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The Statute of Limitations and the Mentally Incapacitated Plaintiff

By Robert E. Spitzer
October 02, 2014

On Oct. 13, 2009, plaintiff, Jonathan Smart (“Jonathan”) was driving westbound on Breakneck Road, which is a two-lane road located in Bridgewater, NJ. At the same time, Veronica West (“Veronica”) was traveling eastbound on Breakneck Road. As her car approached him, Veronica observed Jonathan's vehicle veer to the right, then suddenly make a 90-degree turn across the center lane, directly in Veronica's path. Veronica, who was speeding and texting, did not have time to react to the sudden event. The front of her vehicle hit the passenger-side door of Jonathan's car. The impact was immense, but since Veronica was in a SUV, while Jonathan was in a mini-cooper, Veronica was left unharmed. There was little left of Jonathan's vehicle.

Jonathan was air-lifted to Hopewell Hospital, where he arrived in a comatose state. Although he survived, Jonathan never regained consciousness.

Given that Veronica admitted to the police that she had been texting and speeding, she pleaded guilty to a citation of reckless driving. Two years after the incident, Jonathan's father, Jason Smart (“Mr. Smart”), was appointed as Guardian ad Prosequendum . Once appointed Guardian, Mr. Smart contemplated filing a lawsuit against Veronica.

Given the above scenario, in order to avoid being time-barred, when does Mr. Smart have to file a lawsuit against Veronica?

NJ's Statute of Limitations

Under general principles, a plaintiff's claims based upon a claim of personal injury are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, as set forth at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. This statute, which applies equally to the institution of medical malpractice actions, provides, in relevant part, that “every action at law ' shall be commenced within two years after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” The general purpose of a statute of limitations is to stimulate prompt action and to penalize negligence while promoting repose by establishing stability in human affairs. Statutes of limitations are intended to protect defendants from unexpected enforcement of stale claims by plaintiffs who fail to use reasonable diligence in prosecuting their claims. However, the effects of statutes of limitations have exceptions, primarily based on equitable considerations. For example, New Jersey's N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21 directs that:

If any person entitled to relief to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane, such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such time after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.

It should be noted that New Jersey's Appellate Division has found that an unconscious plaintiff is deemed “insane” within the meaning of the aforementioned section to toll the statute of limitations.

Appointment of a Guardian and the Ticking Clock

A seminal case that addressed whether the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 began to run on the event of the appointment of a guardian is Unkert by Unkert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 301 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 1997). In Unkert' the plaintiff was rendered incapacitated on Oct. 25, 1988, as the result of an automobile accident. His parents were appointed as his guardians in March 1989. A little less than four years later, the plaintiff sued General Motors (“GM”). The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of GM, finding that the two-year statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs were appointed guardians; therefore, their action against GM four years later was barred. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 compelled a conclusion that the appointment of a guardian triggered the running of the statute of limitations.

Cases decided subsequent to Unkert have noted that while N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 was amended in 2004, no changes were made to the tolling provision as it relates to incapacitated persons. See Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condo. Ass 'n. Inc., 388 N.J. Super. 571, 584 (App. Div. 2006) (“We are convinced that the Legislature agreed with our interpretation of the tolling provision in Unkert and that if the Legislature intended that the tolling provision should not apply to the insane on appointment of a guardian, it would have amended the provision pertaining to the insane at the time of its 2004 amendment”). However, the New Jersey Supreme Court decision Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona Inc., 44 N.J. 100 (1965), reached a different conclusion.

In Kyle, th plaintiff instituted suit on May 28, 1962, following a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on Jan. 21, 1957. As a result of the injuries sustained, the plaintiff was officially deemed insane and committed to an institution in October, 1957. She was released to a nursing home in April 1961 and was officially discharged in March 1962. The Kyle court ultimately held that where a plaintiff was rendered insane due to a defendant's wrongful act, an action would not be barred by the statute of limitations if it was started within a reasonable time after restoration of sanity or after appointment of a guardian or committee that knew or should have known of the cause of action.

While at first blush, the Kyle court's decision stands in direct contrast to Unkert , the court's analysis supports the Appellate Division decision in Unkert. Notably, the Appellate Division in Unkert distinguished Kyle insofar as “unlike in Kyle , James' incompetence occurred simultaneously with the accrual of his alleged cause of action against GM.” In analyzing whether the plaintiff's claims were time barred, the Kyle court went through a lengthy analysis tracing the statute of limitation's antecedents to an English statute adopted during the reign of James I in 1623.

The Kyle court confirmed that basic equitable principles mandate that no man shall benefit from his wrong, and, therefore, if the defendant's negligent act caused the plaintiff's insanity, the plaintiff should not be precluded from suing, even if the conventional statute of limitations had expired. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jacobs in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961) “there have been many instances in which courts, in our State as well as elsewhere, have found the particular circumstances and the considerations of individual justice to be sufficiently compelling to dictate a less harsh approach [than barring a claim based on being filed after the statute of limitations expired].” In weighing equitable interests, the New Jersey Supreme Court found in Fernandi that barring the plaintiff's claims would be unfair: “[I]f plaintiff's insanity was caused by defendant's wrongful act, it may be said that such act was responsible for plaintiff's failure or inability to institute her action prior to the running of the statute of limitations.” Quite simply, “a defendant whose negligent act brings about plaintiff's insanity should not be permitted to cloak himself with the protective garb of the statute of limitations.”

In recognizing that defendants are still entitled to the legislative intent of the statute of limitations, New Jersey's Supreme Court cautioned in Kyle that the tolling principle should also require equity to give some protection to a defendant from stale claim litigation and a plaintiff should act promptly. Even in fraud cases, the authorities require a plaintiff to be diligent because a plaintiff cannot defer the running of the statute by sleeping on his rights or by his own negligence. “Therefore,” stated the Kyle court, “the equitable approach should mandate the following: A trial court shall itself without a jury hear and determine: 1) whether insanity developed on or subsequent to the date of the alleged act of the defendant and within the period of limitation and if so, whether that insanity resulted from the defendant's acts; and 2) whether the plaintiff's suit was started within a reasonable time after restoration of sanity or after the appointment of a guardian or committee that knew or should have known of the cause of action.”

The Kyle court defined the term “insane” within the context of tolling the statute of limitations as such a condition of mental derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action. The definition delineated in Kyle is consistent with the statutory definition of insanity in the context of the Superior Court appointing a guardian for the person or property, or both, of a person found to be incapacitated. A person is incapacitated, in this context, if “impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency to the extent that he lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage his affairs.” N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2.

Conclusion

In the case of Jonathan, it is evident that the claims are tolled since he was rendered “insane” as a result of Veronica's negligence and never regained his facilities. In other cases where a plaintiff may have been injured and later succumbs to mental incapacity, the Guardian should be wary of the Statute of Limitations and the requirement delineated in Kyle that suit be instituted within a reasonable time.


Robert E. Spitzer, a member of this newsletter's Board of Editors, is an attorney with Post, Polak, Goodsell, MacNeill & Strauchler, P.A., where he concentrates his practice on medical malpractice, as well as commercial litigation.

On Oct. 13, 2009, plaintiff, Jonathan Smart (“Jonathan”) was driving westbound on Breakneck Road, which is a two-lane road located in Bridgewater, NJ. At the same time, Veronica West (“Veronica”) was traveling eastbound on Breakneck Road. As her car approached him, Veronica observed Jonathan's vehicle veer to the right, then suddenly make a 90-degree turn across the center lane, directly in Veronica's path. Veronica, who was speeding and texting, did not have time to react to the sudden event. The front of her vehicle hit the passenger-side door of Jonathan's car. The impact was immense, but since Veronica was in a SUV, while Jonathan was in a mini-cooper, Veronica was left unharmed. There was little left of Jonathan's vehicle.

Jonathan was air-lifted to Hopewell Hospital, where he arrived in a comatose state. Although he survived, Jonathan never regained consciousness.

Given that Veronica admitted to the police that she had been texting and speeding, she pleaded guilty to a citation of reckless driving. Two years after the incident, Jonathan's father, Jason Smart (“Mr. Smart”), was appointed as Guardian ad Prosequendum . Once appointed Guardian, Mr. Smart contemplated filing a lawsuit against Veronica.

Given the above scenario, in order to avoid being time-barred, when does Mr. Smart have to file a lawsuit against Veronica?

NJ's Statute of Limitations

Under general principles, a plaintiff's claims based upon a claim of personal injury are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, as set forth at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. This statute, which applies equally to the institution of medical malpractice actions, provides, in relevant part, that “every action at law ' shall be commenced within two years after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” The general purpose of a statute of limitations is to stimulate prompt action and to penalize negligence while promoting repose by establishing stability in human affairs. Statutes of limitations are intended to protect defendants from unexpected enforcement of stale claims by plaintiffs who fail to use reasonable diligence in prosecuting their claims. However, the effects of statutes of limitations have exceptions, primarily based on equitable considerations. For example, New Jersey's N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21 directs that:

If any person entitled to relief to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane, such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such time after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.

It should be noted that New Jersey's Appellate Division has found that an unconscious plaintiff is deemed “insane” within the meaning of the aforementioned section to toll the statute of limitations.

Appointment of a Guardian and the Ticking Clock

A seminal case that addressed whether the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 began to run on the event of the appointment of a guardian is Unkert by Unkert v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 301 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 1997). In Unkert' the plaintiff was rendered incapacitated on Oct. 25, 1988, as the result of an automobile accident. His parents were appointed as his guardians in March 1989. A little less than four years later, the plaintiff sued General Motors (“GM”). The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of GM, finding that the two-year statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs were appointed guardians; therefore, their action against GM four years later was barred. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 compelled a conclusion that the appointment of a guardian triggered the running of the statute of limitations.

Cases decided subsequent to Unkert have noted that while N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-21 was amended in 2004, no changes were made to the tolling provision as it relates to incapacitated persons. See Estate of Nicolas v. Ocean Plaza Condo. Ass ' n. Inc., 388 N.J. Super. 571, 584 (App. Div. 2006) (“We are convinced that the Legislature agreed with our interpretation of the tolling provision in Unkert and that if the Legislature intended that the tolling provision should not apply to the insane on appointment of a guardian, it would have amended the provision pertaining to the insane at the time of its 2004 amendment”). However, the New Jersey Supreme Court decision Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona Inc. , 44 N.J. 100 (1965), reached a different conclusion.

In Kyle, th plaintiff instituted suit on May 28, 1962, following a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on Jan. 21, 1957. As a result of the injuries sustained, the plaintiff was officially deemed insane and committed to an institution in October, 1957. She was released to a nursing home in April 1961 and was officially discharged in March 1962. The Kyle court ultimately held that where a plaintiff was rendered insane due to a defendant's wrongful act, an action would not be barred by the statute of limitations if it was started within a reasonable time after restoration of sanity or after appointment of a guardian or committee that knew or should have known of the cause of action.

While at first blush, the Kyle court's decision stands in direct contrast to Unkert , the court's analysis supports the Appellate Division decision in Unkert. Notably, the Appellate Division in Unkert distinguished Kyle insofar as “unlike in Kyle , James' incompetence occurred simultaneously with the accrual of his alleged cause of action against GM.” In analyzing whether the plaintiff's claims were time barred, the Kyle court went through a lengthy analysis tracing the statute of limitation's antecedents to an English statute adopted during the reign of James I in 1623.

The Kyle court confirmed that basic equitable principles mandate that no man shall benefit from his wrong, and, therefore, if the defendant's negligent act caused the plaintiff's insanity, the plaintiff should not be precluded from suing, even if the conventional statute of limitations had expired. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jacobs in Fernandi v. Strully , 35 N.J. 434 (1961) “there have been many instances in which courts, in our State as well as elsewhere, have found the particular circumstances and the considerations of individual justice to be sufficiently compelling to dictate a less harsh approach [than barring a claim based on being filed after the statute of limitations expired].” In weighing equitable interests, the New Jersey Supreme Court found in Fernandi that barring the plaintiff's claims would be unfair: “[I]f plaintiff's insanity was caused by defendant's wrongful act, it may be said that such act was responsible for plaintiff's failure or inability to institute her action prior to the running of the statute of limitations.” Quite simply, “a defendant whose negligent act brings about plaintiff's insanity should not be permitted to cloak himself with the protective garb of the statute of limitations.”

In recognizing that defendants are still entitled to the legislative intent of the statute of limitations, New Jersey's Supreme Court cautioned in Kyle that the tolling principle should also require equity to give some protection to a defendant from stale claim litigation and a plaintiff should act promptly. Even in fraud cases, the authorities require a plaintiff to be diligent because a plaintiff cannot defer the running of the statute by sleeping on his rights or by his own negligence. “Therefore,” stated the Kyle court, “the equitable approach should mandate the following: A trial court shall itself without a jury hear and determine: 1) whether insanity developed on or subsequent to the date of the alleged act of the defendant and within the period of limitation and if so, whether that insanity resulted from the defendant's acts; and 2) whether the plaintiff's suit was started within a reasonable time after restoration of sanity or after the appointment of a guardian or committee that knew or should have known of the cause of action.”

The Kyle court defined the term “insane” within the context of tolling the statute of limitations as such a condition of mental derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action. The definition delineated in Kyle is consistent with the statutory definition of insanity in the context of the Superior Court appointing a guardian for the person or property, or both, of a person found to be incapacitated. A person is incapacitated, in this context, if “impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency to the extent that he lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage his affairs.” N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2.

Conclusion

In the case of Jonathan, it is evident that the claims are tolled since he was rendered “insane” as a result of Veronica's negligence and never regained his facilities. In other cases where a plaintiff may have been injured and later succumbs to mental incapacity, the Guardian should be wary of the Statute of Limitations and the requirement delineated in Kyle that suit be instituted within a reasonable time.


Robert E. Spitzer, a member of this newsletter's Board of Editors, is an attorney with Post, Polak, Goodsell, MacNeill & Strauchler, P.A., where he concentrates his practice on medical malpractice, as well as commercial litigation.

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