NJ & CT News

NEW JERSEY

Findings in FRO Proceeding Not Binding

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, has reversed a jury award of nearly $150,000 to a woman who claimed her boyfriend assaulted her; the appeals court concluded that the Law Division court improperly relied on an earlier Family Part determination that the man assaulted the woman to conclude that he must be prevented from offering a defense in the second matter. L.T. v. F. M., 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 154 (11/14/14).

The plaintiff obtained a final restraining order (FRO) against the defendant based on an assault that allegedly occurred on Feb. 27, 2008, when the couple of seven years had an argument. The woman claimed the defendant spat in her face, pushed her against the bathroom wall, grabbed her neck, and hit her head repeatedly into the wall. That same day she reported the assault to the police and received prescription medication to treat her injuries at a hospital. Before the Family Part, the woman alleged that the defendant had assaulted her on three previous occasions. While acknowledging that two of those other assaults “occurred,” the FRO that issued was based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff on Feb. 27, 2008. The man did not appeal the FRO.

The plaintiff next sought compensatory and punitive damages not in the Family Part but in this action in the Law Division. She based her claim not only on the Feb. 27, 2008, incident, but also on alleged assaults in April and August 2007. The judge initially handling this second action in the Law Division was the same one who oversaw the FRO proceedings. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment that the prior FRO trial “establish[ed defendant's] liability, as a matter of law, in the present intentional tort action, by operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” The judge denied the motion, explaining that collateral estoppel would be unfair to the defendant because the two types of actions between these two people were very different. The judge's opinion stated, “[A] domestic violence hearing is clearly a summary proceeding, held in an 'emergency situation.' The procedural limitations imposed by the Legislature in achieving the worthy goal of 'assur[ing] the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide' are not consistent with a civil action, filed in the Law Division, in which the parties are permitted extensive pre-trial discovery, which New Jersey Courts consistently construe liberally.”

This might have been the end of the matter except that a new judge was later assigned to the case, at which point the plaintiff renewed her motion for partial summary judgment. This time it was granted, and the defendant was estopped from arguing that he had not assaulted the plaintiff. This second judge did not mention the first judge's denial of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment; the only explanation he offered for the different outcome was this: “The fact that no timely appeal [of the FRO] was filed is a significant factor in this determination.” The Feb. 27, 2008 assault having been deemed “established” on summary judgment, the jury found that the defendant also assaulted the plaintiff in April 2007. They awarded her $149,500 in damages, and the defendant appealed.

The appeals court noted that although the elements were present for holding the defendant collaterally estopped from defending against the allegation that he assaulted the plaintiff in 2008, it agreed with the first judge that it would not be equitable to prevent the defendant from mounting a defense in this situation. That's because in an action seeking a restraining order in a domestic violence case, time is generally of the essence and discovery is not permitted. Therefore, the defendant could not be said to have received a full and fair hearing in the FRO proceeding, and should not be equitably estopped from offering a defense in the civil damages proceeding. In addition, the first judge in the damages action had denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. That ruling thus became the “law of the case,” which should normally put that issue to rest for the remainder of the case. And although the law of the case is not ironclad, and a judge can change a previously made decision if required by the emergence of new evidence, the appeals court observed that “when a judge decides not to follow the law of the case doctrine, it is incumbent on the judge to explain the reasons for that departure.” In this case, a bare statement that the man's failure to appeal the FRO was “significant” did not explain anything.

Because the court found that the defendant was incorrectly barred from offering a defense, the appeals court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

CONNECTICUT

Habeas Petitioner Must Prove That She Is Legal Guardian

Only a parent, foster parent, approved adoptive parent or legal guardian can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to challenge the custody of a minor child. Gonzalez v. Katz, FA13-4026627S (Stamford/Norwalk J.D., at Stamford 10/23/14).

In October 2012, the Department of Children and Families took custody of the minor child, who was born in Guatemala. Allegedly, the birth mother, who was only 14 years old, gave the baby to the petitioner, Maria Gonzalez, and Gonzalez and her husband attended the birth, paid the hospital expenses and took the baby to Stamford, CT. The child's birth certificate names Gonzalez and her husband as the parents. Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to regain custody of the 5-year-old child, and the parties disputed whether she possessed standing, as a legal guardian of the minor child. Connecticut General Statutes '52-466(f) provides that a foster parent or an approved adoptive parent can petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to obtain custody. Gonzalez moved for summary judgment. The United States Department of Homeland Security apparently suspected that Gonzalez and her husband purchased the child and engaged in human trafficking. The court found Gonzalez's motion premture and scheduled an evidentiary hearing, to permit Gonzalez to prove that she is the minor child's legal guardian. “[U]nder the unique circumstances of this case,” wrote the court, “the mere assertion by the petitioner that she is the legal guardian of the child under Guatemala law, without more, is insufficient to confer standing.”

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NEW JERSEY

Findings in FRO Proceeding Not Binding

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, has reversed a jury award of nearly $150,000 to a woman who claimed her boyfriend assaulted her; the appeals court concluded that the Law Division court improperly relied on an earlier Family Part determination that the man assaulted the woman to conclude that he must be prevented from offering a defense in the second matter. L.T. v. F. M., 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 154 (11/14/14).

The plaintiff obtained a final restraining order (FRO) against the defendant based on an assault that allegedly occurred on Feb. 27, 2008, when the couple of seven years had an argument. The woman claimed the defendant spat in her face, pushed her against the bathroom wall, grabbed her neck, and hit her head repeatedly into the wall. That same day she reported the assault to the police and received prescription medication to treat her injuries at a hospital. Before the Family Part, the woman alleged that the defendant had assaulted her on three previous occasions. While acknowledging that two of those other assaults “occurred,” the FRO that issued was based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff on Feb. 27, 2008. The man did not appeal the FRO.

The plaintiff next sought compensatory and punitive damages not in the Family Part but in this action in the Law Division. She based her claim not only on the Feb. 27, 2008, incident, but also on alleged assaults in April and August 2007. The judge initially handling this second action in the Law Division was the same one who oversaw the FRO proceedings. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment that the prior FRO trial “establish[ed defendant's] liability, as a matter of law, in the present intentional tort action, by operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” The judge denied the motion, explaining that collateral estoppel would be unfair to the defendant because the two types of actions between these two people were very different. The judge's opinion stated, “[A] domestic violence hearing is clearly a summary proceeding, held in an 'emergency situation.' The procedural limitations imposed by the Legislature in achieving the worthy goal of 'assur[ing] the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide' are not consistent with a civil action, filed in the Law Division, in which the parties are permitted extensive pre-trial discovery, which New Jersey Courts consistently construe liberally.”

This might have been the end of the matter except that a new judge was later assigned to the case, at which point the plaintiff renewed her motion for partial summary judgment. This time it was granted, and the defendant was estopped from arguing that he had not assaulted the plaintiff. This second judge did not mention the first judge's denial of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment; the only explanation he offered for the different outcome was this: “The fact that no timely appeal [of the FRO] was filed is a significant factor in this determination.” The Feb. 27, 2008 assault having been deemed “established” on summary judgment, the jury found that the defendant also assaulted the plaintiff in April 2007. They awarded her $149,500 in damages, and the defendant appealed.

The appeals court noted that although the elements were present for holding the defendant collaterally estopped from defending against the allegation that he assaulted the plaintiff in 2008, it agreed with the first judge that it would not be equitable to prevent the defendant from mounting a defense in this situation. That's because in an action seeking a restraining order in a domestic violence case, time is generally of the essence and discovery is not permitted. Therefore, the defendant could not be said to have received a full and fair hearing in the FRO proceeding, and should not be equitably estopped from offering a defense in the civil damages proceeding. In addition, the first judge in the damages action had denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. That ruling thus became the “law of the case,” which should normally put that issue to rest for the remainder of the case. And although the law of the case is not ironclad, and a judge can change a previously made decision if required by the emergence of new evidence, the appeals court observed that “when a judge decides not to follow the law of the case doctrine, it is incumbent on the judge to explain the reasons for that departure.” In this case, a bare statement that the man's failure to appeal the FRO was “significant” did not explain anything.

Because the court found that the defendant was incorrectly barred from offering a defense, the appeals court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

CONNECTICUT

Habeas Petitioner Must Prove That She Is Legal Guardian

Only a parent, foster parent, approved adoptive parent or legal guardian can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to challenge the custody of a minor child. Gonzalez v. Katz, FA13-4026627S (Stamford/Norwalk J.D., at Stamford 10/23/14).

In October 2012, the Department of Children and Families took custody of the minor child, who was born in Guatemala. Allegedly, the birth mother, who was only 14 years old, gave the baby to the petitioner, Maria Gonzalez, and Gonzalez and her husband attended the birth, paid the hospital expenses and took the baby to Stamford, CT. The child's birth certificate names Gonzalez and her husband as the parents. Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to regain custody of the 5-year-old child, and the parties disputed whether she possessed standing, as a legal guardian of the minor child. Connecticut General Statutes '52-466(f) provides that a foster parent or an approved adoptive parent can petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to obtain custody. Gonzalez moved for summary judgment. The United States Department of Homeland Security apparently suspected that Gonzalez and her husband purchased the child and engaged in human trafficking. The court found Gonzalez's motion premture and scheduled an evidentiary hearing, to permit Gonzalez to prove that she is the minor child's legal guardian. “[U]nder the unique circumstances of this case,” wrote the court, “the mere assertion by the petitioner that she is the legal guardian of the child under Guatemala law, without more, is insufficient to confer standing.”

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