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Non-Custodial Father Has No Cause of Action
A father has been found to lack standing to sue third parties for interference with his visitation rights, as his son's mother, who had sole legal and physical custody of the boy, had given her permission for him to be taken to and retained at a “boot camp” facility in another state. Decter v. Second Nature Therapeutic Program, 13-cv-3519.
The plaintiff and his ex-wife were divorced in 2002, at which time the wife was given sole legal and physical custody of the couple's son. The father had no decision-making authority regarding the child but was allowed twice-weekly visitation and daily telephone contact.
Ten years later, in the middle of the night of June 12, 2012, three men appeared in the 16-year-old boy's room, woke him from his sleep and spirited him off to a Utah camp called the Second Nature Therapeutic Program. On the night he was taken from his bedroom, the boy asked to speak to his father or to his lawyer, but the three men who had come to collect him refused to permit this.
Second Nature's website says that its program turns troubled lives around, and states that its therapists offer “the industry's most clinically sophisticated wilderness therapy program to thousands of children and adults.” At Second Nature, the 16-year-old allegedly had to wear an orange jumpsuit, hike through rough terrain, eat freeze-dried food and bathe using a bag of water. He claimed to have lost 25 pounds during his one-month attendance at Second Nature.
The father was not informed that his son would be sent to Second Nature, and he became alarmed when he could not contact the boy. After he learned where his son had been taken, the father made several unsuccessful attempts to speak with his son at the camp, but he was rebuffed by personnel there. In fact, the camp refused for a long period even to disclose that the boy was actually in attendance. After the father obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a Nassau County court, his son was sent home.
The father sued Second Nature for interference with parental and visitation rights, but the court refused to permit this action after concluding that there existed no New York precedent for such a cause of action by a noncustodial parent against a third party. Instead, the court determined that the father must seek redress from the boy's mother, if from anyone. Stated the court: “To the extent that [the father's] visitation rights were violated, his cause of action may lie against [the mother], not defendants.” In addition, the court held that the mother's authority as custodial parent precluded the father's claims for false imprisonment and abduction because the defendants could not “be liable for carrying out [the mother's] wishes.” In sum, the court concluded that a “non-custodial parent has no cause of action against a third party where the custodial parent consented to the custody by the third party. To hold otherwise would create a novel claim under New York law that would potentially create liability to various institutions ' such as schools, camps and day-care centers ' who are caught in the middle of a marital dispute over visitation rights involving the child.”
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Non-Custodial Father Has No Cause of Action
A father has been found to lack standing to sue third parties for interference with his visitation rights, as his son's mother, who had sole legal and physical custody of the boy, had given her permission for him to be taken to and retained at a “boot camp” facility in another state. Decter v. Second Nature Therapeutic Program, 13-cv-3519.
The plaintiff and his ex-wife were divorced in 2002, at which time the wife was given sole legal and physical custody of the couple's son. The father had no decision-making authority regarding the child but was allowed twice-weekly visitation and daily telephone contact.
Ten years later, in the middle of the night of June 12, 2012, three men appeared in the 16-year-old boy's room, woke him from his sleep and spirited him off to a Utah camp called the Second Nature Therapeutic Program. On the night he was taken from his bedroom, the boy asked to speak to his father or to his lawyer, but the three men who had come to collect him refused to permit this.
Second Nature's website says that its program turns troubled lives around, and states that its therapists offer “the industry's most clinically sophisticated wilderness therapy program to thousands of children and adults.” At Second Nature, the 16-year-old allegedly had to wear an orange jumpsuit, hike through rough terrain, eat freeze-dried food and bathe using a bag of water. He claimed to have lost 25 pounds during his one-month attendance at Second Nature.
The father was not informed that his son would be sent to Second Nature, and he became alarmed when he could not contact the boy. After he learned where his son had been taken, the father made several unsuccessful attempts to speak with his son at the camp, but he was rebuffed by personnel there. In fact, the camp refused for a long period even to disclose that the boy was actually in attendance. After the father obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a Nassau County court, his son was sent home.
The father sued Second Nature for interference with parental and visitation rights, but the court refused to permit this action after concluding that there existed no
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