Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
The interplay between ” 363(f) and 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code continues to plague various courts. This article explores several recent decisions evaluating whether a tenant's rights under ' 365(h) survive a sale of the debtor's assets free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances pursuant to section 363(f). In many cases, the issue boils down to the language of ' 363(f), which permits a sale “free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate ' .” Courts have grappled with the question of whether the phrase “any interest” in the context of a real property sale includes not only fee interests, security interests and other ownership interests, but also a tenant's possessory right under ' 365(h). Some courts have construed the broad language of “any interest” to encompass leasehold interests and thus have determined that ' 363(f) trumps ' 365(h), permitting debtors and trustees to sell real property free and clear of leasehold interests. Other courts have reached different conclusions.
In the Courts
In the lone circuit court decision that has dealt with the issue, Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that there was no conflict, holding that ” 365(h) and 363(f) “apply to distinct sets of circumstances.” Id. at 547. The Qualitech court reconciled the alleged conflict by stating that the terms of ' 363(f) apply when a trustee or a debtor-in-possession seeks to sell property of which it is a lessor, whereas ' 365(h) only deals with the assumption or rejection of unexpired leases of real property. By contrast, the district court in Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), recently reconciled these apparently conflicting Bankruptcy Code sections differently. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, which authorized a sale of real property pursuant to ' 363(f), but also permitted the existing tenant to remain in possession of the premises under ' 365(h) after the purchase (i.e., the sale was not free and clear of the lease).
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.