Case Notes

According to Judge Nervo's decision, Ivana Trump received a settlement of $10 million, plus $350,000 annually, and agreed that she would not disclose information about the marriage or 1990 divorce. The movants argued, however, that both Donald and Ivana Trump have spoken at length of their marriage and divorce since that time. Despite this, Judge Nervo saw no reason to undo the agreement, particularly as Ivana might be adversely affected by the unsealing of the records.

The judge stated, “If the court were to deprive the candidate party of his rights under the agreement and the statute on the ground that there may be something in the confidential file that would be useful in determining his fitness for office, that ground does not exist in the case of his former wife, who is not a candidate.” The judge continued: “Were the court to make the confidential records available for journalistic, and thus public, scrutiny, it would impermissibly inject itself into the political process by making the value judgment of what information is useful in determining the present candidate's, or any other candidate's, fitness for office. The court's role in the electoral process is strictly limited to determining whether a candidate complies with the Election Law. The court will not take an action that exceeds that limitation.”

NJ Alimony Reduction Amendments May Be Applied Retroactively

In an Oct. 7 ruling in the case of Mills. v. Mills, Ocean County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones declared that the New Jersey legislature's alimony reduction statute amendments could be applied retroactively. The law in question, New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 2A:34-23(k), allows a court to reduce alimony obligations based upon changed circumstances. However, it only went into effect in September 2014, saying nothing about whether it should be applied only prospectively. Therefore, law practitioners and litigants were left uncertain as to whether the amended law could be used to alter alimony payments in cases concluded prior to September 2014.

The Mills case involved a couple married 13 years, with children aged 13 and 11 at the time of divorce. The husband was making $108,000 a year, and the wife $59,000. In their settlement, the husband agreed to pay the wife $330 per week in limited-duration alimony, as well as $200 in weekly child support. In January 2015, the husband was laid off, but he did receive $35,000 in severance pay. In April 2015 the husband secured a new position, but with pay, perks and bonuses, he was earning just $82,000 per year. Using the $35,000 severance pay, the husband was able to keep up his alimony payments for a time, but when this fund ran out he sought reduction in his obligations.

Judge Jones relied primarily on two things in deciding that the husband could take advantage of the alimony-reduction amendments: First, that it was reasonable that he accepted the lower-paying job under the circumstances and, second, that an adjustment in alimony would be fair and reasonable to both parties. “For many people, the harsh, present-day reality is that once they lose a position, they may never return to a similar income, no matter how diligently they try,” Jones said. That is what had happened in Mills, the court determined, and since the legislature had not explicitly said that the amendments should only be applied prospectively, there was no fair reason not to do so. Alimony was therefore reduced to $250 per week, and child support to $194 per week.

Conviction Upheld: Divorced Man Threatened to 'Kill and Eat' Judge and His Family

A man who threatened a judge and his family because he was unhappy with the outcome of his matrimonial action was unsuccessful in reversing his conviction, as the gun evidence admitted at trial, though not elemental to the charges, showed the defendant's intent to carry through with his threats. Satterfield v. The States, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 570 (10/19/16).

James Satterfield was divorced in mid-2012 in a Georgia court overseen by a judge whom he later threatened. On Nov. 30, 2012, Satterfield told a professional counselor at a counseling center that he wanted to kill the judge and/or the judge's family. The counselor reported this threat to the authorities and the judge was informed of this by the following day. On Dec. 30, 2012, the judge received a rambling, five-page typed letter containing threats to the judge and his family, most of them veiled by Satterfield in phrases that indicated “others” besides himself had been maltreated by the judge and these “others” were likely to do harm to the judge and his family.

He also stated in the letter, however, that he was planning to harm the family himself and that he was going to give all of his possessions away first in preparation for doing this. Satterfield was apprehended at his ex-wife's home and the van he had parked outside was searched, revealing a revolver. His bank account of more than $70,000 had recently been nearly emptied. Satterfield was convicted on three counts of making terroristic threats and two counts of terroristic threats with intent to retaliate against a judge.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, the defendant objected to the introduction of the revolver into evidence, claiming it was not relevant to the charges against him and that even if it was relevant, the gun evidence was significantly more prejudicial than probative. The appeals court found that the gun evidence was not “extrinsic” evidence — i.e., evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” which are subject to the admissibility requirements of Georgia law — but “intrinsic.” Evidence is “intrinsic,” said the court, “'if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.'” Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 727 (2), n. 11 (783 SE2d 895) (2016), quoting United States v. Utter, 97 F3d 509, 513 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 1996). “Here,” stated the court, “at the time that Satterfield was arrested, the evidence of the gun, the gun box, and the ammunition strongly suggests that Satterfield was in the process of executing the steps outlined in the Dec. 30, 2012, letter in that he was disposing of his assets and arming himself to follow through on his plan to murder the judge's family, motivated by revenge. Accordingly, at a minimum, the gun and related evidence were inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offenses and therefore relevant to the charges against Satterfield.”

News Agencies Wanted Trump's Divorce Records: Judge Said 'No'

Manhattan Supreme Court Judge Frank Nervo recently issued a decision denying The New York Times' and Gannet Co., Inc.'s motion to unseal the divorce records of Donald and Ivana Trump. The journalism organizations argued in their August 2016 motion papers that the public had a right to know what went on in the divorce proceedings because it would shed light on Mr. Trump's credibility, finances and treatment of women, among other things.

Under New York law, the records of matrimonial proceedings are sealed as a matter of course. They can be unsealed by judicial order in appropriate cases, according to Domestic Relations Law (DRL) Section 235(1). The movants pointed out that some courts nationwide have unsealed the divorce proceeding records of political candidates, and they pressed the court to do the same in this instance, in the public interest. Ultimately, they claimed, the knowledge of the workings of the Trump marriage and divorce would help American voters to decide whether they wanted to elect Mr. Trump to the presidency.

According to Judge Nervo's decision, Ivana Trump received a settlement of $10 million, plus $350,000 annually, and agreed that she would not disclose information about the marriage or 1990 divorce. The movants argued, however, that both Donald and Ivana Trump have spoken at length of their marriage and divorce since that time. Despite this, Judge Nervo saw no reason to undo the agreement, particularly as Ivana might be adversely affected by the unsealing of the records.

The judge stated, “If the court were to deprive the candidate party of his rights under the agreement and the statute on the ground that there may be something in the confidential file that would be useful in determining his fitness for office, that ground does not exist in the case of his former wife, who is not a candidate.” The judge continued: “Were the court to make the confidential records available for journalistic, and thus public, scrutiny, it would impermissibly inject itself into the political process by making the value judgment of what information is useful in determining the present candidate's, or any other candidate's, fitness for office. The court's role in the electoral process is strictly limited to determining whether a candidate complies with the Election Law. The court will not take an action that exceeds that limitation.”

NJ Alimony Reduction Amendments May Be Applied Retroactively

In an Oct. 7 ruling in the case of Mills. v. Mills, Ocean County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones declared that the New Jersey legislature's alimony reduction statute amendments could be applied retroactively. The law in question, New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 2A:34-23(k), allows a court to reduce alimony obligations based upon changed circumstances. However, it only went into effect in September 2014, saying nothing about whether it should be applied only prospectively. Therefore, law practitioners and litigants were left uncertain as to whether the amended law could be used to alter alimony payments in cases concluded prior to September 2014.

The Mills case involved a couple married 13 years, with children aged 13 and 11 at the time of divorce. The husband was making $108,000 a year, and the wife $59,000. In their settlement, the husband agreed to pay the wife $330 per week in limited-duration alimony, as well as $200 in weekly child support. In January 2015, the husband was laid off, but he did receive $35,000 in severance pay. In April 2015 the husband secured a new position, but with pay, perks and bonuses, he was earning just $82,000 per year. Using the $35,000 severance pay, the husband was able to keep up his alimony payments for a time, but when this fund ran out he sought reduction in his obligations.

Judge Jones relied primarily on two things in deciding that the husband could take advantage of the alimony-reduction amendments: First, that it was reasonable that he accepted the lower-paying job under the circumstances and, second, that an adjustment in alimony would be fair and reasonable to both parties. “For many people, the harsh, present-day reality is that once they lose a position, they may never return to a similar income, no matter how diligently they try,” Jones said. That is what had happened in Mills, the court determined, and since the legislature had not explicitly said that the amendments should only be applied prospectively, there was no fair reason not to do so. Alimony was therefore reduced to $250 per week, and child support to $194 per week.

Conviction Upheld: Divorced Man Threatened to 'Kill and Eat' Judge and His Family

A man who threatened a judge and his family because he was unhappy with the outcome of his matrimonial action was unsuccessful in reversing his conviction, as the gun evidence admitted at trial, though not elemental to the charges, showed the defendant's intent to carry through with his threats. Satterfield v. The States, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 570 (10/19/16).

James Satterfield was divorced in mid-2012 in a Georgia court overseen by a judge whom he later threatened. On Nov. 30, 2012, Satterfield told a professional counselor at a counseling center that he wanted to kill the judge and/or the judge's family. The counselor reported this threat to the authorities and the judge was informed of this by the following day. On Dec. 30, 2012, the judge received a rambling, five-page typed letter containing threats to the judge and his family, most of them veiled by Satterfield in phrases that indicated “others” besides himself had been maltreated by the judge and these “others” were likely to do harm to the judge and his family.

He also stated in the letter, however, that he was planning to harm the family himself and that he was going to give all of his possessions away first in preparation for doing this. Satterfield was apprehended at his ex-wife's home and the van he had parked outside was searched, revealing a revolver. His bank account of more than $70,000 had recently been nearly emptied. Satterfield was convicted on three counts of making terroristic threats and two counts of terroristic threats with intent to retaliate against a judge.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, the defendant objected to the introduction of the revolver into evidence, claiming it was not relevant to the charges against him and that even if it was relevant, the gun evidence was significantly more prejudicial than probative. The appeals court found that the gun evidence was not “extrinsic” evidence — i.e. , evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” which are subject to the admissibility requirements of Georgia law — but “intrinsic.” Evidence is “intrinsic,” said the court, “'if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.'” Brooks v. State , 298 Ga. 722, 727 (2), n. 11 (783 SE2d 895) (2016), quoting United States v. Utter , 97 F3d 509, 513 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 1996). “Here,” stated the court, “at the time that Satterfield was arrested, the evidence of the gun, the gun box, and the ammunition strongly suggests that Satterfield was in the process of executing the steps outlined in the Dec. 30, 2012, letter in that he was disposing of his assets and arming himself to follow through on his plan to murder the judge's family, motivated by revenge. Accordingly, at a minimum, the gun and related evidence were inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offenses and therefore relevant to the charges against Satterfield.”