Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
What should you do when you become aware of the existence of a third party patent that claims subject matter possibly related to your company's product? If you take no action to timely investigate the patent, and the product is subsequently held to infringe the patent at trial, the company may be at risk of a court finding that the infringement was willful and assessing enhanced damages. To mitigate this risk, “the law of willful infringement … requires prudent, ethical, legal and commercial actions” on which basis “a prudent person would have had sound reason to believe that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would be so held if litigated.” SIR International, Inc. v. Advanced Technology Laboratories, Inc., 127 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Written opinions of counsel are gaining renewed interest as a valuable tool to limit liability for willful patent infringement. A patent opinion that is competently written by a registered patent attorney sets forth the factual and legal basis for finding a patent not infringed, invalid, and/or unenforceable. Although a patent opinion is not required to unequivocally state that the patent is not infringed, invalid, and/or unenforceable, the opinion must be reasonable and prudent. However, to be effective, the timing of the rendered patent opinion may be critical.
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1923, making it easier for courts to find willful infringement in patent cases and award enhanced damages. Prior to Halo, district courts were guided by the so-called Seagate test in which plaintiff patent holders had to “show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Plaintiff patent holders also had to prove that the risk of infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Thus, under the Seagate test, an infringer could effectively escape a court finding willful infringement by constructing an objectively reasonable infringement defense at the time of trial — even if the infringer was unaware of these defenses upon becoming aware, or being put on notice, of the potential infringement.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?