Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
|
On September 7, the Federal Circuit made clear that an IPR petitioner always retains the burden of establishing the timeliness of its petition, and that the burden never formally shifts to the patent holder; not even to identify a real party in interest. More specifically, in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., Nos. 2017-1481, 2017-1546 & 2017-1583 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2018), slip op. Chief Judge Prost reiterated that an IPR petitioner “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its petitions are not time-barred” because of a complaint previously served on a real party in interest. Slip. Op. at 8-9 (“the timely filing of a petition … is a condition precedent to the Director's authority to act”). The court then outlined the procedure for analyzing that issue, rejecting any formal “presumption” in favor of the petitioner, and instead mandating that the PTO Board make all “factual determinations necessary to evaluate” the issue once a sufficient question is raised by the patent holder. Id. at 15.
Worlds grew out of a dispute related to computer-generated avatars. In 2012, Worlds filed suit against Activision Publishing, Inc. (Activision) in the District of Massachusetts, alleging that Activision infringed Worlds's avatar-related patents in certain of its video games, including Call of Duty. Id. at 2. In 2014, Worlds notified Activision that it intended to add another video game series — Destiny — as an additional accused product in the litigation. See, id. at 2-3. The Destiny games were distributed by Activision, but developed by Bungie, Inc. (Bungie), which was not a party to the district court suit.
Roughly six months later (and more than two years after Activision was served in the district court litigation), Bungie filed IPR petitions challenging Worlds's patents. Id. at 3. Worlds quickly sought discovery in IPR, “requesting information regarding whether Activision should have been named as a real party in interest to the proceedings, … making the petitions time barred under 35 U.S.C. §315(b).” Id. According to Worlds, a development agreement between Activision and Bungie required Activision to “review and approv[e]” all “legal reviews” of the video game products, and that likely meant Activision “had the opportunity to control the IPRs, making [it] a real party in interest.” Id. at 13. The Board was unconvinced, and denied the motion for discovery, as well as Worlds's substantive real party in interest arguments. Ultimately (at least in view of Chief Judge Prost), the Board simply took Bungie's (and its counsel's) word, and accepted their interpretation of the development agreement at face value. That, the court held, was error.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that the Board cannot “merely rely” on the petitioner's identification of the real parties in interest. Neither can the Board place the burden on the patent holder to identify all real parties in interest. Instead, the Board must follow a “flexible” procedure that allows for the weighing of evidence, but keeps the burden of persuasion on the petitioner. Still, that procedure must begin with the “patent owner … produc[ing] some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named as a real party in interest.” Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original). While the court did not clarify the “quantum of support” needed to meet that threshold, it did note that, on one hand, “[a] mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support …, is insufficient,” and that, on the other hand, Worlds did “more than enough” (by pointing, in particular, to the development agreement's language and the fact that Bungie initiated IPR shortly after the Destiny games were added to the district court litigation) to put the “issue into dispute” below Id. at 12 n. 8. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the Board for a full evaluation of the real-party-in-interest matter, with an appropriate weighing of evidence, and deference to the court's recent rulings on that issue (including in Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 2018) and Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), both of which provided guidance on Section 315(b) determinations).
|On September 17, the Federal Circuit issued another opinion discussing burden shifts during IPR, and held, for the first time, that the general framework for “overlapping range cases” also applies in IPR. See, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., No. 2017-1977 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2018), slip. op. DuPont involved a challenge to Synvina's '921 patent, which described a method of creating an increasingly valuable form of dicarboxylic acid (specifically, FDCA). DuPont instituted IPR, claiming the various claims of the '921 patent were obvious, as they mostly involved adjustments to the “temperature, pressure, catalyst, and solvent” of prior art. The Board held that the instituted claims were not un-patentable as obvious. In doing so, the Board “rejected DuPont's contention that a burden-shifting framework applied,” and found that, even though the prior art “disclosed [a method] under reaction conditions that overlapped with those claimed in the '921 patent,” none of the references “expressly taught a process” in the precise range of the '921 patent. Slip Op. at 9-10.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit (after rejecting Synvina's argument that DuPont lacked standing), ruled that the Board erred in its analysis, and reversed the Board's conclusion. According to Judge Lourie, the Board misapplied (or ignored) a set of “old” legal principles, which had routinely been applied in district court litigation (if not IPR), and stood for the proposition that, “where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation”; “it is to be expected that a change in temperature, or in concentration, or in both, would be an unpatentable modification.” Id. at 15-16 (quotations omitted). Thus, where the “ranges of a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art,” that “overlap creates a presumption of obviousness,” id. at 16 — a presumption that the patentee must overcome through the evidence of “teaching away, unexpected results, or other pertinent evidence of nonobviousness.” Id. at 17, 20.
The Board failed to follow that procedure, and then came to the wrong result. It incorrectly required DuPont “to prove that the disclosures in the prior art 'necessarily required' the variable to be within the claimed range, or that the variables 'predictably affected FDCA yields.'” Id. at 22. That placed an inappropriate burden on DuPont; under the correct approach, all Dupont had to do was “show that it was recognized in the prior art, either expressly or implicitly, that the claimed oxidation reaction was affected by reaction temperature and PO2.” Id. On review of the evidence submitted at IPR, the court held that DuPont had done exactly that, and thus concluded that temperature and PO2 were result-effective variables (i.e., the prior art recognized them as potential variables which would affect the method's results), which made the challenged claims in the '921 patent obvious. See, id. at 16, 22-23. The Board was simply wrong to say there “was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between” temperature, PO2, and the claimed oxidation reaction.” See, id. There was, in fact, such a disclosure — and neither Synvina, nor the prior patent holder, did enough to rebut the resulting presumption in any sufficient way. Id. at 26. They did not, for example, establish unexpected results or show how the patent changed the method to a “commercial scale” process. Id. at 28. Ultimately, the court reversed the Board, and held that the challenged claims were obvious from the prior art and unpatentable.
*****
Howard J. Shire is Editor-in-Chief of this newsletter and a Partner in the New York office of Pepper Hamilton, LLC. He can be reached at [email protected]. Adam B. Fischer is an associate at Pepper Hamilton in the Pittsburgh, PA office. He can be reached at [email protected].
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
In a profession where confidentiality is paramount, failing to address AI security concerns could have disastrous consequences. It is vital that law firms and those in related industries ask the right questions about AI security to protect their clients and their reputation.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, some tenants were able to negotiate termination agreements with their landlords. But even though a landlord may agree to terminate a lease to regain control of a defaulting tenant's space without costly and lengthy litigation, typically a defaulting tenant that otherwise has no contractual right to terminate its lease will be in a much weaker bargaining position with respect to the conditions for termination.
The International Trade Commission is empowered to block the importation into the United States of products that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights, In the past, the ITC generally instituted investigations without questioning the importation allegations in the complaint, however in several recent cases, the ITC declined to institute an investigation as to certain proposed respondents due to inadequate pleading of importation.
Practical strategies to explore doing business with friends and social contacts in a way that respects relationships and maximizes opportunities.
As the relationship between in-house and outside counsel continues to evolve, lawyers must continue to foster a client-first mindset, offer business-focused solutions, and embrace technology that helps deliver work faster and more efficiently.