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Over the past three years, one of the hottest class action litigation trends in the United States has been Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. BIPA requires entities that collect biometric information or identifiers to obtain prior written consent, provide notice of biometric privacy practices, and maintain reasonable security features to protect any collected data. Although BIPA was enacted in 2008, the law went largely unnoticed until 2016, leading many companies to unknowingly operate outside of strict compliance with the law for nearly a decade. Unfortunately, this could be a costly mistake, as BIPA provides a private right of action as well as statutory damages of up to $5,000 per violation.
At the same time, in a perfect storm for plaintiffs' attorneys, the use of biometric information grew exponentially. Aside from high-tech uses for biometric information, such as the facial recognition technology at issue in the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Patel v. Facebook Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019), employers increasingly implemented biometric finger or hand print scanners to track their employees' attendance and hours. The increased use of biometric information combined with the plaintiffs' bar's discovery of a long-neglected privacy statute with a private right of action has resulted in hundreds class action lawsuits under BIPA in the last three years. The lion's share of these lawsuits have been brought by hourly employees against their employers, or ex-employers.
The BIPA compliance lag has led companies using or collecting biometric information to consider how far back their liability may extend. The Illinois General Assembly, however, did not include an explicit statute of limitations period in BIPA, nor do claims brought under the law fit nicely into one of Illinois' prescribed statutory periods. As a result, the statute of limitations has become one of BIPA's primary battlegrounds as litigants argue about potential class sizes and damages awards.
Where a statute does not prescribe a statute of limitations period, Illinois has several default statutory limitations periods. Of these, several are arguably applicable to BIPA. Of course, plaintiffs' and defendants' views differ significantly about which statute applies, with defendants pushing for a one- or two-year period and plaintiffs seeking five years. The three limitations periods most often cited by litigants are:
In addition to the three limitations periods cited above which litigants have focused on to date, there could be an additional argument that the three-year statute of limitations period used by the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (CFA), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., could be applied to BIPA. The CFA serves as Illinois' primary consumer protection statute and a violation of several privacy laws (e.g., the Student Online Personal Protection Act and the Personal Information Privacy Act) constitutes a violation of the CFA. In addition, BIPA uses a three-year record retention period, which aligns with the CFA's limitations period. However, the potential counter argument is that, unlike the laws listed above, a violation of BIPA does not constitute a violation of the CFA and there is no direct link between the laws other than that they both are designed to protect individuals' privacy rights.
BIPA case law is, in many ways, still in its infancy. Until January 2019, most decisions focused on interpreting BIPA's private right of action, which allows "aggrieved" individuals to bring suit. Defendants argued that this standard required plaintiffs to demonstrate some type of actual harm (e.g., identity theft) beyond a technical violation of the law (e.g., neglecting to obtain the required consent). However, in January 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. In Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, 2019 IL 123186 (Ill. 2019), the court held that a technical violation of BIPA was enough to state a claim under BIPA.
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