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Through the years, the four original members of the 1960s rock band The Rascals, whose hits included "Groovin'" and "People Got To Be Free," have engaged in multiple intra-band battles over which members have the right to use the "Rascals" name for live performances. In the most recent case, arising out of a 2018 tour by keyboardist/vocalist Felix Cavaliere and guitarist Gene Cornish, Cavaliere and Cornish's touring company Beata Music filed a declaratory judgment and trademark dilution action against Rascals drummer Dino Danelli and vocalist Eddie Brigati. In 2021, District Judge John G. Koeltl of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment against Danelli. Then in January 2022, District Judge Koeltl issued a summary judgment ruling against Brigati on Brigati's counterclaims alleging breach of 1990 and 1992 settlement agreements and for a declaration that the consent of three of the four original Rascals members is required for live performance uses of the band name. Beata Music LLC v. Danelli, 18-cv-6354 (S.D.N.Y.). District Judge Koeltl found, among other things: "Because Brigati has offered no justification for failing to provide a damages calculation, and because he has not demonstrated the willingness or capability to provide evidence of damages now at the summary judgment stage, Brigati is precluded from offering any damages evidence," the district judge noted. The court added: "When the 1990 agreement was executed, Brigati had not been a performing member of the band for twenty years. The terms of the 1990 agreement address only how Danelli, Cornish, and Cavaliere may use The Rascals name. … Accordingly, Brigati is not a third-party beneficiary to the 1990 agreement and he cannot enforce that agreement.' Furthermore, the court wrote: "Brigati's contract claim with respect to the 1992 agreement also fails for the independent reason that the 1992 agreement does not address live performances and it does not supersede the 1990 agreement."
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that a "Media Exclusion" clause's use of the term "broadcasting," in a commercial general liability insurance policy that Dish Network purchased, applied to free, rather subscription-fee, TV services. DISH Network Corp. v. Ace American Insurance Co. (ACE), 20-0268. In 2012, DISH was sued by four TV networks alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement over DISH's "Hopper" digital recording device that allowed DISH customers to bypass advertisements in the networks' programming. After settling the lawsuits, DISH sued ACE to recoup expense incurred in the network litigations. The insurance policy DISH purchased from ACE covered "personal and advertising injury" claims that were the result of "[i]nfringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in [an] 'advertisement.'" But the policy's Media Exclusion clause stated that insurance coverage was excluded for "'[p]ersonal and advertising injury' committed by an insured whose business is … [a]dvertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting." (DISH didn't act on its insurance broker's recommendation to additionally purchase a "Broadcasters Errors & Omissions" policy to cover "liability as a broadcasting professional[]," including for "unintentional errors you made in advertising or programming you produced or broadcasted as a professional broadcaster.") In its duty-to-defend lawsuit against ACE, DISH argued that the term "broadcasting" in the Media Exclusion clause only applied to free programming transmissions to consumers. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed and granted summary judgment for ACE. In its affirmance, the Second Circuit noted: "DISH argues that the 'plain and ordinary' meaning of 'broadcasting' does not apply here because (1) the Policy describes its business as '[c]ommunication,' and (2) a technical or specialized definition of 'broadcasting' applies." However, the appeals court found: "DISH cites no authority for the proposition that the description of the 'Business of Insured' must be exhaustive or that it must match any other reference within the Policy to the insured's business. Entities may be involved in various businesses, and each of those businesses may be accurately described in different ways. Furthermore, DISH's argument makes no sense because broadcasting is unquestionably communication, regardless of whether a fee is charged." Thus, the appeals court concluded, "We reject DISH's invitation to discard the plain and ordinary meaning of the term 'broadcasting' in favor of its preferred definitions."
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