Verdicts

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se , brought suit against the hospital in April 2013. She later obtained counsel. The gist of the plaintiff's suit was that her vision capabilities were compromised as a result of oxygen deprivation during her respiratory arrest, which was, she claimed, the fault of her nurses, who purportedly had not properly monitored her condition post-operatively. The plaintiff contended that her bleeding occurred over the course of several hours and was a slow-developing hematoma, while the hospital argued that the bleeding occurred acutely and that the nursing staff noticed it quickly and responded appropriately.

The plaintiff's treating physician, critical care specialist Dr. Robert Searcy, was deposed on Nov.19, 2014, after the discovery deadline had passed. Three weeks later, the plaintiff's attorney amended the expert-witness designations to include Dr. Searcy. The defendant hospital soon filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Searcy's expert testimony, while the plaintiff filed similar motions to exclude two of her other treating physicians from providing expert testimony on behalf of the defense. The trial court heard the parties' motions and concluded that all three physicians would be permitted to testify only as fact witnesses, and not as experts.

After trial, a jury found for the defense, which lead to this appeal in which the plaintiff claimed the trial court abused its discretion by limiting Dr. Searcy's testimony without providing any reasoning on the record. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion, as Dr. Searcy had not been timely disclosed as an expert, and he expressly testified under oath that he did not intend to come to trial and give expert opinions. In addition, the court had ruled similarly as to the testimony of the two other treating physicians whom the defense had wanted to call as experts.

Further, the fact that the defense had listed Dr. Searcy as one of its possible expert witnesses in court filings made prior to the close of discovery did not mean he could opine for the plaintiff. The court explained that it understood that that action was taken by the defense prophylactically: “Dr. Searcy had already been disclosed as a fact witness by [plaintiff], but Baptist had been unable to depose Dr. Searcy despite asking for the opportunity to do so for five months prior to the discovery deadline. Due to Rule 35 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, counsel for Baptist was prohibited from any ex parte communication with Dr. Searcy regarding his treatment of [plaintiff] without her express consent. Therefore, Baptist's counsel explained that, without knowing what Dr. Searcy might say or be willing to say, Baptist ' out of an abundance of caution ' characterized him as an expert just prior to the deadline.” The court agreed with the hospital that its prior designation of Dr. Searcy as an expert witness was of “no moment.”

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