Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Last month, we began our discussion of what constitutes a good-faith defense to a fraudulent transfer claim with an initial examination of the recent Sixth Circuit opinion in Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (Feb. 8, 2017). We continue the analysis this month by focusing on sub-issues presented in Meoli, including the question of notice, the proper test of good faith, and an analysis of whether banks may be considered “transferees” with respect to ordinary bank deposits. In addition, we discuss a recent Ninth Circuit preference decision that offers a mistaken analysis of the transfer issue.
Meoli
In Meoli, the trustee, sought to recover fraudulent transfers of funds from the debtor, T, to a bank that lent money to, and maintained the deposits of, another company, C, which had created T to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme. As a part of the scheme, C and T moved the fraud's proceeds between their bank accounts.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.