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To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must meet the standing requirements of the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution. Foremost among these requirements is that the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact. This constitutional minimum requirement applies not only when one private party sues another but also when a private party seeks appellate-court review of a final administrative agency action, including, as relevant here, appeals from decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).
A challenger need not, however, suffer injury in fact in order to challenge the validity of a patent before the PTAB itself.
The question then arises of how, if at all, a non-injured party that challenges a patent before the PTAB and loses may then demonstrate Article III standing to appeal to the federal courts from the PTAB's decision upholding the patent's validity. We report here on two pending appeals — one at the Supreme Court and one at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit — that may soon answer this question. See, RPX v. ChanBond, No. 17-1686 (U.S.); Momenta Pharm. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 2017-1694 (Fed. Cir.).
The standing doctrine “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The “'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1547 (citations omitted).
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