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Editor's Note: Last month, the authors noted with dismay the fact that the Connecticut Supreme Court is currently considering whether the state should abandon its traditional strict product liability standard for design defect claims and replace it with section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which requires plaintiffs to prove the manufacturer's foreseeability of harm, and prove the effectiveness of a reasonable alternative design in order to recover damages for product-caused injuries. See Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc. (FEDB-CV-060001768-S (Connecticut Supreme Court docket for Bifolck); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability § 2(b) (Am. Law Inst.). They conclude their discussion herein.
Fifty Years of Design Defect Jurisprudence Dismantled?
The test proposed in section 2(b) requires the court to sever design defect claims from their strict product liability roots, cut ties with the public policy supporting its holding in Potter (Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199 (1997)), and rebalance protection of the innocent consumer with the financial interests of manufacturers. Section 2(b) adopts principles of negligence for design defect claims. Comments to this section explain that the test “for products that are defectively designed or sold … achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence.” See Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability § 3 cmt. a. In addition, there is the requirement that a plaintiff must prove a reasonable alternative design, and its effectiveness.
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