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For many years, circuit courts were split on whether and how the equitable doctrine of laches should be applied in copyright cases. The Fourth Circuit, for example, previously held that laches was never an available defense to copyright infringement, regardless of the remedy that was sought by the plaintiff. Other circuit courts, in contrast, held that laches could apply to bar an otherwise timely suit, but only in “extraordinary circumstances” or “the most compelling of cases.” Still other courts held that laches could bar injunctive relief but not damages.
The Ninth Circuit previously endorsed the most expansive application of the laches defense, allowing all relief, both legal and equitable, to be barred where: 1) the plaintiff delayed in initiating the lawsuit; 2) the delay was unreasonable; and 3) the delay resulted in prejudice. The Ninth Circuit also presumed that a claim was barred by laches where the first infringing act occurred outside the three-year statute of limitations in Section 507 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
The Supreme Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), recently resolved this split amongst the circuit courts in a 6-3 decision, holding that the equitable doctrine of laches could not be invoked to preclude a claim for damages within the statute of limitations for copyright cases. The Court did not, however, find that the laches defense was never available. Under the majority's reasoning, the defense can still be applied to bar injunctive relief and an accounting of the defendant's profits.
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