Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Thirty years after its introduction, the absolute pollution exclusion continues to be the subject of vigorous litigation, recently reaching the supreme courts of Vermont and Georgia. In December 2015, the Vermont Supreme Court issued its decision in Whitney v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co., No. 2015-073, 2015 WL 8540432 (Vt. Dec. 11, 2015), in which it refused to limit the absolute pollution exclusion to “traditional” environmental claims. Many had wondered whether the Georgia Supreme Court would follow suit, which it did in its recent ruling in Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. S15G1177, 2016 WL 1085397 (Ga. Mar. 21, 2016), reaffirming its earlier determination that the exclusion is not subject to a limiting gloss arising out of its original purpose of reinforcing the earlier qualified pollution exclusion. Cf. Reed v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 284 Ga. 286 (2008). Indeed, both cases find that the injury-causing agent falls within the definition of a “pollutant.”
1. VT Finds Absolute Pollution Clause Not Inherently Ambiguous
In Whitney v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co., the Vermont Supreme Court was asked to consider the application of the absolute pollution exclusion to property damage allegedly caused by a pesticide application. The pollution exclusion in Whitney matches the typical one, excluding coverage for “bodily injury” or “property damage” “arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants,'” which are defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” Whitney v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2015-073, 2015 WL 8540432, *1-2 (Vt. 2015).
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?