NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Judge Announces New Formula for Who Decides Pre-School Questions

In his opinion in the case of Madison v. Davis, decided in June of this year but not approved for publication until Oct. 9, Judge L.C. Jones of Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, Chancery Division, Family Part, reconciled two contradictory precedential cases to come up with a seven-part test for determining whether a custodial parent's unilateral decision concerning a child's pre-school placement should stand.

The parties in Madison v. Davis had entered into a matrimonial settlement agreement whereby they shared joint legal custody of their three-year-old child, but the mother had primary residential custody. They also agreed that they would share equally in the cost of work-related childcare expenses. Less than four months after their divorce was finalized, the mother, without notifying the father, moved the child to a new pre-school. The father sought judicial intervention. Relying on Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480 (1981), he asserted that any decision concerning the choice of the child's pre-school should have been made only upon notice to him, and with his consent. The mother countered that, as the custodial parent, she was entitled to unilaterally make the normal day-to-day decisions about the child's childcare situation, in accordance with Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583 (1995).

The court agreed that Beck stands for the notion that a non-custodial parent with joint custody has the right to be involved in making important child-rearing decisions, and that Pascale says a custodial parent may unilaterally make decisions about a child's day-to-day upbringing without first securing the other parent's consent. Neither of these two cases dealt with the question of pre-school placement, however, causing the court to note, “Pre-school is neither pure 'school,' as defendant contends, or pure 'day care,'” as plaintiff contended. Instead, “pre-school is a sociological cross between these two concepts,” stated Judge Jones. For this reason, the court came up with a seven-part inquiry to be used when parents disagree on the subject of their child's pre-school arrangement. Those steps say:

• The primary custodian has the initial right to select a pre-school if it is also filling the need for work-related day care;
• That choice must be reasonable, taking into consideration cost, location, hours of operation and curriculum;
• Reasonable notice of change in pre-school must be provided to the non-custoidal parent;
• The non-custodial parent has a right to information about the new pre-school, and if he or she disagrees with the choice, the non-custodial parent bears the burden of proving to the court that the choice of school is unreasonable;
• To be successful in a challenge, the non-custodial parent must propose a more reasonable placement for the child;
• The court may decide the issue and order both parents to contribute to the cost of the chosen school; and
• If either party is acting unreasonably, the court may order him or her to pay the other's counsel fees and/or sanctions.

After working through these seven steps, Judge Jones decided that the new pre-school proposed by the custodial mother was not unreasonable, and that her decision to send the child there should stand.

After concluding the substantive portion of the decision, Judge Jones went on to issue an interesting lecture to the parents, scolding them for having returned twice to the courtroom within less than a year of their divorce over matters that the court deemed less than substantial. “In this case,” stated Judge Jones, “the reality is that the parties have at least fifteen more years of co-parenting on the horizon. They have already been to court twice in one year, and may very likely continue this pattern, to their child's emotional and financial detriment, unless they both agree to attempt a drastic change in their interpersonal dynamics. While the parties always technically retain the right to repeatedly return to court over newly arising issues, what they truly need for their child's sake, as well as their own, is to commence participation in professional co-parenting counseling, and mutually work in a constructive and pro-active manner on improving their long-term ability to communicate and cooperate with each other as effective joint legal custodians.”

Although he did not order any such counseling, the judge made it clear that, should the parties return to court, a counseling order would likely ensue.

The opinion is available at http://bit.ly/1xeeVIc.

CONNECTICUT

State Has No Standing to Intervene in Divorce Action

The government is not entitled to intervene in a marital dissolution action to protect its interest in property that belongs to one of the long-married parties. a court declared in Kinney v. Kinney, New Haven Judicial District Court, at New Haven, Doc. No.: FA14-4061339S.

The wife filed a complaint to dissolve the marriage, and the government, which previously obtained a judgment against the husband, moved to intervene, to protect the government's interest in property that belongs to the husband and to prevent any fraudulent conveyance of that property. Both parties objected that the government, as a third-party creditor, lacked standing to intervene. “[A] person or entity does not have a sufficient interest to qualify for the right to intervene merely because an impending judgment will have some effect on him, her or it,” pursuant to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, a 2006 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Here, the government had not identified any interest of a “direct and immediate” character that would result in a gain or loss as a result of the court's judgment in the dissolution of marriage action and the government does not belong to one of the recognized statutory categories of individuals or entities that can intervene. Its claims about potential fraudulent conveyances were also merely conjectural. Therefore, the court denied the government's request to intervene.

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NEW JERSEY

Judge Announces New Formula for Who Decides Pre-School Questions

In his opinion in the case of Madison v. Davis, decided in June of this year but not approved for publication until Oct. 9, Judge L.C. Jones of Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, Chancery Division, Family Part, reconciled two contradictory precedential cases to come up with a seven-part test for determining whether a custodial parent's unilateral decision concerning a child's pre-school placement should stand.

The parties in Madison v. Davis had entered into a matrimonial settlement agreement whereby they shared joint legal custody of their three-year-old child, but the mother had primary residential custody. They also agreed that they would share equally in the cost of work-related childcare expenses. Less than four months after their divorce was finalized, the mother, without notifying the father, moved the child to a new pre-school. The father sought judicial intervention. Relying on Beck v. Beck , 86 N.J. 480 (1981), he asserted that any decision concerning the choice of the child's pre-school should have been made only upon notice to him, and with his consent. The mother countered that, as the custodial parent, she was entitled to unilaterally make the normal day-to-day decisions about the child's childcare situation, in accordance with Pascale v. Pascale , 140 N.J. 583 (1995).

The court agreed that Beck stands for the notion that a non-custodial parent with joint custody has the right to be involved in making important child-rearing decisions, and that Pascale says a custodial parent may unilaterally make decisions about a child's day-to-day upbringing without first securing the other parent's consent. Neither of these two cases dealt with the question of pre-school placement, however, causing the court to note, “Pre-school is neither pure 'school,' as defendant contends, or pure 'day care,'” as plaintiff contended. Instead, “pre-school is a sociological cross between these two concepts,” stated Judge Jones. For this reason, the court came up with a seven-part inquiry to be used when parents disagree on the subject of their child's pre-school arrangement. Those steps say:

• The primary custodian has the initial right to select a pre-school if it is also filling the need for work-related day care;
• That choice must be reasonable, taking into consideration cost, location, hours of operation and curriculum;
• Reasonable notice of change in pre-school must be provided to the non-custoidal parent;
• The non-custodial parent has a right to information about the new pre-school, and if he or she disagrees with the choice, the non-custodial parent bears the burden of proving to the court that the choice of school is unreasonable;
• To be successful in a challenge, the non-custodial parent must propose a more reasonable placement for the child;
• The court may decide the issue and order both parents to contribute to the cost of the chosen school; and
• If either party is acting unreasonably, the court may order him or her to pay the other's counsel fees and/or sanctions.

After working through these seven steps, Judge Jones decided that the new pre-school proposed by the custodial mother was not unreasonable, and that her decision to send the child there should stand.

After concluding the substantive portion of the decision, Judge Jones went on to issue an interesting lecture to the parents, scolding them for having returned twice to the courtroom within less than a year of their divorce over matters that the court deemed less than substantial. “In this case,” stated Judge Jones, “the reality is that the parties have at least fifteen more years of co-parenting on the horizon. They have already been to court twice in one year, and may very likely continue this pattern, to their child's emotional and financial detriment, unless they both agree to attempt a drastic change in their interpersonal dynamics. While the parties always technically retain the right to repeatedly return to court over newly arising issues, what they truly need for their child's sake, as well as their own, is to commence participation in professional co-parenting counseling, and mutually work in a constructive and pro-active manner on improving their long-term ability to communicate and cooperate with each other as effective joint legal custodians.”

Although he did not order any such counseling, the judge made it clear that, should the parties return to court, a counseling order would likely ensue.

The opinion is available at http://bit.ly/1xeeVIc.

CONNECTICUT

State Has No Standing to Intervene in Divorce Action

The government is not entitled to intervene in a marital dissolution action to protect its interest in property that belongs to one of the long-married parties. a court declared in Kinney v. Kinney, New Haven Judicial District Court, at New Haven, Doc. No.: FA14-4061339S.

The wife filed a complaint to dissolve the marriage, and the government, which previously obtained a judgment against the husband, moved to intervene, to protect the government's interest in property that belongs to the husband and to prevent any fraudulent conveyance of that property. Both parties objected that the government, as a third-party creditor, lacked standing to intervene. “[A] person or entity does not have a sufficient interest to qualify for the right to intervene merely because an impending judgment will have some effect on him, her or it,” pursuant to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, a 2006 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Here, the government had not identified any interest of a “direct and immediate” character that would result in a gain or loss as a result of the court's judgment in the dissolution of marriage action and the government does not belong to one of the recognized statutory categories of individuals or entities that can intervene. Its claims about potential fraudulent conveyances were also merely conjectural. Therefore, the court denied the government's request to intervene.

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