Verdicts

At trial, the plaintiff called two board-certified obstetrician/gynecologists to testify that Weaver's untreated gestational diabetes caused Demarius' death. Both doctors had extensive experience in the treatment of gestational diabetes. Purporting to rely on Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad , 292 Conn. 150 (2009), the trial court precluded these opinions on the grounds that neither witness had any training or experience in determining cause of death, nor were they board-certified in pathology. Thus, the trial court found that the experts' knowledge was not directly applicable to the issue of causation.

The high court in Weaver set forth the test to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, which is threefold: one, the witness has specialized skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue; two, that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person; and three, the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. Regarding the first prong of this test, the state supreme court found that the trial court (and appellate court) were wrong when they determined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the experts' experience in determining the cause of Demarius' stillbirth.

The high court held that specialized certifications or degrees are not prerequisites to qualifications for medical causation opinions. It is the scope of a witness' knowledge and not the artificial classification that governs the threshold question of admissibility. An expert need not know everything about a topic to be an expert in that field; neither must he be the best or the most qualified expert for his testimony to be admissible. Once reasonable qualifications of an expert are established, then any objection goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Furthermore, the skill and knowledge possessed by the proposed expert OB/GYN experts were not common to the layperson and their opinions would have been helpful (even necessary) to the jury in deciding the case. Thus, it was error to exclude them.

In the course of its opinion, the court also took the time to “stress” that the analysis applied in accordance with State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 (1998) (for assessing the validity of scientific methods used to support an expert's opinion), is separate from the test used to determine whether an expert is qualified to give expert testimony because the appellate court incorrectly conflated the two. While all expert witnesses must be properly qualified to offer opinions to the jury, Porter analysis is a further hurdle beyond the general qualification requirements for admitting expert testimony based on scientific evidence and methods. Rather than assessing a witness' qualifications ( i.e., knowledge and experience), a Porter analysis assesses a witness' methods (i.e., reasoning and procedures) used to reach his conclusions.

Also in Weaver , the court wrestled with two very important evidentiary issues that were likely to arise on retrial. First, the court reiterated the Connecticut rule that treating physicians may testify to opinions formed during the course of treatment when those opinions do not constitute standard of care opinions. Second, the court held that the plaintiff's expert could not be questioned about a prior censure by the voluntary organization American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists for allegedly testifying “falsely” and “beyond his area of expertise.” Rather, under Code of Evidence Sections 4-4, 4-5 and 6-6, on retrial defense counsel would be allowed to ask only if the plaintiff's expert had ever testified falsely or about matters not within his area of expertise. Whatever the answer, counsel will simply have to live with it. ' Carey Reilly , Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder

BIO HERE

CT Supreme Court Clarifies Expert Qualification Requirements

In September, Connecticut's Chief Justice, Chase Rogers, provided much-needed articulation regarding the qualifications needed to support admission of expert testimony on causation, generally, and cause of death, specifically. Weaver v. McKnight , 313 Conn. 393 (9/2/14).

Plaintiff Dorothy Weaver's son, Demarius, was stillborn. Weaver claimed that Dr. Henry Amdur negligently failed to diagnose and treat Ms. Weaver's gestational diabetes, thereby causing her baby's death.

At trial, the plaintiff called two board-certified obstetrician/gynecologists to testify that Weaver's untreated gestational diabetes caused Demarius' death. Both doctors had extensive experience in the treatment of gestational diabetes. Purporting to rely on Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad , 292 Conn. 150 (2009), the trial court precluded these opinions on the grounds that neither witness had any training or experience in determining cause of death, nor were they board-certified in pathology. Thus, the trial court found that the experts' knowledge was not directly applicable to the issue of causation.

The high court in Weaver set forth the test to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, which is threefold: one, the witness has specialized skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue; two, that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person; and three, the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. Regarding the first prong of this test, the state supreme court found that the trial court (and appellate court) were wrong when they determined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the experts' experience in determining the cause of Demarius' stillbirth.

The high court held that specialized certifications or degrees are not prerequisites to qualifications for medical causation opinions. It is the scope of a witness' knowledge and not the artificial classification that governs the threshold question of admissibility. An expert need not know everything about a topic to be an expert in that field; neither must he be the best or the most qualified expert for his testimony to be admissible. Once reasonable qualifications of an expert are established, then any objection goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Furthermore, the skill and knowledge possessed by the proposed expert OB/GYN experts were not common to the layperson and their opinions would have been helpful (even necessary) to the jury in deciding the case. Thus, it was error to exclude them.

In the course of its opinion, the court also took the time to “stress” that the analysis applied in accordance with State v. Porter , 241 Conn. 57 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 (1998) (for assessing the validity of scientific methods used to support an expert's opinion), is separate from the test used to determine whether an expert is qualified to give expert testimony because the appellate court incorrectly conflated the two. While all expert witnesses must be properly qualified to offer opinions to the jury, Porter analysis is a further hurdle beyond the general qualification requirements for admitting expert testimony based on scientific evidence and methods. Rather than assessing a witness' qualifications ( i.e., knowledge and experience), a Porter analysis assesses a witness' methods (i.e., reasoning and procedures) used to reach his conclusions.

Also in Weaver , the court wrestled with two very important evidentiary issues that were likely to arise on retrial. First, the court reiterated the Connecticut rule that treating physicians may testify to opinions formed during the course of treatment when those opinions do not constitute standard of care opinions. Second, the court held that the plaintiff's expert could not be questioned about a prior censure by the voluntary organization American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists for allegedly testifying “falsely” and “beyond his area of expertise.” Rather, under Code of Evidence Sections 4-4, 4-5 and 6-6, on retrial defense counsel would be allowed to ask only if the plaintiff's expert had ever testified falsely or about matters not within his area of expertise. Whatever the answer, counsel will simply have to live with it. ' Carey Reilly , Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder

BIO HERE