conflict, for over five years amounts to an unreasonable delay.” The district judge concluded Stroud thus “impliedly waived” any potential conflict of interest by Shukat Arrow.


Stan Soocher is Editor-in-Chief of Entertainment Law & Finance and a tenured Associate Professor of Music & Entertainment Industry Studies at the University of Colorado's Denver Campus. He can be reached at [email protected] or via www.stansoocher.com.

Law Firm's Push for Sale of George Clinton Copyrights, to Pay for Legal Fees, Will Remain in Western District of Washington

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington refused to dismiss a bid by former attorneys of musician George Clinton who are seeking the sale of the artist's copyrights to pay for legal fees that a California federal court found the artist owed the firm. Clinton v. Hendricks v. Lewis PLLC, 11-1142.

In 2009, an arbitrator ruled that Clinton owed legal fees to his former lawyers, Seattle-based Hendricks & Lewis. In 2010, the Western District of Washington confirmed the award. Hendricks & Lewis then sued George Clinton in the Central District of California for an assignment of royalties that Capitol Records owed Clinton. But the California district court denied the assignment request. (That case is on appeal.) Meanwhile, Clinton filed a malpractice complaint against Hendrick & Lewis in the Western District of Washington. The law firm counterclaimed for judicial sale of four of Clinton's copyrights to pay the legal fees judgment it had previously obtained against Clinton. Clinton responded with an affirmative defense to have the law firm's counterclaim dismissed as duplicative of the California litigation.

Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the Western District of Washington explained, however, that the ruling by the Central District of California “that Hendricks & Lewis was not entitled to the assignment of royalties under California law will not be disturbed regardless of how this Court rules on [Hendricks & Lewis'] request for assignment and judicial sale of four specific copyrights. The law and facts in the two actions will differ significantly. The California action was based on California law and required evidence regarding royalty streams subject to judicial action in California. This case, on the other hand, will require defendant to show that it is entitled to the assignment of different assets (the four copyrights) and that judicial sale of those assets is appropriate under Washington law. In addition, Hendricks & Lewis will have to show how much has already been recovered from Clinton to ensure that there is no double recovery.”

Still, Clinton moved for transfer of the Washington federal court case to California. But denying that motion, Judge Lasnik observed: “Clinton makes no effort to show that venue in this district (which he chose as plaintiff in this matter) is improper. The mere fact that the Central District of California was an appropriate venue for [Hendricks & Lewis'] attempt to collect royalty payments owed by certain entities tells us nothing about the propriety of bringing the pending counterclaim in this district.”


Motion by Nina Simone's Former Husband, to Disqualify Counsel in Estate Litigation, Is Denied

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a motion by the former husband of singer/songwriter Nina Simone to disqualify the attorneys representing his late wife's estate as plaintiff's counsel in a suit in which he is a defendant. Kelly v. Roker, 11-05822.

Andrew Stroud claims that, based on the recommendation of Simone's daughter and estate administrator Lisa Simone Kelly, he had retained the New York law firm of Shukat Arrow Hafer Weber & Herbsman in 2006 “to represent [him] in connection with all music industry matters relating to my Nina Simone ownership interests.” But in October 2011, a lawyer for Stroud sent Shukat Arrow a letter objecting to the latter's continued representation of the Simone estate in litigation the parties face from entertainment attorney Steven Ames Brown, also over rights to Simone works. Brown v. Stroud, 08-2348 (N.D.Calif.). Shukat Arrow claimed Stroud orally waived the conflict issue during yet a different litigation, Stroud Production Enterprises Inc. v. Castle Rock Entertainment Inc., 09-3796 (N.D.Calif.), in which Shukat Arrow attorney Dorothy Weber represented Castle Rock.

Kelly sued Stroud in December 2011 in the Northern District of California over her mother's recordings and belongings. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310(E) requires “informed written consent” of clients for lawyers to accept “adverse” employment. In considering Stroud's motion to disqualify Shukat Arrow as plaintiff's pro hac vice counsel in the suit by Kelly, District Judge Jeffrey S. White noted in an unreported decision: “When, as here, the alleged conflict of interest arises from successive representation of clients with potentially adverse interests, the principal question is whether there is a 'substantial relationship' between the subjects of the former and current relationships.”

If a substantial relationship exists, disqualification is usually mandatory ' unless here Stroud unreasonably delayed in objecting to the potential conflict. Judge White emphasized that the Kelly suit “is yet another strand in the web of litigation between the parties, which has been pending for years.” The district judge continued: “It is clear that Stroud ' if not his current counsel ' has known of the facts underlying the alleged conflict since at least 2007, when the issue was raised in the Castle Rock action. ' In addition, although he raised the issue in October 2011 in the [Brown v.] Stroud action, he has yet to file a motion to disqualify in that case.”

Judge White then found that, “although it appears that Stroud filed his motion as early as possible in the instant litigation, he fails to offer any persuasive reason for not acting sooner in the other cases. Thus, given the extensive litigation between the parties, the Court finds that Stroud's failure to act on this issue, despite his knowledge of the purported conflict, for over five years amounts to an unreasonable delay.” The district judge concluded Stroud thus “impliedly waived” any potential conflict of interest by Shukat Arrow.


Stan Soocher is Editor-in-Chief of Entertainment Law & Finance and a tenured Associate Professor of Music & Entertainment Industry Studies at the University of Colorado's Denver Campus. He can be reached at [email protected] or via www.stansoocher.com.

This premium content is locked for Entertainment Law & Finance subscribers only

  • Stay current on the latest information, rulings, regulations, and trends
  • Includes practical, must-have information on copyrights, royalties, AI, and more
  • Tap into expert guidance from top entertainment lawyers and experts

For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473

Read These Next
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin Image

With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.

Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws Image

This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.

Fresh Filings Image

Notable recent court filings in entertainment law.

The Article 8 Opt In Image

The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.

Removing Restrictive Covenants In New York Image

In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?