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In a case in which a pedestrian sued the lessor and lessee of commercial real property for failure to remove snow and ice, allegedly causing him injury, the court dismissed the causes of action because the remote landlord had contracted to have the lessee remove snow and the lessee's promise to remove snow did not create a duty on its part to protect the passing pedestrian. Lawrence v. 239 E. 115th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 879 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 3/12/18).
Landlord 239 East 115th Street Housing Development Fund Corp. leased the premises at 2032 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY, to JNS, which operated a business there. During the course of the lease, plaintiff William Lawrence slipped and fell in front of the premises and sued both lessor and lessee for failure to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk.
The lease required JNS to remove snow and ice, so the landlord moved to dismiss the action against it, based on the fact that it had not only contracted away any responsibility for removing snow, it was also an out-of-possession landlord and so did not owe a common-law duty to the plaintiff to remove naturally accumulated snow. The court noted that New York City Administrative Code section 7-210 imposes a duty on real property owners to keep their properties and abutting sidewalks in reasonably safe condition, which includes keeping them free of snow and ice (see, McKenzie v. City of New York, 116 A.D.3d 526 (1st Dept. 2014). Further, the duties imposed by section 7-210 have been held non-delegable. Cook v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 51 A.D.3d 447 (1st Dept. 2008). However, in a more recent case, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, held that a remote landlord who has contracted to keep the sidewalks clear is not responsible, unless it affirmatively does something else to create a dangerous condition, for damages for injuries caused by snow or ice on the pavement adjacent to its property because snow and ice do not constitute a “significant structural or design defect.” Xiang Fu He v. Troon Mgmt. Inc., 157 A.D.3d 586 (1st Dept. 2018), citing Bing v. 296 Third Ave. Group, 94 A.D.3d 413 (1st Dept. 2012) (holding landlord not responsible for snow removal where lease held tenant responsible for same).
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