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If, post-arrest, your client was subjected to extremely harsh incarceration conditions (either in the United States or abroad), can you argue that his or her sentence should be more lenient in light of the harm he or she endured?
In determining the defendant's sentence, courts must take into account a variety of factors, including the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. ' 3553(a)(1). If the defendant endured dire incarceration conditions (such as interpersonal violence or threats, or no access to basic hygiene or potable water), that experience is a part of the defendant's “history” and can warrant a downward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines range. This is because the defendant has suffered an uncommonly severe punishment already, a factor that the advisory guidelines range does not adequately reflect.
Defendants have made this argument with varied success. While the court may ultimately disregard it altogether, as a general rule there is no harm and a large potential benefit to making it. If successful, it may reduce the defendant's sentence by at least several months.
Cases in Point
Courts presented with an argument for consideration of harsh incarceration conditions have responded differently. Some judges have entirely refused to take them into account, and their decisions have held up on appeal. For example, in United States v. Gomez, 402 Fed. Appx. 579, 581 (2d Cir. 2010), the court held that the defendant was not entitled to a reduction. On appeal, the Second Circuit found no procedural error and emphasized that the defendant offered no evidence of the conditions he personally faced. Id.; see also United States v. Naranjo-Ramirez, 402 F. App'x 576, 578 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the sentencing court may ' but has no obligation to ' reduce the sentence based on harsh pretrial confinement conditions); United States v. Villegas-Amariles, 237 F. App'x 654, 656 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to find a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range unreasonable and finding that it properly accounted for the deplorable pre-extradition conditions and the seriousness of the offense); United States v. Sanpedro, 352 F. App'x 482, 486-87 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court's conclusion that the harsh conditions of the defendant's pretrial confinement, in light of other relevant factors, warranted a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines' range but did not warrant a further reduction).
In other cases, however, courts have reduced imprisonment terms based on harsh pretrial confinement. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Vargas, No. 06 Cr. 507, Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 41, 51 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010); see also United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2001) (“pre-sentence confinement conditions may in appropriate cases be a permissible basis for downward departures”).
Calculating the Reduction
Where courts do reduce sentences on this basis, they do not follow a precise or consistent formula in calculating the reduction. The length of the reduction, nevertheless, typically bears some relationship to the time the defendant spent under severe conditions. For instance, the defendant in United States v. Henao had spent 16 months in a women's prison in Colombia where she faced harsh conditions, including a lack of basic medical care. United States v. Henao, No. 01 Cr. 864 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011), Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 18-19, July 27, 2011. The court granted a 26-month downward variance based on the defendant's 16-month incarceration in Colombia, her remorse, and other factors. Id. at 18-19, 22.
Another court granted a 24-month downward variance from a stipulated Guidelines range based on the defendant's health and the circumstances of his 13-month imprisonment in Colombia. United States v. Garcia-Giraldo, No. 02 Cr. 706 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006), Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 29, Aug. 29, 2006; see also United States v. Torres, No. 01 Cr. 1078, 2005 WL 2087818, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (granting a one-level downward departure based on defendant's five-month detention at Combita prison in Colombia after concluding that “while it is an exaggeration to compare Combita to a concentration camp, conditions there at the time of the defendant's incarceration were harsh by any American standard”); United States v. Salvador, No. 98 Cr. 484, 2006 WL 2034637, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) (granting a downward departure based on the defendant's six-month incarceration in the Dominican Republic, thereby reducing his offense level from 40 to 39 and the Guidelines range from 292-365 months to 262-327). But see United States v. Fajardo, No. 03 Cr. 156-04, 2006 WL 3498640, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006) (taking note of pre-sentence detention conditions in Colombia, but noting that a downward departure was unavailable because the 10-year statutory mandatory minimum acted as the lower bound of the defendant's Guidelines range); United States v. Castellanos, No. 03 Cr. 156-08, 2006 WL 3016313, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) (same).
Where this issue has come up, no particular test has emerged for how harsh the conditions have to be before they can be a basis for a downward variance, but presumably the harsher the conditions the greater the downward variance the defendant can hope to obtain. Significantly, courts have rejected the argument that the defendant's experience must have been notably worse than the experience of his or her fellow prisoners housed at the same prison. United States v. Cruz-Vargas, No. 06 Cr. 507 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010), Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 9-15, Jan. 5, 2010.
Instead, it appears sufficient to show that your client was exposed to conditions that depart significantly from the minimally accepted norm in the United States. Id.; United States v. Rivera-Vera, No. 04 Cr. 289, Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 33-34, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2007).
Suggestions for Argument
What should the attorney do when attempting to gain more lenient treatment for a client who has suffered harsh incarceration? Here are some tips:
Conclusion
In the end, defense counsel should be sure always to ask their clients about their pre-sentencing incarceration conditions, and, if there is a basis, seek a downward variance. While the court ultimately may decline the variance, typically, there is no downside to making this argument, particularly where it is backed up by strong, specific, and particularized evidentiary support. The argument may just convince the court to shorten the sentence by several months and, in rare circumstances, by several years.
Svetlana M. Eisenberg and Daniel O. Blau are attorneys in the New York office of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP.
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If, post-arrest, your client was subjected to extremely harsh incarceration conditions (either in the United States or abroad), can you argue that his or her sentence should be more lenient in light of the harm he or she endured?
In determining the defendant's sentence, courts must take into account a variety of factors, including the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. ' 3553(a)(1). If the defendant endured dire incarceration conditions (such as interpersonal violence or threats, or no access to basic hygiene or potable water), that experience is a part of the defendant's “history” and can warrant a downward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines range. This is because the defendant has suffered an uncommonly severe punishment already, a factor that the advisory guidelines range does not adequately reflect.
Defendants have made this argument with varied success. While the court may ultimately disregard it altogether, as a general rule there is no harm and a large potential benefit to making it. If successful, it may reduce the defendant's sentence by at least several months.
Cases in Point
Courts presented with an argument for consideration of harsh incarceration conditions have responded differently. Some judges have entirely refused to take them into account, and their decisions have held up on appeal. For example, in
In other cases, however, courts have reduced imprisonment terms based on harsh pretrial confinement. See, e.g.,
Calculating the Reduction
Where courts do reduce sentences on this basis, they do not follow a precise or consistent formula in calculating the reduction. The length of the reduction, nevertheless, typically bears some relationship to the time the defendant spent under severe conditions. For instance, the defendant in United States v. Henao had spent 16 months in a women's prison in Colombia where she faced harsh conditions, including a lack of basic medical care.
Another court granted a 24-month downward variance from a stipulated Guidelines range based on the defendant's health and the circumstances of his 13-month imprisonment in
Where this issue has come up, no particular test has emerged for how harsh the conditions have to be before they can be a basis for a downward variance, but presumably the harsher the conditions the greater the downward variance the defendant can hope to obtain. Significantly, courts have rejected the argument that the defendant's experience must have been notably worse than the experience of his or her fellow prisoners housed at the same prison.
Instead, it appears sufficient to show that your client was exposed to conditions that depart significantly from the minimally accepted norm in the
Suggestions for Argument
What should the attorney do when attempting to gain more lenient treatment for a client who has suffered harsh incarceration? Here are some tips:
Conclusion
In the end, defense counsel should be sure always to ask their clients about their pre-sentencing incarceration conditions, and, if there is a basis, seek a downward variance. While the court ultimately may decline the variance, typically, there is no downside to making this argument, particularly where it is backed up by strong, specific, and particularized evidentiary support. The argument may just convince the court to shorten the sentence by several months and, in rare circumstances, by several years.
Svetlana M. Eisenberg and Daniel O. Blau are attorneys in the
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