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New York Federal Court Dismisses Copyright Plaintiff's Suit Against Former Lawyers
In 2003, Carla Boone sued artists Fabolous and Pharrell Williams and related entities by alleging the defendants' song rap song “Young'n (Holla Back)” infringed on the song “Holla Back” to which Boone's company had the rights. At the New York federal district court level, Boone was represented by what today are two firms: Codispoti & Associates and Mancinelli & Associates. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted pre-trial summary judgment for the Fabolous defendants. The district court determined: ” The presence of the phrase 'holla back,' rapped in an eighth note, eighth note, quarter note rhythmic pattern in the hook of each song is too common to be protectable.” Boone v. Jackson, 03 CV 8661 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Boone represented herself pro se on appeal; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Boone v. Jackson, 206 Fed. Appx. 30 (2d. Cir. 2006). In 2015, Boone sued her former lawyers in the Southern District, including by alleging fraud. She claimed the lawyers falsely led her “to believe that a [j]ury [t]rial would occur,” that they knew or should have known most copyright infringement cases don't reach the trial stage. District Judge Lorna G. Schofield dismissed Boone's suit against the lawyers. First, District Judge Schofield noted that “the statements about the likelihood of defeating summary judgment and obtaining a jury trial were 'mere expression[s] of future expectations' that did not constitute actionable fraud.” The district judge went on to find that, even if Boone's claim was analyzed as one for malpractice, “the Complaint fails to allege negligence as it 'essentially alleges ' an “error of judgment”' '.” In any case, a malpractice claim would be time-barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations. “Here,” Judge Schofield observed, “Defendants ceased their representation of Plaintiff after the Copyright Action was dismissed by Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 30, 2005, and therefore any claim for legal malpractice against Defendants accrued by that date.” Boone v. Codispoti & Associates P.C., 15 Civ. 01391. '
The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, found no procedural bar to actress Nicollette Sheridan's retaliation claim over her firing from the TV series Desperate Housewives. Sheridan v. Touchstone Television Productions LLC, B254489. Sheridan claimed she was fired after complaining to the series' production company that show creator Marc Cherry hit her during a discussion about an episode script at a rehearsal in 2008. Sheridan filed a wrongful termination suit in L.A. Superior Court alleging violation of public policy. Following a mistrial, the court of appeal ordered the trial court to grant a directed verdict in favor of Touchstone but allowed Sheridan to amend her complaint to state a claim under California Labor Code '6310 for being fired for objecting to unsafe employment conditions. But in November 2013, the trial court dismissed Sheridan's suit by granting Touchstone's demurrer that she should have filed her '6310 complaint with the California Labor Commissioner. Meanwhile, in October 2013, the state legislature had amended the Labor Code to limit when a complaining party must file an administrative claim before filing a civil suit. Reversing the demurrer grant, the court of appeal noted of prior sections of the Labor Code: “The plain language of sections 6312 and 98.7 before the 2013 amendments did not require exhaustion. Both stated that a person who believed that he or she had been discriminated against in violation of the relevant Labor Code provisions 'may,' not 'shall,' file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner or the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.” The court added: “Given that exhaustion was not required under the pre-2013 versions of sections 6312 and 98.7, the 2013 enactment of section 244, subdivision (a) and section 98.7 subdivision (g), merely clarified existing law. Thus, those enactments apply to Sheridan's lawsuit.”
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