Addressing the Dissipation of Marital Assets in a Divorce Case

In the formative case of Kothari v. Kothari' the New Jersey Appellate Division defined dissipation as a situation in which a spouse uses marital property for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage, at a time when the marital relationship is in serious jeopardy. 255 N.J. Super 500 (App. Div. 1992). Dissipation of marital assets “in its simplest form occurs when a party conceals, conveys or wastes marital assets during the dissolution proceeding or in anticipation of divorce.” Erica Driskell, Dissipation of Marital Assets and Preliminary Injunctions: A Preventive Approach to Safeguarding Marital Assets, 20 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 135, 136 (2006) citing Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property ' 6.30 at 467 (2d. ed. 1994 and 2004 Supp.). And, “dissipation rules in a number of equitable distribution states therefore generally focus on management actions done after the marriage has broken down.” Turner, supra ' 6:108, at 605 (2005).

Further, New Jersey courts have a great deal of discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy in any divorce where there are serious claims of dissipation of a marital asset by a spouse without the other's knowledge or consent. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes a court “to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage.” The New Jersey Legislature intended that its reference to “property” in the equitable distribution statute be construed comprehensively. Dugan v. Dugan , 92 N.J. 423, 428, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Painter v. Painter , 65 N.J. 196, 217, 320 A.2d 484 (1974). In Painter , the N.J. Supreme Court cautioned that “any disposition of property in fraud of the other spouse could be promptly made the subject of appropriate judicial action.” 55 Id . at 218, n. 6. See also Monte v. Monte , 212 N.J. Super. 557, 567-68 (App. Div.1986) (“Intentional dissipation” of marital assets by one spouse would constitute a “fraud on [the] marital rights” of the other spouse.) In a matrimonial matter, “dissipated funds are subject to equitable distribution, as if the funds were not dissipated at all.” Wasserman v. Schwartz , 364 N.J. Super. 399, 414 (Law Div. 2001). And in New Jersey, a trial court has sole discretion to determine the dissipation of assets, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Kothari, supra , 255 N.J. Super. at 506. If there is a gross dissipation then the court has the authority to allocate assets in an effect to avoid harm to the non-dissipating spouse. Id. Moreover, it can also disproportionally allocate any marital debt in the divorce proceedings to account for a dissipation that created a marital debt that should not be labeled as such because the non-dissipating spouse had no knowledge of the debt. Ibid.

The Kothari Ruling

In Kothari, the court held that the defendant-husband dissipated marital assets when he wired large amounts of money to his parents in India. 255 N.J. Super 500 (App. Div. 1992). The husband had filed for divorce three separate times during the time of the transfers. Id. In Kothari , the New Jersey Appellate Division identified factors relevant to the question of “whether the assets were expended by one spouse with the intent of diminishing the other spouse's share of the marital estate.” Those factors have been widely used throughout New Jersey trial courts since 1992 to determine if there was a dissipation. They include, “(1) the proximity of the expenditure to the parties' separation, (2) whether the expenditure was typical of expenditures made by the parties prior to the breakdown of the marriage, (3) whether the expenditure benefited the “joint” marital enterprise or was for the benefit of one spouse to the exclusion of the other, and (4) the need for, and amount of, the expenditure.” Id' at 507.

The Kothari court held that the Defendant's wiring of funds to his out-of-the-country family after he had contemplated divorce was dissipation. Id. In Kothari, the trial court made specific findings in fixing the debt that the husband owed the wife; one-half of the sum the husband gave his parents over his wife's objection; one-half of a fund the husband established by liquidating marital assets and spending for his own purposes while contemplating divorce; and one-half of the amount he spent to support his parents who lived with him after he abandoned his wife. Id. at 505'06.

Wadhwa v. Sethi

In the New Jersey Appellate Division's recent, unpublished, opinion Wadhwa v. Sethi, the court follows Kothari's factor review and thoroughly discussed dissipation claims. The Wadwa court noted that where one spouse has “dissipated the marital assets, or otherwise disposed of them in fraud of the other,” a court properly imposes a debt on the dissipating “spouse in favor of the other.” WL 1748430, at *2 (App. Div. 2013), citing Kothari v. Kothari, 255 N.J. Super. 500, 510 (App. Div. 1992). In Wadhwa, the Appellate Division detailed that “in determining that defendant dissipated $355,350 between March 2005 and December 2009, the judge identified the ultimate question, articulated in Kothari, presented by a dissipation case: whether the assets were expended by one spouse with the intent to diminish the others ' share of the marital estate.” Id. (Emphasis added.)

The Wadhwa court noted that that trial judge properly identified the factors relevant to a dissipation inquiry: 1) proximity to separation; 2) whether the expenditure was typical of those made prior to the breakdown of the marriage; 3) whether the expenditure benefited one party to the exclusion of the other; and 4) the need for and amount of the expenditure.” Wadhwa v. Sethi, 2013 WL 1748430, at *8 (App. Div. 2013).

In the States

A review of case law throughout the United States acknowledges that courts all allocate debt created by a dissipation similar to New Jersey courts, and that they have come up with “three different remedies for asset-related misconduct: fraudulent conveyance, unequal division, and classification as marital property.” Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property ' 6:102 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.).

The first remedy for dissipation identified by a review of national case law is the unequal division of the remaining assets in the marital estate. Turner, ' 6:104 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.). An unequal division will cover all different types of dissipation, for the court can grant relief in cases of waste and concealment, as well as fraudulent conveyance. Id.

The second remedy when a marital asset is conveyed to a third person is the employment of the state's relevant fraudulent conveyance statute. Id. A fraudulent conveyance is defined in N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a) or (b). Review whether the “transfer or incurred obligation [was made]: 1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation. Equitable distribution statutes generally do not give the court express authority to retract fraudulent conveyances; however, state courts have little difficulty concluding that such rescission falls within the inherent equitable powers of courts in divorce actions. Ibid., citing Shah v. Shah, 270 Ga. 649 (1999) (although damages cannot be awarded); In re Marriage of Frederick, 218 Ill. App. 3d 533 (2d Dist. 1991) (rescinding conveyance into irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children); Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2000); Nevitt v. Nevitt, 155 Vt. 391 (1990) (rescinding conveyance to the husband's mother).

The requirements of fraudulent conveyance statutes vary from state to state but the provisions are similar in that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. A conveyance to a third party generally qualifies as fraudulent if the innocent party shows either that: 1) both the transferor and the transferee had actual fraudulent intent; or 2) the transfer was made without substantial consideration and it rendered the conveying spouse insolvent (having greater liabilities than assets). Turner, ' 6:102 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.), citing, e.g., Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Westlaw 2005). But cf. Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 580 A.2d 1212 (1990) (any conveyance of a marital asset without substantial consideration is per se fraudulent).

'Existing Marital Property'

The last remedy employed by courts when marital assets are dissipated in anticipation of divorce, is that the dissipated assets are treated as if they were existing marital property, i.e., “they are then constructively awarded to the dissipating spouse as part of that spouse's share of the marital estate.” Turner, ' 6:105 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.). If there are insufficient tangible assets remaining in the marital estate to compensate the innocent spouse, the court may order the dissipating spouse to pay a monetary award. Id. See, e.g., Monte v. Monte , supra, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 567-68 (App. Div.1986); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 172 A.D.2d 316, (1st Dep't 1991).

However, where viable marital assets exist to satisfy the dissipation, a monetary award is not required. Ibid . The court may instead simply treat the dissipation as a factor to be considered in dividing the other marital assets. Turner, supra, at ' 6:105 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.); see also In re Marriage of Durante, 201 Ill. App. 3d 376 (1st Dist. 1990); Cofer v. Price-Cofer, 825 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1992).

Courts in equitable distribution states now remedy asset-related misconduct such as dissipation of a joint marital asset with remedies such as a finding of fraudulent conveyance, rendering an unequal division of the remaining marital estate, classifying property that was dissipated as marital property, and also rendering a money judgment against the dissipating spouse in favor of the other spouse. See Mir v. Birjandi, 2007 WL 4170868 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007); Pride v. Pride, 318 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App. 1958); Swisher v. Swishe , 190 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App. 1945).

Analysis

All of the aforementioned approaches strive to deter spouses from engaging in dissipation, in addition to the possibility of burdening them with special interrogatories, notice to produce, subpoena of records, depositions, joinder of third party, third-party discovery, and the obligation to incur the total financial loss resulting from the dissipation.

New Jersey has Case Information Statements (CIS), which disclose the full finances of each party. N.J.C.R. 5:5-2. In fact, full and fair disclosure is required, and there is an obligation to update a CIS consistently as the divorce matter progresses. Id. In addition, marital dissipation will be looked at within the context of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, and it is highly unethical ever to allow a client to hide or deliberately diminish the value of an asset, or perpetrate a fraud on the opposing party. N.J.R.P.C. 1.16 states that a lawyer must discontinue representation of a client that “persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.” N.J.R.P.C. 1.16.

Further, an attorney may not knowingly submit a CIS as complete, when s/he knows it is not, and all clients are required to certify and sign their CIS's to certify to its truth and veracity. A client who seeks to lie about assets must cease and desist at first advice from his or her counsel, or the attorney must stop representation of the client. Ibid. While attorneys are not required to audit their clients, they cannot participate in facilitating a dissipation of marital assets/income.

Conclusion

Proper and sufficient discovery must occur to trace dissipated assets and meet your initial burden. To prepare a case with these issues, a number of actions must be considered by the matrimonial practitioner. The use of a forensic accountant to trace the dissipated assets, and prepare a report setting forth the claim, may also be necessary depending on the nature and extent of the dissipation.

Gerard Giannetti, a forensic accountant, points out that, “Another form of dissipation is when a spouse 'parks' assets in either a friend, family or business name, and retrieves them after the final judgment of divorce is issued. An example of that practice is when a spouse works in a closely held business and has the ability to instruct management to withhold stock or options that are due to the spouse and have those assets or income 'parked' off the martial books until such time as the spouse seeks to retrieve them. These assets would normally be part of equitable distribution or would be considered compensation for alimony. It is imperative for the forensic accountant to review all employment documents and filings when stock, options or any other form of equity payment can be made to an employee/partner.”

Lynne Strober, a member of this newsletter's Board of Editors, chairs the Family Law Department of Mandelbaum Salsburg, P.C. She is a former Chair of the NJSBA Family Law Section, Former Chair of the Essex County Family Law Executive Committee and former Chair of the Supreme Court Matrimonial Certification Committee as well as a former member of the Supreme Court Board on Attorney Certification. Jennifer Presti is an associate with the firm. The authors thank Gerard Giannetti, a forensic accountant with Giannetti & Assoc., who contributed to this article.

The typical allegations of dissipation in a divorce include spending, sending or funneling marital monies to a spouse's extended family or friends, gambling debts, bad business decisions, and spending money on extramarital affairs. The critical question in these situations is, at what point does one spouse's gifts to family or'friends, or their bad investments and/or extravagant spending, become considered dissipation in the eyes of an adversary looking to review a case or the judiciary, and what remedies are available to a spouse where a dissipation has been found to have occurred?

In the state of New Jersey, for example, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 (i) requires the court, in making an equitable distribution of marital property, to consider the “contribution of each party to the acquisition, dissipation, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property.” (Emphasis added.) It is not uncommon for one spouse to hide and/or spend down marital assets in the anticipation of divorce. A matrimonial law practitioner is all too familiar with the term “divorce planning,” and the dissipation of a marital asset is often a key strategy employed for that purpose. The New Jersey Legislature did not define “dissipation” of marital property; however, case law gives courts and practitioners a definition and framework for review of dissipation claims.

NJ Case Law

In the formative case of Kothari v. Kothari' the New Jersey Appellate Division defined dissipation as a situation in which a spouse uses marital property for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage, at a time when the marital relationship is in serious jeopardy. 255 N.J. Super 500 (App. Div. 1992). Dissipation of marital assets “in its simplest form occurs when a party conceals, conveys or wastes marital assets during the dissolution proceeding or in anticipation of divorce.” Erica Driskell, Dissipation of Marital Assets and Preliminary Injunctions: A Preventive Approach to Safeguarding Marital Assets, 20 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 135, 136 (2006) citing Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property ' 6.30 at 467 (2d. ed. 1994 and 2004 Supp.). And, “dissipation rules in a number of equitable distribution states therefore generally focus on management actions done after the marriage has broken down.” Turner, supra ' 6:108, at 605 (2005).

Further, New Jersey courts have a great deal of discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy in any divorce where there are serious claims of dissipation of a marital asset by a spouse without the other's knowledge or consent. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 authorizes a court “to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage.” The New Jersey Legislature intended that its reference to “property” in the equitable distribution statute be construed comprehensively. Dugan v. Dugan , 92 N.J. 423, 428, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Painter v. Painter , 65 N.J. 196, 217, 320 A.2d 484 (1974). In Painter , the N.J. Supreme Court cautioned that “any disposition of property in fraud of the other spouse could be promptly made the subject of appropriate judicial action.” 55 Id . at 218, n. 6. See also Monte v. Monte , 212 N.J. Super. 557, 567-68 (App. Div.1986) (“Intentional dissipation” of marital assets by one spouse would constitute a “fraud on [the] marital rights” of the other spouse.) In a matrimonial matter, “dissipated funds are subject to equitable distribution, as if the funds were not dissipated at all.” Wasserman v. Schwartz , 364 N.J. Super. 399, 414 (Law Div. 2001). And in New Jersey, a trial court has sole discretion to determine the dissipation of assets, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Kothari, supra , 255 N.J. Super. at 506. If there is a gross dissipation then the court has the authority to allocate assets in an effect to avoid harm to the non-dissipating spouse. Id. Moreover, it can also disproportionally allocate any marital debt in the divorce proceedings to account for a dissipation that created a marital debt that should not be labeled as such because the non-dissipating spouse had no knowledge of the debt. Ibid.

The Kothari Ruling

In Kothari, the court held that the defendant-husband dissipated marital assets when he wired large amounts of money to his parents in India. 255 N.J. Super 500 (App. Div. 1992). The husband had filed for divorce three separate times during the time of the transfers. Id. In Kothari , the New Jersey Appellate Division identified factors relevant to the question of “whether the assets were expended by one spouse with the intent of diminishing the other spouse's share of the marital estate.” Those factors have been widely used throughout New Jersey trial courts since 1992 to determine if there was a dissipation. They include, “(1) the proximity of the expenditure to the parties' separation, (2) whether the expenditure was typical of expenditures made by the parties prior to the breakdown of the marriage, (3) whether the expenditure benefited the “joint” marital enterprise or was for the benefit of one spouse to the exclusion of the other, and (4) the need for, and amount of, the expenditure.” Id' at 507.

The Kothari court held that the Defendant's wiring of funds to his out-of-the-country family after he had contemplated divorce was dissipation. Id. In Kothari, the trial court made specific findings in fixing the debt that the husband owed the wife; one-half of the sum the husband gave his parents over his wife's objection; one-half of a fund the husband established by liquidating marital assets and spending for his own purposes while contemplating divorce; and one-half of the amount he spent to support his parents who lived with him after he abandoned his wife. Id. at 505'06.

Wadhwa v. Sethi

In the New Jersey Appellate Division's recent, unpublished, opinion Wadhwa v. Sethi, the court follows Kothari's factor review and thoroughly discussed dissipation claims. The Wadwa court noted that where one spouse has “dissipated the marital assets, or otherwise disposed of them in fraud of the other,” a court properly imposes a debt on the dissipating “spouse in favor of the other.” WL 1748430, at *2 (App. Div. 2013), citing Kothari v. Kothari , 255 N.J. Super. 500, 510 (App. Div. 1992). In Wadhwa, the Appellate Division detailed that “in determining that defendant dissipated $355,350 between March 2005 and December 2009, the judge identified the ultimate question, articulated in Kothari, presented by a dissipation case: whether the assets were expended by one spouse with the intent to diminish the others ' share of the marital estate.” Id. (Emphasis added.)

The Wadhwa court noted that that trial judge properly identified the factors relevant to a dissipation inquiry: 1) proximity to separation; 2) whether the expenditure was typical of those made prior to the breakdown of the marriage; 3) whether the expenditure benefited one party to the exclusion of the other; and 4) the need for and amount of the expenditure.” Wadhwa v. Sethi, 2013 WL 1748430, at *8 (App. Div. 2013).

In the States

A review of case law throughout the United States acknowledges that courts all allocate debt created by a dissipation similar to New Jersey courts, and that they have come up with “three different remedies for asset-related misconduct: fraudulent conveyance, unequal division, and classification as marital property.” Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property ' 6:102 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.).

The first remedy for dissipation identified by a review of national case law is the unequal division of the remaining assets in the marital estate. Turner, ' 6:104 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.). An unequal division will cover all different types of dissipation, for the court can grant relief in cases of waste and concealment, as well as fraudulent conveyance. Id.

The second remedy when a marital asset is conveyed to a third person is the employment of the state's relevant fraudulent conveyance statute. Id. A fraudulent conveyance is defined in N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a) or (b). Review whether the “transfer or incurred obligation [was made]: 1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation. Equitable distribution statutes generally do not give the court express authority to retract fraudulent conveyances; however, state courts have little difficulty concluding that such rescission falls within the inherent equitable powers of courts in divorce actions. Ibid ., citing Shah v. Shah , 270 Ga. 649 (1999) (although damages cannot be awarded); In re Marriage of Frederick, 218 Ill. App. 3d 533 (2d Dist. 1991) (rescinding conveyance into irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children); Mayes v. Stewart , 11 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2000); Nevitt v. Nevitt , 155 Vt. 391 (1990) (rescinding conveyance to the husband's mother).

The requirements of fraudulent conveyance statutes vary from state to state but the provisions are similar in that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. A conveyance to a third party generally qualifies as fraudulent if the innocent party shows either that: 1) both the transferor and the transferee had actual fraudulent intent; or 2) the transfer was made without substantial consideration and it rendered the conveying spouse insolvent (having greater liabilities than assets). Turner, ' 6:102 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.), citing, e.g., Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Westlaw 2005). But cf. Gaudio v. Gaudio , 23 Conn. App. 287, 580 A.2d 1212 (1990) (any conveyance of a marital asset without substantial consideration is per se fraudulent).

'Existing Marital Property'

The last remedy employed by courts when marital assets are dissipated in anticipation of divorce, is that the dissipated assets are treated as if they were existing marital property, i.e., “they are then constructively awarded to the dissipating spouse as part of that spouse's share of the marital estate.” Turner, ' 6:105 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.). If there are insufficient tangible assets remaining in the marital estate to compensate the innocent spouse, the court may order the dissipating spouse to pay a monetary award. Id. See, e.g., Monte v. Monte , supra, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 567-68 (App. Div.1986); Goldberg v. Goldberg , 172 A.D.2d 316, (1st Dep't 1991).

However, where viable marital assets exist to satisfy the dissipation, a monetary award is not required. Ibid . The court may instead simply treat the dissipation as a factor to be considered in dividing the other marital assets. Turner, supra, at ' 6:105 (3d. ed. 2014 Supp.); see also In re Marriage of Durante, 201 Ill. App. 3d 376 (1st Dist. 1990); Cofer v. Price-Cofer , 825 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1992).

Courts in equitable distribution states now remedy asset-related misconduct such as dissipation of a joint marital asset with remedies such as a finding of fraudulent conveyance, rendering an unequal division of the remaining marital estate, classifying property that was dissipated as marital property, and also rendering a money judgment against the dissipating spouse in favor of the other spouse. See Mir v. Birjandi, 2007 WL 4170868 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007); Pride v. Pride , 318 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App. 1958); Swisher v. Swishe , 190 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App. 1945).

Analysis

All of the aforementioned approaches strive to deter spouses from engaging in dissipation, in addition to the possibility of burdening them with special interrogatories, notice to produce, subpoena of records, depositions, joinder of third party, third-party discovery, and the obligation to incur the total financial loss resulting from the dissipation.

New Jersey has Case Information Statements (CIS), which disclose the full finances of each party. N.J.C.R. 5:5-2. In fact, full and fair disclosure is required, and there is an obligation to update a CIS consistently as the divorce matter progresses. Id. In addition, marital dissipation will be looked at within the context of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, and it is highly unethical ever to allow a client to hide or deliberately diminish the value of an asset, or perpetrate a fraud on the opposing party. N.J.R.P.C. 1.16 states that a lawyer must discontinue representation of a client that “persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.” N.J.R.P.C. 1.16.

Further, an attorney may not knowingly submit a CIS as complete, when s/he knows it is not, and all clients are required to certify and sign their CIS's to certify to its truth and veracity. A client who seeks to lie about assets must cease and desist at first advice from his or her counsel, or the attorney must stop representation of the client. Ibid. While attorneys are not required to audit their clients, they cannot participate in facilitating a dissipation of marital assets/income.

Conclusion

Proper and sufficient discovery must occur to trace dissipated assets and meet your initial burden. To prepare a case with these issues, a number of actions must be considered by the matrimonial practitioner. The use of a forensic accountant to trace the dissipated assets, and prepare a report setting forth the claim, may also be necessary depending on the nature and extent of the dissipation.

Gerard Giannetti, a forensic accountant, points out that, “Another form of dissipation is when a spouse 'parks' assets in either a friend, family or business name, and retrieves them after the final judgment of divorce is issued. An example of that practice is when a spouse works in a closely held business and has the ability to instruct management to withhold stock or options that are due to the spouse and have those assets or income 'parked' off the martial books until such time as the spouse seeks to retrieve them. These assets would normally be part of equitable distribution or would be considered compensation for alimony. It is imperative for the forensic accountant to review all employment documents and filings when stock, options or any other form of equity payment can be made to an employee/partner.”

Lynne Strober, a member of this newsletter's Board of Editors, chairs the Family Law Department of Mandelbaum Salsburg, P.C. She is a former Chair of the NJSBA Family Law Section, Former Chair of the Essex County Family Law Executive Committee and former Chair of the Supreme Court Matrimonial Certification Committee as well as a former member of the Supreme Court Board on Attorney Certification. Jennifer Presti is an associate with the firm. The authors thank Gerard Giannetti, a forensic accountant with Giannetti & Assoc., who contributed to this article.