Personal Jurisdiction Roundup

For example, in a music sampling litigation alleging misappropriation and unjust enrichment, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled this summer that distribution activity by an affiliate of defendant UMG Recordings, part of the world's largest music company, didn't create a “substantial connection” between UMG and Illinois for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction (i.e., that arising out of the facts in the case). The district court was satisfied by a UMG affidavit that “avers that UMG and UMGCS [distributor UMG Commercial Services] have the same corporate parent, but they operate separately from each other ' in particular, UMG neither owns nor controls UMGCS.” The court added that plaintiff Syl Johnson “offers no evidence of geographically-focused targeting that could subject UMG to personal jurisdiction on the basis of its alleged online sales.” Johnson v. Barrier, 15-CV-03928.

By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee ruled in July that it had specific personal jurisdiction over the company that releases online albums of musical performances from the now-defunct Bottom Line nightclub in New York City. See, Ian v. Bottom Line Record Co., 3:16-cv-00187. Tennessee-based artist Janis Ian filed a copyright infringement and right of publicity suit over the alleged unauthorized online release of some of her Bottom Line performances. The district court found: “The allegations that Bottom Line maintains a website where it can sell the allegedly-infringing material to residents of Tennessee is likely insufficient, by itself, for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Bottom Line without allegations that residents of Tennessee have actually bought the allegedly-infringing material. ' However, the running of the website coupled with Bottom Line's attorneys negotiating and executing a contract via telephone calls, emails, and letters to Ian and her attorneys in Tennessee, is sufficient activity toward Tennessee to constitute purposeful availment.”