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It is a fact pattern common to asbestos-related lawsuits: A plaintiff recalls generally working around different products that may or may not have contained asbestos, but cannot pinpoint specific time periods or locations where those products were present and could have exposed the plaintiff to asbestos. Typically, the alleged exposure occurred three or more decades ago, with no potential corroborating documents or witnesses surviving to the present date. This scenario places defendants in the untenable position of defending a claim without access to any information on the products, or the alleged exposure, that will either confirm or deny that the identified products were both present in the plaintiff's workplace and actually contained asbestos.
Recognizing this issue, some courts have attempted to delineate standards requiring that plaintiffs make at least a threshold showing of their exposure to products manufactured or supplied by the defendant in order to avoid summary judgment. However, the standards may differ from one jurisdiction to another, bringing questions of venue and choice of law back to the forefront of these lawsuits.
In the recent case of Feaster v. A.W. Chesterton Company, No. 14-3417, 2015 WL 9308341 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2015), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey tackled two distinct questions on this front. First, should maritime law apply to the claim for asbestos exposure, or should New Jersey law govern? Second, based on the governing standard, was defendant General Electric entitled to summary judgment?
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This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
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